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Can Vermont Put the Nuclear Genie Back in 
the Bottle?: A Test of Congressional 
Preemptive Power 
Hope Babcock • 
Before the nuclear core meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
reactors in Japan restoked public anxiety about nuclear energy, Vermont's 
Senate used Vermont Act No. 160 to vote to block continued operation of the 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant after the expiration of its forty-year 
operating license. This Article examines whether a state can legislatively 
override a permit issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission extending the 
license of a power plant. The author places this question within a broader 
federalism context-one where states assert their sovereign rights to regulate 
the environment in the shadow of federal mandates. She finds the absence of 
language mandating the use of nuclear power and of an express preemption 
provision in the Atomic Energy Act persuasive of a lack of preemption for a 
state's legislative override of this type of permit. Equally convincing is the 
Atomic Energy Act's reservation of state authority over the generation, sale, 
and transmission of energy produced by nuclear power plants, and the passage 
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of environmental laws giving states regulatory authority over some aspects of 
nuclear power plant operation. Additionally, the author argues that policy 
arguments favoring preemption, such as the need for uniformity and 
coordination of shared resources, superior federal resources and technical 
knowledge, and prevention of spillover effects do not apply to this situation; 
while arguments against preemption, such as preserving states as robust 
centers of governance and regulatory experimentation and as checks on federal 
government excesses and errors, and avoiding regulatory gaps and regulatory 
capture, do apply here. Even collective action problems, which often favor 
preemption, are weak. The argument that Vermont's initiative may derail 
recent national efforts to "restart" the nuclear power industry as a way to 
reduce the nation 's dependence on foreign oil and its global carbon footprint 
also fails as applied to Vermont's legislation. Thus, the author concludes that 
Vermont Act No. 160 should withstand a preemption challenge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The [state] law will be followed in this matter regardless of the NRC's 
jurisdiction. 1 
We nuclear people have made a Faustian Bargain with society. On the 
one hand we offer-in a catalytic nuclear burner-an inexhaustible 
source of energy. But the price we demand of society for this miracle 
energy source is both a vigilance and longevity of our social 
institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to. The society must then 
make the choice and this is a choice that we nuclear people cannot 
dictate. We can only participate in making it. 2 
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Nuclear power currently provides approximately 20 percent of the 
electrical energy consumed by the United States. 3 Yet, largely because of the 
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1978, 
no new reactors have been constructed since then. Indeed, many reactors on the 
drawing boards at that time were cancelled.4 As a result, the nation's nuclear 
fleet is an aging one. Originally licensed for forty years, designers of these 
older reactors expected that they would have been replaced before the end of 
their operating lifetime by now with newer models. 5 However, none of these 
reactors have been replaced, which is why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) is issuing licenses to extend their operating lifetime for twenty-year 
periods. This is what the NRC did in the case of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Plant. 6 
1. Elizabeth MiJier, State Commissioner of Public Services, as quoted in Amanda Peterka, NRC 
Puts Hold on Vermont Yankee License, GREENWIRE (March 16, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/ 
Greenwire/print/2011/03/16/7. 
2. Eric Charles Woychik, California's Nuclear Disposal Law Confronts the Nuclear Waste 
Management Dilemma: State Power to Regulate Reactors, 14 ENVTL. L. 359 (1984) (quoting Alvin 
Weinberg, Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, 177 SCI. 27 (1972)). 
3. See Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy 
Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REv. 509, 528 (2010) (listing nuclear energy as 20 percent of U.S. total net 
electricity generation). 
4. Nathan Hultman, Jonathan G. Koomey & Daniel M. Kammen, Viewpoint, What History Can 
Teach Us about the Future Costs of U.S. Nuclear Power, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2088-89 (2007) (In 
2005, "[o]ne hundred and four nuclear reactors provided 19.3% of U.S. electricity generation, but no 
new reactors have been approved for construction by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
since 1978."); see also Hope M. Babcock, A Risky Business-Generation of Nuclear Power and 
Deepwater Drilling for Offshore Oil and Gas, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63 (2012) (discussing cancelling 
nuclear power plants after the core meltdown at Three Mile Island). 
5. As Reactors Age, Standards Relax-Report, GREENWIRE (June 20, 2011) [hereinafter As 
Reactors Age, Standards Relax], http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/06/20/7. 
6. The NRC has issued sixty-six licenses granting operating reactors twenty-year extensions of 
their original licenses, and sixteen more extensions are pending at the NRC. Jeff Donn, Tritium Leaks 
Found at Many Nuke Sites, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 21, 2011), http://www.ap.org/company/ 
awards/part-ii-aging-nukes; see also Timothy Hurst, Will Fukushima Pull a Vermont Nuclear Plant Off 
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The recent concern about climate change and energy independence has 
rekindled an interest in rebooting the commercial nuclear industry. 7 The 
nuclear industry is developing a new generation of reactors and streamlined 
licensing procedures in response to that interest. 8 Yet public concerns remain 
about reactor safety, spent nuclear fuel storage, and nuclear proliferation, as 
well as the high costs of the nuclear plants. 9 These factors prompt some states 
to question the advisability of extending the operating lifetime of their older 
plants. 10 
This Article examines whether states, like Vermont, li can block the 
NRC's extension of the operating lifetime of nuclear reactors. Answering this 
question requires an examination of federalism and preemption concerns, 
which have become increasingly muddled. Evolving understandings about the 
safety risks of these reactors and attendant economic costs to states of their 
operation, as well as available energy alternatives, have made the answer less 
clear, and the peripatetic boundary between state and federal power over 
environmental matters has encouraged states to flex their regulatory muscles 
the Rails?, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2011 ), http:www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid~US 156615525820 I 10331 
("The NRC gas never turned down a plant relicensing ... granting 61 straight extensions to the nation's 
aging fleet."). 
7. Hultman et a!., supra note 4, at 2089 ("Rising and volatile petroleum prices, geo-political 
conflicts in fossil-fuel-rich regions, increasing energy demand from emerging economies, and climate 
change have all contributed to a resurgence of interest in nuclear power because of its potential to 
address energy security without emitting C02 or regional pollutants."); id. at 2092 ("The case for nuclear 
power resurgence rests not on expectations for dramatic growth in electricity demand but rather on 
concerns about energy security and climate change."). 
8. Babcock, supra note 4, at 143 nn. 404, 405 (discussing the next generation of nuclear power 
plants and proposals to streamline the reactor licensing process). 
9. Hultman et a!., supra note 4, at 2089 ("[E]ven in a carbon-constrained world, nuclear power 
may be more expensive than some decentralized energy-efficient and distributed-generation 
technologies."). 
I 0. Similar situations have arisen in other areas involving nuclear power plants and radioactive 
materials. See, e.g., Brendan T. Guastella, Lights Out for L/LCO: A Look at New Yorks' Takeover Plan, 
53 BROOK. L. REv. 723, 744 (1987) ("Unless the NRC changes the regulations [allowing utilities to 
carry out emergency response functions], the Supreme Court will be forced to determine whether a state 
may effectively prohibit a utility from obtaining an operating license for a nuclear power plant by 
withholding services, ordinarily provided by the state, when the services are necessary for fulfillment of 
RERP [radiological emergency response plan] requirements."); Karen Goxem, Emergency Offiite 
Planning for Nuclear Power Plants: Federal Versus State and Local Control, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 417, 
434 (1988); Barbara H. Schuknecht, Thomas D. Overcast & Dwight D. Dively, Federal Preemption of 
State and Local Radioactive Materials Transportation Regulations, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 3, 16 
(1985) ("[T]he federal government has the legal authority to preempt virtually all state and local laws 
regulating transportation of radioactive materials [under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, [and] the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1804 
(1982)] .... [State and local] laws already disrupt radioactive materials transportation to some extent, 
and carriers and shippers fear that further proliferation of such laws may make such shipments virtually 
impossible. On the other hand, states, localities, and facilities can offer substantial reasons for some of 
their requirements, usually related to improved safety or information to facilitate planning. From a 
policy perspective, these reasons suggest that considerable thought should be given to any effort to 
preempt all state and local requirements affecting shipments of radioactive material."). 
II. See 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160. 
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over nuclear plants. Since the U.S. Supreme Court carved out an area of state 
regulation from the previously exclusive regulatory domain of the federal 
government in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation 
& Development Commission 12 twenty-five years ago, states have been pushing 
to expand their authority over nuclear power plants. 
This Article first examines the state of nuclear power today, the industry's 
accident record, and the current condition of its aging commercial generating 
plants. Part I also briefly identifies factors that make it more attractive for the 
nuclear industry to extend the operating lifetime of its plants instead of bringing 
new, arguably safer reactors online. Part II takes a closer look at Vermont 
Yankee, its operating history and accident record, and Vermont Act 160. Then, 
the author examines preemption doctrine against a backdrop of federalism 
theory in Part III, focusing on the judicial presumption against preemption of 
state law and the difficulty, as well as importance, of determining congressional 
intent. Part IV identifies policy reasons for and against preemption of state laws 
in general, returning to some of the federalism concerns raised in Part III. 
Pragmatic qualms, such as collective action problems, are also discussed in this 
Part. Part V applies principles and teachings from previous discussion of 
preemption law and policy to Vermont Act 160. This Part concludes that 
neither express nor implied preemption apply to Vermont Act 160 because of 
the absence of an express preemption provision or any mandate directing the 
development of commercial nuclear power in the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 13 
and the reservations of state power in the AEA and in other environmental 
statutes. The Article also finds that Vermont's law does not create collective 
action problems, removing the only policy rationale that might warrant its 
preemption. 
Based on this analysis, the author concludes that while states like Vermont 
can close down the nuclear industry within their borders because of state 
regulatory authority over environmental matters in general and over nuclear 
plants in particular, most have little incentive to do so. Not finding Vermont's 
law preempted also promotes federalism as it preserves states as a brake on 
powerful, yet sometimes captured, federal agencies and assures that there are 
more than one set of eyes watching an inherently risky activity. 14 
I. THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TODAY 
There are several factors that make an investment in nuclear power risky 
for the utility industry. Increased operating and regulatory costs have put 
12. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) 
(allowing California to block the construction of new nuclear plants because of ongoing concerns about 
disposal of their waste). 
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2284 (1982)). 
14. Babcock, supra note 4, at 82-84 (discussing potential risks of operating nuclear power plants). 
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financial strains on utilities which own nuclear power plants and dissuaded 
many from constructing new plants. Because of these costs, power companies 
have turned to extending the operating lifetime of their existing plants. 
A. Nuclear Power Is a Risky Business Investment 
Today there are 104 nuclear power plants operating in the United States, 
but no new reactors have been ordered since 1978, the date of the accident at 
Three Mile Island. 15 The commercial nuclear industry has essentially been 
"moribund" since that accident. 16 Three Mile Island created a tidal wave of 
opposition to nuclear power, which led to the cancellation of plants that had 
been ordered and the shutdown of a plant that had entered the low power-
testing phase. 17 The accident also ushered in an era of heightened regulatory 
review and new requirements. 18 Plants had to move offline to meet the new 
requirements, reducing their overall production rate and increasing cost per 
megawatt hour of electricity, which drove new capital away from the 
industry. 19 Thus, post-Three Mile Island, selecting the nuclear option became 
financially risky-a far cry from the industry's initial promise of cheap 
electricity that had prompted a binge of nuclear power plant construction. 20 
Investing in nuclear power remains financially uncertain for electric power 
15. See id. at 89-90 (discussing what happened to the nuclear industry after Three Mile Island). 
16. See Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221, 225 (2005) 
('Thus it is more than fair to say that the nuclear industry in this country has been moribund for 30 years 
after what promised to be a nearly inexhaustible and cheap source of energy."); see also Neal H. Lewis, 
Interpreting the Oracle: Licensing Modifications, Economics, Safety, Politics, and the Future of Nuclear 
Power in the United States, 16 ALB. L.J. 27,28 (2006) ("In the twenty years prior to 1990, one hundred 
licenses were issued to operate nuclear reactors. A license for a new nuclear facility in the United States 
has not been issued since the Watts Bar I facility was permitted in 1996. Over one hundred permits that 
were issued for construction of nuclear facilities were withdrawn during the 70's and 80's."). 
17. Goxem discusses the saga of shutting down Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham 
nuclear plant, which still awaits decommissioning. See generally Goxem, supra note 10; Petra Shattuck, 
Note, Federalism and 0./fsite Emergency Planning for Nuclear Reactors: The Shoreham Impasse, 66 
B.U. L. REV. 229,257 (1986). 
18. Babcock, supra note 4, at 129-35 (discussing post-Three Mile Island accident regulatory 
changes). 
19. See David F. Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 KY. L.J. 
33, 33 (1961) ("Progress toward [economic return on investment] could be set back by regulatory 
authorization in either of two ways; by the careless or inexpert scrutiny of reactor designs and operating 
procedures, followed by a reactor 'incident' ... or by the imposition of unnecessary and costly 
precautionary requirements rendering economic power an impossibility. The federal government can 
properly claim special standing to protect against both of these risks."). Ironically, these new regulations 
have increased public apprehension about nuclear power. See Laurence H. Tribe, California Declines 
the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679,708 n.l39 (1979) ("The 
public's misgivings about nuclear energy grow in proportion to the precautions which must be taken to 
guard against any mishaps of a flawed technology."). 
20. Tomain, supra note 16, at 227 (quoting Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss 
as saying privatized nuclear power would be "too cheap to meter"); see also Guastella, supra note 10, at 
765-66 (quoting James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. II, 1985, at cover, 82 ("The failure of the 
U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history.")). 
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companies for many reasons. 21 Construction of nuclear plants is a lengthy 
process and energy demand is volatile. 22 The cost-effectiveness of a plant 
depends on its reliable operation for an extended period in order for plant 
owners to recoup their investment in the plant, its fuel, and its operation.23 
When a plant is offline for refueling or repairs, including safety upgrades, the 
power company must purchase expensive substitute energy.24 Companies with 
nuclear plants in electric markets that have not been deregulated have seen their 
rate base increase substantially once a plant becomes operational, 25 and many 
of these same companies have seen their bond ratings reduced, further eroding 
their financial strength. 26 Concerns about disposal of radioactive wastes, 
another incident like Three Mile Island, and terrorist threats have all fueled 
public opposition, attenuated the licensing process, and helped make nuclear 
energy more costly than electricity from coal or gas fired power plants. As 
plants age, worn out components require repair27 and new standards require 
additional safety equipment, resulting in expenses that consumers of electricity 
will incur through increased rates-another source of public anger and 
opposition. 28 
Although the reliability of nuclear power plants has improved 
substantially over the past decades, 29 their operating costs have continued to 
21. See William S. Jordan III, A Plea for Reason and Responsibility in Nuclear Energy Policy, 56 
U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 983 (1988) {reviewing JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 
( 1987)) ("[N]uclear power was nurtured in an artificial market ... traditional ratemaking tends to 
encourage nuclear power, and ... increased competition has been a major change in the market in recent 
years."); see also Thomas Kaplan & Danny Hakim, Indian Pt. May Enlist Giuliani as Defender, N.Y. 
TiMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A20 (saying the company was "startled" by Governor Cuomo's blunt 
determination to shut down the Indian Point reactors). 
22. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 400 ("Since nuclear plants require long lead times and 
continued growth of electricity demand is, at best, uncertain, proposed reactors may be unnecessary by 
the time they are completed."); see also id at 402 ("While nuclear plant construction costs have 
increased rapidly, the demand for electricity and the need for new nuclear plants has declined."). 
23. See id. at 400-{) I. Indeed, when a plant is prematurely shuttered, there are many besides 
ratepayers who must bear the costs. Shattuck, supra note 17, at 268 n.216 (Former utility executive John 
S. Dyson said "[t]he possible victims include the taxpayers, the ratepayers, the stockholders, the 
bondholders, which may include some pension funds, and the banks, which could create some very 
serious problems for the banking system in New York."). 
24. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 400 n.259. 
25. See id. A utility's rate base consists of its capital expenditures. Melissa Powers, The Cost of 
Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of "Cheap" Electricity, 12 U. PENN. J. Bus. L. 
407, 413-14 {20 I 0). In exchange for an exclusive "franchise" to provide electricity within a defined 
geographic area, a utility must agree to subject their "cost-of-service" ratemaking to public utility 
commission review. /d. at 412. Utilities are allowed to earn "just and reasonable" revenues for provision 
of those services. /d. at 412-13. 
26. See id. 
27. See David Lochbaum, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime, UNION 
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 19-20 (2004), http:l/www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/ 
nuclear04fnl.pdf. 
28. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 401; see also Powers, supra note 25, at 413 (discussing how 
utilities can recover their operating expenses from ratepayers). 
29. There was a precipitous drop in overall nuclear plant capacity after Three Mile Island. See 
Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091 ("After the accident at TMI in 1979, the industry was subjected to 
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escalate. 30 The increased cost in part reflects the more rigorous regulatory 
environment following the Three Mile Island accident and rising public 
opposition to nuclear power. 31 Because the cost of building and operating 
nuclear power plants does not vary significantly among reactors, any increase 
in capital cost has a direct impact on the delivered cost of the electricity 
generated by these plants. 32 Where the electric utility market is deregulated, it 
is particularly sensitive to high capital costs. 33 Consequently, utilities are 
turning away from nuclear power in favor of less financially risky sources of 
electricity, like coal, natural gas, and wind, any one of which can usually be 
built more quickly than a nuclear power plant. 34 
While the next generation of nuclear reactors and continued public 
subsidization of the risk of an accident through the Price-Anderson Act35 will 
reduce the costs of constructing and operating a nuclear power plant, 36 the 
continued possibility of financial surprises increases the potential for 
unanticipated costs for utilities that select the nuclear option. 37 High unit costs 
and the length of time it takes to get NRC approval of a reactor design both 
slow down technological learning and impede information transfers in the 
nuclear industry. When these factors are added to "the highly contextualized 
nature" of site-specific nuclear plants, they present "a nontrivial risk of cost 
intense regulatory scrutiny and evaluation. As a result, the overall fleet capacity factor-the net 
generation for all reactors in the set divided by the maximum possible generation of all reactors in the 
set-dropped precipitously and reached its nadir in 1982 at 52.9%. During the period 2000-2004, the 69 
reactors operation by 1982 had improved their overall capacity factor to 87.4%. This increase, 
attributable to improvements in utilization rates and decreases in service down time, is equivalent to an 
additional 16.3 GW of generation just from those reactors existing in 1982--equivalent to the addition 
of -15 new nuclear reactors."). But see Babcock, supra note 4, at 82 n.98 (arguing that the increase in 
plant utilization rates was a result of the NRC's maintenance rule that allowed some maintenance 
activities to be performed while the plant was still operating, which decreased the time the plant was out 
of service for refueling). 
30. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. 
33. A deregulated market is a competitive market and, hence, market participants are particularly 
price sensitive to any increase in costs that might make their electricity less competitive. 
34. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2089. 
35. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2210 (2000)). The Price-Anderson Act limited the liability of utilities and manufacturers of 
nuclear reactors in the event of a nuclear accident. 
36. See Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091 ("Factors expected to lead to such cost improvements 
include better technology, streamlined regulation, operational incentives, design standardization, the 
intensive use of information technology for design, supply chain and construction management, and 
concern over climate change."). Jordan discusses the subject of public subsidization of the commercial 
nuclear fuel cycle. See Jordan, supra note 21, at 974. Chandler discusses the next generation of 
commercial nuclear reactors and the licensing changes made to facilitate their use. See generally 
Christopher C. Chandler, Recent Developments in Licensing and Regulation at the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 485 (2006); Lewis, supra note 16 (describing the changes made to the 
NRC's licensing regulations to accommodate the next generation of nuclear reactors and make the 
licensing process more efficient and less costly and time consuming). 
37. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091. 
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surprises" for utilities. 38 
Additionally, nuclear energy's position as an alternative source of energy 
is far from secure as its significant environmental benefits are balanced by 
significant environmental costs. 39 On one hand, nuclear power offers the 
potential to reduce the country's reliance on fossil fuels and its carbon 
footprint; on the other, the waste disposal problem and "the hefty financial 
burdens associated with nuclear power plants" remain the biggest barriers to its 
reinvigoration. 40 The benefits of reducing the country's reliance on fossil fuels 
and decreasing its carbon footprint may not be obvious enough to overcome the 
costs of constructing and operating a nuclear power plant and disposing of its 
waste fuel, and to warrant states taking on the financial risks of underwriting 
nuclear power. 
Not only are there financial risks for power companies who select nuclear 
power, but also there are other factors contributing to the industry's lack of 
growth and causing it to extend the operating lifetime of existing plants rather 
than construct new ones. Thus, although there are twenty-two applications for 
licenses to build thirty-three new reactors pending before the NRC, "regulatory 
constraints, a potentially rate-limiting supply chain for reactor parts, and the 
need to train new nuclear operators" make it unlikely that any new reactors will 
be finished until 2020.41 With no new nuclear capacity on the immediate 
horizon, the only way to avoid disrupting the service that existing nuclear 
plants provide is to extend their forty-year operating licenses for a sufficient 
amount of time to allow a new generation of reactors to come online. 42 The 
38. See id. at 2091-92 ("Yet high unit costs and long lead times lead to a slower learning rate and 
require more expenditures than would technologies of smaller scale, and the contextualized nature of 
site-built nuclear reactors presents a nontrivial risk of cost surprises."). 
39. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 528; see also Jordan, supra note 21, at 972 ("[A]ccording to 
Professor Tomain, the potential financial consequences of an accident, changes in the energy market, 
and the financial condition of the nuclear industry have determined nuclear power developments since 
the [Three Mile Island] accident and will be major, if not conclusive, determinants of the future of 
nuclear power."). 
40. Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529; see also Woychik, supra note 2, at 402; Tomain, supra note 
I6, at 237. Despite these concerns and the recent catastrophic nuclear accident in Japan, some states 
continue to be interested in reviving the industry; however, others have increased their opposition as a 
result of the accident. Christa Marshall, Nuclear Revival Plans Continue in Some States, CLIMATEWIR.E 
(Mar. 2I, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2011/03/2114 (citing Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Iowa, Utah, and Missouri, as states that are still considering the nuclear option; other states, like New 
York and New Jersey, are less supportive). 
41. Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and 
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 56 (2008); see also Tomain, supra note 16, at 240 
(explaining that while there is "evidence that nuclear plants are becoming better managed . . . 
universities are turning out fewer trained nuclear engineers to become those managers"). 
42. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 228 ("Nuclear plants were the largest electric utilities operating 
until that time and continue to be so through the present. From 1963 to 1969, for example, the Atomic 
Energy Commission issued twenty-eight construction permits for plants ranging from 800 to 1100 
megawatts which constitute the upper range of electric plants."). The effect of taking a nuclear plant 
offline was vividly illustrated by the recent shutdown of San Onofre, which affected 5 million 
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consequences of permanently taking nuclear power plants offline are 
considerable, 43 not the least of which would be the need to continue to rely on 
coal-fired power plants.44 However, there are some drawbacks to relying on 
older nuclear plants; there is no question that safety risks45 and maintenance 
costs46 increase as plants become older. The financial uncertainty of the 
nuclear market, which could lead to plant cancellations and disruptions in the 
supply of electrical power, public opposition to nuclear power, and safety risks 
make building new nuclear power an unattractive alternative to states.47 
Evidently, adding nuclear power to the electric grid is no longer "a panacea" 
for the industry, if it ever was. 48 
B. The Nuclear Industry's Accident Record and the Particular Problems 
with Older Plants 
Although the accident record of the commercial nuclear industry in the 
United States is good compared to other high-risk industries, like the chemical 
or deepwater drilling industry,49 it still presents concerns. Post-Three Mile 
Island, there have been forty-seven accidents serious enough to require the 
afflicted plants to shut down for longer than a year. 50 The average cost of these 
customers. See Power Outage Hits up to 5M in U.S. Southwest, Mexico, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 9, 
20 II), http://news.yahoo.com/power-outage-hits-5m-us-southwest-mexico-034451499.html. 
43. See Kathleen C. Reilly, Global Benefits Versus Local Concerns: The Need for a Bird's Eye 
View of Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L. J. 679, 697 (1995) ("In cases where a nuclear plant shuts down 
because its safety costs are too great, one must consider opportunity costs .... Naturally, the 
opportunity costs of forgoing nuclear power include the elimination of energy the nuclear plant would 
have provided. However, this cost will vary under different circumstances."); see also Tribe, supra note 
19, at 706 ("Each one of those big reactors represents about a half-billion dollars investment .... 
Further, for each idle reactor the utility must find and fuel alternate generating capacity. Replacement 
fuel alone, if generating capacity is available, amounts to about 10 million barrels for each idle 
reactor."). 
44. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 698; see also Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear 
Moratorium Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 392, 455 (1976) (referring to "the confusion and delay" that "might result in the choice 
of fossil fuel plants by some companies who did not wish to take even the small risk that the acts would 
be upheld"); Luis Li, Comment, State Sovereignty and Nuclear Free Zones, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 
1204 (1991) (finding preemption unlikely because it was improbable that every locality would enact 
nuclear free zones and because the NRC could continue weapons production in its own facilities). 
45. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 245. 
46. See Paul Voosen, As Nuclear Reactor Fleet Ages, Engineers Ask, 'Is 80 the New 40?', N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/ll/20/20greenwire-as-nuclear-reactor-
fleet-ages-engineers-ask-is-94897.html?pagewanted=all. 
47. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 246 ("Nuclear does not appear to pass a market test, has 
increasing safety concerns, and does not have great promise for replacing fossil fuels."); see also 
Voosen, supra note 46. 
48. Tomain, supra note 16, at 234 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND 
RESPONSE 51 {2004)). 
49. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 70-75, 82-84 (discussing the accident record of the deepwater 
drilling industry and the nuclear industry). 
50. See Bob Herbert, Op.-Ed., We're Not Ready, N.Y. TiMES, July 20, 2010, at A23, available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/07 /20/opinion/20herbert.html (describing "[a ]nother frightening 
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outages has been between $1.5 billion and $2 billion, principally because of the 
need to find replacement power. 51 In recent years, many of these problems can 
be attributed to aging systems at older plants, 52 raising the probability that 
extending the operating lifetime of these plants will result in more problems, 
more outages, and more costs. 
The higher accident rates at older plants as compared to newer plants are 
not surprising, since the components of these older plants, like their piping 
systems, are wearing out. A report by the Government Accountability Office 
found that "all 65 sites where nuclear plants are located in the United States 
have experienced leakage or spillage of radioactive material into groundwater, 
some of which is attributable to aging underground pipes."53 Radioactive 
tritium has leaked from corroded, buried pipes at three-quarters of U.S. 
commercial reactors. 54 Moreover, based on a yearlong review ofNRC records, 
the Associated Press found that "the number and severity of these leaks has 
been escalating."55 In 2011, there was a tritium leak from underground pipes of 
2.5 million picocuries per liter at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, 
which is 125 times higher than the drinking water standard promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 56 The year before that, a week after 
accident" in 2002 at the Davis-Besse plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, where a "hidden leak led to corrosion 
that caused a near-catastrophe. By the time the problem was discovered, only a thin layer of stainless 
steel was left to hold back the disaster."). More recently, radioactive tritium leaked from underground 
pipes at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Vernon, Vermont. Peter Behr, Experts Weigh 
Extending the Lives of Nuclear Power Plants for 80 Years, CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/09/20/1. In 2007, part of the plant's cooling tower collapsed. 
!d. For a comparison between the accident records of the nuclear industry and offshore deepwater 
drilling industry, see Babcock, supra note 4. 
51. See Herbert, supra note 50. 
52. See LOCHBAUM, supra note 27, at I 9-20. 
53. Hannah Northey, Pipes Under Nuclear Plants are Leaking, ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY DAILY 
(June 22, 20Il), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/20II/06/22/IO (reporting on the release of the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report by Congressmen Edward Markey (D.-MA) and Peter 
Welch (D.-VT), and citing, as an example, that a 1.5 inch hole in a buried cooling water pipe at a New 
York nuclear power plant was found); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I l-563, 
OVERSIGHT OF UNDERGROUND PIPING SYSTEMS COMMENSURATE WITH RISK, BUT PROACTIVE 
MEASURES COULD HELP ADDRESS FUTURE LEAKS 5 (201 !), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/dl 1563.pdf. 
54. Donn, supra note 6 (reporting that Excelon paid $1.2 million to settle state and county 
complaints over tritium leaks from two of its facilities in Illinois, one of which was awarded relicenses 
for an additional twenty years before the leaks in the emergency core cooling system were discovered; 
the company bought at least nine properties near the other facility for a total of $6.1 million). 
55. See id (reporting that "[n]early two-thirds of the leaks" were reported to the NRC in the last 
five years). 
56. !d. Interestingly, two Entergy employees had testified earlier at two state hearings that there 
were no underground pipes. See Matthew L. Wald, Plant Owner Sues Vermont Over License for 
Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2011, at A16 (describing plant's operational problems as including the 
collapse of a wooden cooling tower in August 2007 and a tritium leak from an underground pipe, after 
plant officials denied that there were any underground pipes containing tritium in testimony before two 
state panels); see also Behr, supra note 50. Entergy later removed the employees. See Letter from David 
C. Lewis, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC to Michael Columb, Entergy Nuclear Operations 
Site Vice President (June I 7, 2010) (reporting on an NRC Inspection and Review of Areas Identified in 
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the forty-one year old Oyster Creek plant was relicensed for an additional 
twenty years, a plant worker discovered tritium "by chance" in 3000 gallons of 
water that had leaked into a concrete vault containing electrical cables. 57 Since 
that time, additional tritium leaks at Oyster Creek have been discovered at 
concentrations 540 times higher than the EPA's drinking water limits. 58 
Tritium leaks have caused particular anxiety because tritium exposure is linked 
to cancer. 59 
According to nuclear safety engineers, the number of leaks "suggests" 
nuclear plant operators are having a hard time maintaining systems that are now 
"decades" old. 60 Making matters worse, there is no quick way to detect these 
leaks because buried pipes are inaccessible and, therefore, difficult and costly 
to inspect. 61 Digging up pipes (the only sure way to tell if they are corroded or 
leaking) is expensive. 62 Leaks can go undetected for years and may be 
discovered only when work is done on nearby piping or holding tanks. 63 Also, 
these underground pipes can carry cooling water, essential to prevent a core 
meltdown in case of an emergency shutdown; thus, leaking pipes may imperil 
emergency safety systems at these plants. 64 Poor maintenance, relaxed 
operating standards, 65 and the high costs of repairs mean that these problems, 
Demand for Information). However, the Vermont Attorney General said he "lacked the smoking gun" 
that would enable him to bring criminal charges against Entergy officials for lying about leaking 
underground pipes, even though the company's employees "clearly ... [and] repeatedly failed to meet a 
minimally acceptable standard of credibility and trustworthiness." Hannah Northey, Vermont Won't 
Charge Entergy over Radioactive Leaks, E&ENEWSPM (July 6, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/ 
eenewspm/2011/07/06/04. There were also tritium leaks in 2005. !d. 
57. Donn, supra note 6 (recounting the critical comments of anti-nuclear activists about how the 
NRC gas "allowed the industry to get away with little concern about public safety"). 
58. See id. Recently, the Third Circuit directed Excelon, the owner of Oyster Creek, and the NRC 
to review the agency's 2009 decision to extend the plant's license for another twenty years and to advise 
the court on any possible impact the Japanese accident might have on "the propriety" of granting that 
license extension. Court Requires Excelon, NRC to Review Licensing at Oyster Creek, GREENWIRE 
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/03/22/archive/19. 
59. See Radioactive Water Leaks in U.S. Plants Go Unchecked, GREENWIRE (Apr. II, 2011) 
[hereinafter Radioactive Water Leaks], http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/04/ll/IO/ ('The 
investigation of NRC documents found that almost all nuclear plants have leaked tritium, a byproduct of 
nuclear fission that has been linked to cancer. Most plants have leaked tritium more than once, and large 
leaks have been on the rise. There were five leaks or spills reported in 201 0."); id. ("While tritium is not 
the most dangerous radioactive material, according to a 2006 National Academy of Sciences panel, it 
can increase the risk of cancer in even small doses."). 
60. Donn, supra note 6. 
61. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 53, at I. 
62. See id. at 7 (quoting Excelon's presentation at a 2009 meeting with regulators as saying, "100 
percent verification of piping integrity is not practical" and "[ e )xcavations have significant impact on 
plant operations"); id. at 9 (saying Excelon has spent $14 million at Oyster Creek to get better access to 
2000 feet of tritium-carrying pipes, but has been unable "to stop widespread leaking"). 
63. Donn, supra note 6 ("The industry tends to inspect piping when it must be dug up for some 
other reason."). 
64. !d. (reporting on the discovery at Salem Unit I of corrosion in the unit's cooling water system 
which had worn the pipe down "to a quarter of its minimum required thickness"). 
65. See As Reactors Age, Standards Relax, supra note 5 (saying GAO reported that "[f]ederal 
nuclear regulators have kept the industry in compliance by repeatedly weakening standards," citing as an 
2012] NUCLEAR GENIE 703 
as well as potential problems caused by failed cables, 66 corroding metal parts, 
cracked cement, brittle reactor vessels, leaky valves, and cracked tubing, are 
not always attended to as plant owners try to get "more and more out of these 
plants."67 
The NRC review instigated in response to the accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant in 2010 has unearthed more anomalies in U.S. reactors. 68 For 
example, a recent report by the NRC's Office of Inspector General reported 
that 30 percent of domestic nuclear power plant operators failed to report 
defects in plant equipment. 69 Some of these defects may have created "a 
substantial safety hazard" during the time they remained uncorrected. 70 
Unfortunately, the NRC has not yet issued any civil penalties or taken other 
serious enforcement action against the utilities that failed to report.71 The 
NRC's apparent laxness has energized anti-nuclear groups, 72 restoking public 
fears about radiation. 73 The record shows that these concerns about the safety 
of nuclear power plants, especially older plants, are not unfounded. 
C. Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants-A House Divided 
With its origins in the highly secretive Manhattan Project, the entire field 
of atomic energy was "monopolized by the federal government, until passage 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," which created a civilian regulatory agency 
to encourage the commercial development of nuclear power. 74 When the Act 
example the case of leaky valves where regulators simply "increased the leakage allowance up to 20 
times the original limit"). 
66. See Donn, supra note 6 (reporting on a 2008 NRC staff memo that said industry data showed 
that eighty-three electrical cables failed between twenty-one and thirty years of service, compared to 
only forty within the first ten years of service, and making the additional point that "underground 
cabling set in concrete can be extraordinarily difficult to replace"). 
67. As Reactors Age, Standards Relax, supra note 5. The AP report found that older plants have 
been allowed to run "less safely just to prolong operations." Donn, supra note 6. 
68. See Hannah Northey & Anne C. Mulkern, Earthquake Risks Must be Reanalyzed for U.S. 
Reactors, GREENWIRE (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/03/24/4 (announcing 
the NRC's initiation of all I 04 reactors to assess their ability to withstand earthquakes). 
69. Hannah Northey, U.S. Plant Operators Failing to Report Some Equipment Defects-NRC 
Audit, E&ENEwsPM (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspr/ 2011/03/24/1. 
70. Jd. 
71. See id. 
72. See Radioactive Water Leaks, supra note 59. 
73. See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for Achieving 
Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. I, 17 (2009) (discussing the role 
of environmental groups as public norm changers). 
74. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 394-95 ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 transferred 
control of the development of atomic energy to a civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission; 
however, as the federal government retained the ownership of all fissionable materials and related 
facilities, and private activity was restricted to contractual operations for the government, the monopoly 
persisted."); see also Cavers, supra note 19, at 32-33 ("[J]t would be hard to defend the discontinuance 
of federal jurisdiction to license the construction and operation of reactors. The federal government has 
both special interests and special qualifications for that task. It has invested billions of dollars in the 
development of atomic energy, and, in the long run, its hope for any substantial return on that 
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was amended in 1954, Congress's preoccupation with developing commercial 
uses of nuclear materials meant that the legislators gave little thought to the 
role of states in regulating nuclear plants beyond the states' customary 
regulation of electric power. 75 Thus, the federal government retained nuclear 
power plant regulatory control. 
The risk of accidents at nuclear plants, the need to isolate and safeguard 
radioactive wastes, the latent national security threats posed by plants, and the 
possible proliferation of fissionable material provided the basis for continuing 
federal regulation.76 However, amendments to the AEA in 1954 and 1959 
whittled away at the exclusive federal regulatory preserve over nuclear reactors 
and decreased ·the promotional bias evident in the earlier legislation. 77 These 
amendments created a role for states in the regulation of some nuclear 
materials 78 and clarified that states retained regulatory authority over the 
generation, sale, and transmission of electric power produced by nuclear 
plants. 79 At the same time, new legislation, like the Energy Reorganization Act 
investment (military uses excepted) must rest on the achievement of economic methods of utilizing 
nuclear fuels for atomic power."). 
75. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 395, 397 ("The fact that there was little state 
regulation of these sources of radiation and that the Act provided only a very limited role for private 
industry meant that there was no reason to provide for or even to contemplate state regulation of atomic 
energy."); see also id. at 397 ("In ignoring such matters, Congress simply reflected the reality that there 
was little or no interest in state regulation of this new federal preserve."); Cavers, supra note 19, at 33 
("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which first made the private ownership of atomic reactors legally 
possible, was singularly silent as to the Act's effect on state authority with respect to the facilities and 
materials over which it gave the federal government far-reaching power to be exercised chiefly through 
the medium of licensing."); Reilly, supra note 43, at 679 ("Congress determined that federal regulation 
of private nuclear development would be necessary for 'optimum progress, efficiency, and economy in 
this area of atomic endeavor."'); Angela Durbin, Corrunent, Striking a Delicate Balance: Developing a 
New Rationale for Preemption While Protecting the Public's Role on Siting Liquefied Natural Gas 
Terminals, 56 EMORY L.J. 507, 528 (2006) ("Congress's interest in and justification for regulating 
nuclear energy exclusively was due in part to the special relationship between nuclear energy and the 
federal government."). 
76. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529 ("[G]iven the danger associated with fission reactions 
and the radioactive waste generated by the process as well as the potential national security threat it 
poses, nuclear energy is regulated under a strict regime that gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
exclusive jurisdiction over the safety of nuclear power plants."). 
77. See Christopher F. Baum, Banning the Transportation of Nuclear Waste: A Permissible 
Exercise of the State's Police Power?, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 663, 668 (1984) ("The primary purpose of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) is to foster the safe development of nuclear energy as a power 
source." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,206-
07 (1983)). See also Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 396 n.30 ("The reports of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy noted that the major reason for amending the 1946 Act to provide for the 
participation of private enterprise was to encourage the development of atomic power for the production 
of electricity. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954), H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 
3 (1954)."). 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2006) (amending the AEA in 1954 to allow states to enter into 
agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission for the regulation of byproduct, source, and special 
nuclear materials in quantities too low to form a critical mass). 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or 
regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of 
electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: Provided, that 
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of 1974 (ERA)80 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1980,81 weakened the promotional bias of the initial AEA. 82 
While the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977 preserved the ERA's 
"balanced approach" to nuclear power and alternative sources of energy, 83 the 
new laws opened the door for states to select alternative sources of power 
without undermining a national goal. Collectively, these laws weakened the 
exclusive hold of the federal government over how the nuclear option might be 
fulfilled. 
The 1959 amendment to the AEA specifically granting state regulatory 
authority over the generation, sale, and transmission of electric power produced 
by nuclear plants, 84 enables a state public service commission (PSC) to set 
rates for the power nuclear plants produce and to certify whether a new nuclear 
power plant is needed. 85 Certification is generally based on the ''utility's need 
for power, its financial health, its compliance with previous rulemaking 
decisions, and the cost and environmental consequences of the proposed power 
this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local agency any authority to 
regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission."); see also Goxem, supra note 10, at 421-
22 ("The amendment, therefore, allowed the states to retain authority in specified areas of nuclear power 
generation, while increasing their regulatory power over certain nuclear materials. Consequently the 
statutory language and legislative history of the 1954 Act and its amendments did not give the federal 
government authority over all aspects of nuclear power regulation."); id. at 421 n.28 (Congress limited 
the scope of state-federal cooperative agreements because "Congress thought that states would not have 
the knowledge or capability to safely and effectively regulate power plants ... [and] Congress was 
concerned with the potential impact of any state regulation on the growth of the industry.") (citations 
omitted). 
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5851. 
81. Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780. For a discussion of these and other laws, such as the 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8286b, which promotes 
conservation instead of consumption, see Jeannette M. Nishimura-Paige, Pacific Gas & Electric: A 
Nuclear Energy Option or a Nuclear Energy Mandate?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 995, 1030 & n.213 
(1984). See also id. at 1030 n.221 ("Congress also passed the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research & 
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5920, which directed [the Energy Research and 
Development Administration] to develop 'a comprehensive nonnuclear energy research, development, 
and demonstration program.' 42 U.S.C. §§ 5905(b)(l) (1982)."). 
82. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1030 (explaining that the ERA established the Energy 
Research and Development Administration, the goal of which was to increase the efficiency and 
reliability of all sources of energy, not just nuclear power); see also id. ("The Act's legislative history 
indicates concern about a pro-nuclear bias in the regulatory agency and expresses a desire to have the 
Federal Government 'place greater relative emphasis on nonnuclear energy.'") (citing S. Rep. No. 980, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. C.C.A.N. 5470, 5480). 
83. See Charles B. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nuclear 
Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. I, 82 (1980). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2018. 
85. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 432-33 ("Authority over state-chartered utilities, wielded by 
state utility regulatory agencies, is exercised generally through (I) setting a utility's rate of return on 
investment in power plant and equipment, (2) directing utility services provided to customers through 
rulemaking authority, and (3) decisions to grant or reject a power plant certificate of public convenience 
and necessity (CPCN) or land use permit."). Since Vermont Yankee sells wholesale power, the Federal 
Energy Commission and not the Vermont Public Service Board approves its rates. See Entergy Nuclear 
Vt. Yankee, LLC, v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-99-jgrn, 2011 WL 2811317, at *8 (D. Vt. July 18, 2011). 
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plant."86 Thus, a state PSC can determine whether a nuclear or non-nuclear 
power plant should be built or "require the development of particular energy 
generation technologies, out-of-state power purchases, or implementation of 
energy conservation programs."87 State PSCs can also influence the source of 
power a utility chooses by offering rate incentives or disincentives that 
encourage energy conservation or utilization of specific energy sources other 
than nuclear power. 88 They can also require utilities to provide lower rates for 
utility customers who conserve energy and to finance alternative energy 
construction. 89 This power amounts to indirect regulation of nuclear power "by 
displacing the need and incentive for its use."90 
State PSCs can also determine what is included in a utility's rate base, 
specifically affecting whether it will be able to recoup the cost of constructing 
or maintaining a nuclear power plant. 91 For example, when a power plant never 
operates, as in the case of Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham facility, 
or its operation produces a severe economic burden on the ratepayers, a state 
PSC could remove the cost of the plant from the utility's rate base.92 Moreover, 
depending on how a state PSC handles these costs, it could dissuade a utility 
from keeping an older plant running. 
In addition to control over rates, states can affect the location of a nuclear 
86. Woychik, supra note 2, at 433. 
87. Jd. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 
190,227 (1983)). 
88. See id. at 434 ("States can promulgate rules to direct utility services and can allocate 
discouraging rates of return for noncompliance with such rules. States can use rulemaking authority to 
require implementation of energy conservation measures and alternative energy supplies that are less 
costly than nuclear power."). 
89. See id. at 435-36. 
90. Jd. at 435. 
91. See id. at 436 ("State legislatures and utility regulators also have authority to allow or disallow 
the cost of a nuclear reactor to be included in 'rate base."'); id. at 439 ("States historically have 
regulated issuance of a CPCN . . . to 'prevent unnecessary or uneconomic construction."'); id. ("It is 
well established that 'applicants for certificates of convenience and necessity ... should show that the 
costs of construction or facilities which they propose are both adequate and reasonable."'). For example, 
the New Jersey and Pennsylvania PSCs did not allow Metropolitan Edison to include the cost of 
cleaning up Three Mile Island Unit 2 in its rate base. See Mark P. Widoff, The Accident at Three Mile 
Island, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 223, 236 (1982), available at http://digitalcommons.law. 
wne.edullawreview/vol4/iss2/2/. 
92. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 436 ("The general criterion is whether the facility is considered 
'used and useful.' Therefore, if a reactor never begins full operation, or if it performs so poorly that it 
produces a severe economic burden on ratepayers, the state's utility regulators can remove the plant's 
cost from the owner's rate base."); id. at 433-34 ("The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure 
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and 
economical management to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for 
the proper discharge of its public duties." (quoting Bluefield Waterworks & Improvements Co. v. W. 
VA. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 693 (1923) (emphasis added))); see also Guastella, supra note 
I 0, at 7 59 (The "prudent investment test" does not allow "the use of plant costs in determining rates if 
the investment was imprudent in light of information that was reasonable available to management at the 
time the investment decision was made"; and while commissions rarely "disallow all of the utility's 
investment as imprudent," they may allow only partial recovery ''whereby the costs are allocated among 
investors, ratepayers, and taxpayers."). 
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plant. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty, 93 states have been considered protectors of their citizens' health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare.94 This authority includes regulation ofland 
use when "reasonably related to those recognized state interests."95 Aproposed 
site for a nuclear power plant would be a strong interest for the affected 
community. 96 Moreover, many ofthe factors that are considered when a site is 
chosen for a reactor implicate state knowledge of and experience with the local 
environment. 97 
Additionally, no environmental law specifically bars states from 
regulating the environmental effects of nuclear power plants. 98 Laws like 
section 122 of the Clean Air Act, 99 which allows states to regulate radioactive 
air emissions from nuclear power plants, 100 and section 116,101 which 
authorizes states to set more stringent air emission limitations than federal 
limitations or to establish their own limitations in the absence of federal 
ones, 102 enable states to prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant for 
93. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
94. See Eleanor M. Young, Exercising Police Powers to Control Spent Fuel and Other 
Radioactive Wastes, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 335,339 (1984). 
95. ld. at 339 (citing Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390); see also George B. Adams, Jr., 
Regulation of Health and Safety in Private Atomic Energy Activities: A Problem in Federal-State 
Relationships, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 163, 186 (1958) ("[D]espite the obvious national interest and the 
extensive AEC program aimed at the most effective locations for nuclear facilities, the concern of local 
authorities cannot be easily dismissed."); Wiggins, supra not~ 83, at 85 ("Decisionmaking about nuclear 
power, on the other hand, affects a subject of exclusively state control. Public utilities wishing to 
construct nuclear power plants seek the use of private or state-owned land and facility, which, unlike 
navigable waters, are not at all in the federal domain."); Tribe, supra note 19, at 709-10 (discussing 
California's nuclear power plant moratorium and arguing that "[s]ince California seeks to eliminate 
land-use which creates a continuing source of public fears and unrest, it is exercising a traditional land 
use power for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards"). 
96. See Adams, supra note 95, at 186 ("The proposed site of an atomic reactor is apt to be of 
intense local interest."); see also Patrick J. Murphy, Case Note, Gone Fission: Federal Preemption and 
the Resurgence of the Nuclear Industry (The One That Almost Got Away), 82 TEMP. L. REV. 863, 886 
(2009) ("[A]ttempting to protect a location from the potentially negative effects of a new power plant is 
a legitimate state concern regardless of the type of plant." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,222-23 (1983))). 
97. See Adams, supra note 95, at 186 ("Reactor location involves a consideration of factors (such 
as conditions of the soil, underground waters and access to main piping and electrical systems) with 
which the state has had long experience and which is not susceptible to general regulation."). 
98. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 886. 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (2006). 
100. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 698 (Section 122 "transfers from the NRC to the EPA and the 
states the authority to set air quality standards and emission levels, as well as requirements respecting 
the control of, radioactive air pollutants for purposes of protecting public health."). 
101. 42 u.s.c. § 7416. 
102. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031 ("The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 give 
the states the authority to regulate radioactive air emissions from nuclear plants," and "[s]tates may 
impose emission standards more stringent than those defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.") 
(citations omitted); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 698-99 ("Under [section 122], radioactive 
pollutants, including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material are covered by 
Section 116 [retention of state authority] of the Clean Air Act. Thus, any State, or political subdivision 
thereof, may establish standards more stringent than Federal, or where a Federal standards [sic] has not 
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noncompliance with state emission levels. 103 Even though Congress realized 
that requiring nuclear utilities to comply with state air emission standards could 
be a burden, it nonetheless concluded protecting public health was a necessary 
"cost of doing business for the nuclear power industry." 104 The House floor 
manager of the bill stated: "[T]he states may protect the ambient air and use 
their police powers to protect the health of the citizens in their area. This has 
always been true for other pollutants, and I see no reason for any exemption for 
radioactive pollutants." 105 
Moreover, the Clean Water Act106 empowers the EPA and states with 
permitting authority to issue permits for the discharge of heated water from 
power plants and the design of their cooling water intake systems. 107 Recent 
rules implementing these provisions, such as regulations forcing nuclear 
utilities to install closed cycle cooling or make changes in the design of their 
intake structures to avoid harming aquatic organisms, could shut down "scores 
of power plants" because of the accompanying costs. 108 Additionally, under 
section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 109 a state can refuse to certify a nuclear 
power plant's discharge for being in non-compliance with state water quality 
standards. 110 Under these statutes, states have a legitimate right to protect their 
been established, may establish any standards they deem appropriate. Thus the provision would not 
preempt States and localities from setting and enforcing stricter air pollution standards for radiation than 
the Federal standards, and would not follow the holding of Northern States Power Co. v. State of 
Minnesota in the context of radioactive air pollution." (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 143 (1977) 
(Conf. Rep.))). 
103. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1030 n.215 {"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 
agreed that, under the authority of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, a state could prevent nuclear 
plants from being constructed at all."); id. at 1031 n.225 (Sections 116 and 122 "reflect the first explicit 
manifestation of congressional intent that states may regulate nuclear energy activity for the purposes of 
protecting their citizens from radiation hazards (at least in the context of radioactive air pollution)."); see 
also Woychik, supra note 2, at 459-60 (contending that because states can adopt tougher air quality 
regulations "[i]t seems safe to conclude that state regulations promulgated under the CAA, and 
genuinely based on concerns for clean air, would withstand a preemption challenge"). 
104. Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031; see also Woychik, supra note 2, at 460 ("Congress 
recognized that the scope of the NRC's authority was 'terribly important' because 'any county [or state] 
in the country could close down any nuclear power plant ... simply by establishing standards of 
emission that are lower than those that exist [at a reactor]."'). 
105. Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031 n.225 (quoting 123 CONG. REc. 8671 (1977) 
(statement of Rep. Rogers)); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 699 ("Section 122 demonstrates that 
Congress is not averse to allowing the states to regulate nuclear energy activity for the purpose of 
protecting their citizens from radiation hazards - at least in the context of radioactive air pollution."). 
106. See 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2006). 
107. /d. §!316(a)-(b). 
108. Behr, supra note 50 (quoting the President of nuclear industry's chief trade association, NEI, 
as saying: "A blanket requirement to force the installation of cooling towers is unnecessary and will put 
regional economies and tens of thousands of jobs at risk by potentially forcing scores of power plants to 
shut down over the next decade."); see also id. (arguing that owners of some older nuclear plants may 
"opt to retire the plants" instead of building cooling towers, citing as an example Oyster Creek plant on 
New Jersey's Barnegat Bay, which closed ten years before the expiration of plant's operating license). 
109. 33 u.s.c. § 1341. 
110. This year, Vermont refused to certify Vermont Yankee's discharges and sued the NRC for 
extending the plant's operating license based on noncompliance with section 401. See Olga Peters, NRC, 
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citizens and natural resources from the adverse environmental impact of power 
plants. 111 
The Supreme Court acknowledged these traditional state areas of 
regulatory authority over nuclear power plants in Pacific Gas & Electric v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, which 
remains good law today. 112 In that case, which involved the preemption of a 
California moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants, the Court said 
that while the federal government has exclusive authority over nuclear power 
plant construction, operation, and radiological safety, states retain regulatory 
authority over non-radiological safety. 113 Thus, only state laws with a "direct 
and substantial effect" on nuclear power plant safety would be preempted. 114 
Subsequent courts have narrowly defined the term nuclear "safety" to protect 
state police power regulations over non-radiological health and safety 
matters. 115 The Court also refrained from questioning California's motive 
behind its law-its concern about the disposal of nuclear wastes-even though 
this motive appeared to fall within the exclusive purview of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) over safety matters. 116 All the Court required was that a 
state, here California, show a "plausible non-safety purpose" for its action. 117 
NEC and State Square Off Over VY Clean Water Certificate, COMMONS (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http:/lvtdigger.org/2011/08/17/nrc-nec-and-state-square-off-over-vy-clean-water-certificate/; see also 
Danny Hakim, Cuomo Stakes Tough Stance on 2 Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, at A2 
(describing New York State Department of Environmental Conservation's rejection of Entergy's 
application for Indian Point Units 2 and 3). The company appealed the denial to the state hearing board 
and the NRC. /d. at AS. 
111. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 886. ("As the Supreme Court reemphasized in English, 
Congress never intended to block all state regulation in the nuclear field. The direct and substantial 
standard allows courts to review the purpose of legislation to ensure that, in practice, the law will not 
impermissibly encroach on federal exclusive authority notwithstanding the state legislature's stated 
purpose."). 
112. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comrn'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See 
e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) (repeating the standard established by Pacific 
Gas and saying "for a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and 
substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning 
radiological safety levels"). See also cases cited holding states laws were not preempted infra note 123 
and accompanying text. 
113. See Goxem, supra note 10, at 423. 
114. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 874 ("The Court has significantly modified the Northern States 
standard of total federal control of nuclear regulation. The current standard used to interpret the meaning 
of the 1954 Act and the 1959 Amendment is the one laid down in Pacific Gas. This standard, termed 
'direct and substantial' in English provides that a state regulation with a direct and substantial effect on 
radiological or safety issues, or in conflict with a named federal power, is preempted by federal law."). 
115. See id. at 887 ("[T]he Pacific Gas direct and substantial standard requires a narrow 
construction of the definition of 'safety,' so as not to impede on a state's traditional authority to regulate 
energy in a manner consistent with congressional intent."); id. at 887 n.269 (citing Pacific Gas for the 
proposition that Congress intended "to preserve state authority over safety matters"). 
116. See Goxem, supra note 10, at 423. 
117. See id. at 427 ("The Court in Pacific Gas held that state actions that had the effect of 
regulating radiological safety were permissible as long as the state could show a plausible non-safety 
purpose for the action. In Silkwood, the Court went further and found that Congress intended state 
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The elasticity of this standard both expanded the scope of state power over 
nuclear power plants and emboldened states to cross into what might otherwise 
be viewed as a federal regulatory preserve. 
Pacific Gas is widely interpreted as creating dual regulatory authority over 
nuclear power plants 118 and decentralizing nuclear plant regulation by 
explicitly recognizing a separate sphere of state regulatory power. 119 A later 
decision by the Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 120 affirmed that the 
states' role in regulating nuclear power can extend into safety regulation. 121 
But, while it is clear that Congress left room for states to regulate nuclear 
plants, the question is how much room. 122 Court decisions on whether a state's 
exercise of regulatory authority over nuclear reactors has crossed the line into 
federal authority have been far from consistent. 123 
punitive damage awards to be available to victims of nuclear accidents, even though the purpose as well 
as the effect of such awards was to regulate conduct in matters related to radiological safety."). 
118. See Goxem, supra note I 0, at 446 ("In fact, the Atomic Energy Act and its amendments 
created a dual system of regulation. The federal government maintains exclusive control over the 
construction and operation of plants, as well as the regulation of radiological hazards. The states retain 
their traditional powers relating to the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating 
facilities to be licensed, land use, and ratemaking. The Supreme Court recognized this dual system of 
regulation in Pacific Gas and reaffirmed in Silkwood."). 
119. See Jordan, supra note 21, at 975 (Pacific Gas '"serves as a benchmark for legal change' by 
explicitly recognizing a state role in nuclear decision making, and thereby contributing to, or perhaps 
even causing, a decentralization of authority with respect to nuclear power." (quoting TOMAIN, supra 
note 21, at 17-18)); Reilly, supra note 43, at 684 ("The court included state economic considerations 
among those immune to preemption, interpreting the Act as reserving the right of states to regulate 
nuclear power based on the '[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and 
service."'); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 
(1983) (noting that "states have traditionally governed in these areas"); cf Goxem, supra note I 0, at 441 
(The federal district court in Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F. 
Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), "held that a state or local government could refrain from participating in 
offsite [emergency] planning."); id. at 443 ("The result in Citizens is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Silkwood. In both cases, the legislative history did not indicate an affirmative intent 
to displace traditional state authority, even though it interfered with federal authority to regulate safety .. 
. . The analysis of preemption as applied to offsite [emergency] planning leads to the conclusion, 
therefore, that state or local governments are free to refrain from developing or implementing an offsite 
plan, even if motivated by safety concerns."). 
120. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 239, 256 (1984). 
121. See Goxem, supra note I 0, at 427. 
122. See David E. Izhakoff, Federal Preemption: State Regulation of Federally Owned Nuclear 
Production Plants, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 665, 669 n.27 (1989) ("We thought that this act [1959 
amendments to AEA] without saying in so many words did make clear that there is preemption here, but 
we have tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption feeling it is better to leave these 
kind [sic] of detailed questions perhaps up to the courts later to be resolved." (quoting Federal-State 
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field: Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th 
Cong. 308 (1959) (statement ofMr. Lowenstein))). 
123. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers & Paul F. Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone 
Ordinances: Statutory and Constitutional Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the 
Producers of Nuclear Weapons Components, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 87, 102 n.95 (1989) (citing cases 
holding that federal law preempted state laws and that federal law did not preempt state laws). Compare 
United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding federal law preempted 
Washington law that required "total cleanup of contamination" from a site before additional radioactive 
materials could be placed there), Skull Valley Band ofGoshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1227 
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II. VERMONT AND ITS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (Vermont Y ank:ee) is a 640 
megawatt nuclear power plant located in Vernon, Vermont, at the southeastern 
tip of the state. 124 The plant provides one-third of Vermont's energy needs. 125 
The AEC licensed the plant in 1972. 126 Entergy, a Louisiana-based energy 
company, purchased Vermont Yankee in 2001 for $180 million, roughly half 
the cost of an equivalent coal-fired plant or wind farm. 127 In 2006, the NRC, 
the successor federal agency to the AEC, permitted Entergy to increase the 
plant's power output by 20 percent. 128 After five years of review, in March 
2010-ironically the day before the Fukushima disaster-the NRC extended 
the plant's operating license, 129 due to expire in 2012, l30 to 2032. 131 Thus, 
(lOth Cir. 2004) (holding Utah law regulating nuclear fuel storage and transportation preempted), United 
States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 820-23 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding federal law preempted Kentucky 
environmental permit conditions applicable to disposing radioactive wastes in a landfill), Cnty. of 
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co, 728 F.2d 52, 60--61 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding state tort and contract 
claims against utility preempted because they related to safety), and Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding ordinance barring spent fuel 
importation and storage preempted by federal law), with Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 
(1988) (declining to preempt incidental safety regulations which allowed award of additional 
compensation to workers at federal nuclear production facility), English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 
90 (1990) (holding state law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not "fall within the 
pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases"), Kerr-McGee v. City of 
W. Chi., 914 F.2d 820, 826 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding City's application of its erosion and sedimentation 
regulations to a waste disposal site not preempted because the City is not "precluded from visiting those 
same areas of concern" touched upon by the NRC's comprehensive licensing scheme "so long as the 
City does not interfere with the regulation of radiological hazards"). 
124. See Hannah Northey, Entergy Sues to Keep Vermont Yankee Running, E&ENEWSPM (Apr. 8, 
2011 ), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/ 2011/04118/4. 
125. Since Vermont Yankee sells wholesale power, its rates are approved by the Federal Energy 
Commission and not the Vermont Public Service Board. See Complaint at 21, Entergy Nuclear Vt. 
Yankee, LLC. v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-00099-jgm (D. Vt. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2811317 
[hereinafter Entergy Complaint], available at http://www.entergy.com/content/investor_relations/pdfs/4-
18-ll_complaint.pdf. 
126. See Gillian Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and 
Nuclear Waste 1, 10 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 
0592, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 0 16&context=columbia_pllt. 
127. Christian Parenti, What Nuclear Renaissance?, THE NATION, May 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/what-nuclear-renaissance. 
128. Press Release, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Staff Approves Power Uprate for 
Vermont Yankee (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docsfML0606/ 
ML060610249.pdf. 
129. See NRC Renews License for Vermont Yankee, E&ENEWSPM (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/20 11103/21/5; see also Northey, supra note 124 (noting that 
NRC renewed Vermont Yankee's operating license on March 21 "after a five-year review"). 
130. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, ENTERGY, http://www.entergy-nuc1ear.com/ 
plant_informationlvermont-yankee (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
131. See Hurst, supra note 6 ("[C]oincidentally, only hours before the earthquake and tsunami 
rocked northeastern Japan and set off the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the NRC voted 4-0 to 
approve Vermont Yankee for another twenty years, putting the streak at 62 straight extensions."). A 
temporary suspension of pending applications to extend the operating lifetime of domestic reactors, 
including the decision to approve the Vermont Yankee extension, is no longer in effect. See Shir 
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Vermont Yankee will continue to operate for another twenty years unless 
something happens to shut it down. 
Vermont Yankee has had several serious accidents. In 1996, there was 
significant circumferential cracking in the plant's reactor pressure vessel, the 
core shroud, and the condenser, as well as in the plant's feedwater and 
recirculation pipes. 132 In 2003, the reactor had a leak in the primary piping 
connected to the reactor vessel head, which automatically shut the plant 
down. 133 In 2004, spent nuclear fuel rods went missing from the plant. 134 In 
2007, a wooden cooling tower collapsed for no apparent reason. 135 In 2010, 
tritium leaks were discovered in underground piping at the plant; that same 
spring both cesium and strontium-90 were found in soils surrounding the plant, 
and recently, a fish with high strontium levels was caught near the plant 
outfall. 136 Tritium was also found in the Connecticut River close to where 
groundwater from the plant enters the river in January 2010, and again recently 
in mid-July of2011 137 prompting the Vermont Senate to take action. 138 
Vermont Yankee's accident record feeds into the general paranoia about 
nuclear power plants, which has been further kindled by the recent accident at 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear generating station in Japan. 139 Vermont 
Haberman, NRC Rejects Petition to Suspend Nuke Plant Licensing Activities, SEACOASTONL!NE.COM 
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20110916-NEWS-109160360; see also Union 
Elec. Co. d/b/a/ Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), CLI-11-05, 74 NRC__, 20-21 (Sept. 9, 
20 II), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/20 11/20 ll-
05cli.pdf. 
132. See Keith Harmon Snow, Vermont Yankee: A Second Lease on Half-Life, 
ALL THINGSPASS.COM (Mar. 30, 20 II), http://www.allthingspass.cornluploads/html-69VT%20Yankee% 
20Nuke%20Final.htm. 
133. See id. (noting that there were actually two leaks: one when packing blew out of a valve; the 
other where a pump seal failed on restart). 
134. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-339, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION: NRC NEEDS TO Do MORE TO ENSURE THAT POWER PLANTS ARE EFFECTIVELY 
CONTROLLING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d05339.pdf. 
135. See Behr, supra note 50. 
136. See Dave Gram, Despite Calls to Slow Down, NRC Grants Vermont Yankee Renewal, 
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Mar. 21, 2011 ), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/viewart/20 1103211 
NEWS07/ll 03210 I 0/Despite-calls-slow-down-NRC-grants-Vermont-Yankee-renewal. Underscoring 
the Governor's concern, a fish caught near the plant contained strontium-90, a radioactive isotope 
capable of causing leukemia and bone cancer. Although strontium-90 can occur naturally, "( o ]ne finding 
of [strontium-90] just above the lower limit of detection in one fish sample is notable because it's the 
first time strontium-90 has been detected in the edible portion of any of our fish samples." Radioactive 
Fish Found Near Vermont Plant, GREENWIRE (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/ 
print/2011/08/03/23. 
137. See Tritium Found Again in River Near Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, GREENWIRE (Aug. 
18, 2011), http://www.eenews.net /Greenwire/2011108/18/21. 
138. See infra note !56 (discussing circumstances of Vermont Senate vote directing the state PSB 
to deny Vermont Yankee a new certificate of public good). 
139. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 140-47 (discussing public fear of nuclear power). The effects of 
the Japanese accident are still unfolding as more evidence is gathered about human and environmental 
exposure. See Fukushima Containment Chambers Likely Breached, GREENWIRE (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/05/25/10 ("Last month, Japan's governrnent raised the 
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Yankee's reactor design is the same as the Fukushima Daiichi plants. 140 It 
contains the Mark 1 suppression system that failed to function in the Japanese 
accident141 and relies on above-ground spent fuel storage tanks like the 
Japanese plants. 142 
Thus, Vermont Yankee "has long been a bone of contention for many 
Vermonters." 143 In 1975, Vermont amended its public services laws to require 
the approval by both houses of the Vermont General Assembly before the state 
Public Service Board (PSB)-the equivalent of a public service commission or 
state utility board-could issue a certificate of public good for the construction 
of a nuclear power plant. 144 Vermont Yankee's original owner consented to the 
state's regulatory power over its nuclear plant, subjecting the plant to regulation 
by the Vermont PSB as well as the state Water Resources Board and Health 
Board. 145 In 2002, when Entergy Corporation bought the plant, it signed an 
agreement with the PSB that it would reapply to the PSB for a new certificate 
of public good when the plant's operating license expired in 2012. 146 
severity rating of the Fukushima crisis to the highest, matching Chernobyl in 1986" and "the Fukushima 
plant may release more radiation than Chernobyl."); see also Norirnitsu Onishi & Martin Fackler, Japan 
Hid Radiation Path Leaving Evacuees in Peril, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2011, at AI. In response to the 
accident, both Germany and Switzerland have suspended their nuclear plans. See Germany, Switzerland 
Suspend Nuclear Plans, GREENWIRE (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/gw/sample/print/7. 
140. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 67 n.13. 
141. See Snow, supra note 132 (quoting Harold Denton, NRC Director of Regulation, as saying the 
Mark I containment system had "something like a 90% probability of containment failure" in the event 
of a core meltdown). 
142. See Hurst, supra note 6 (quoting the executive director of an anti-nuclear citizens group as 
saying, when referring to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, "[t]hat plant, which uses the same General 
Electric boiling water reactors with Mark-1 containment vessels and above-ground spent waste storage 
pools as those at Vermont Yankee, contains more spent fuel than all four of the pools at Fukushima 
combined"). 
143. Jd. 
144. An Act Relating to the Certificate of Public Good for Extending the Operating License of a 
Nuclear Power Plant, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("Before a certificate of 
public good is issued for the construction of a nuclear fission plant the public service board shall obtain 
the approval of the general assembly and the assembly's determination that the construction of the 
proposed facility will promote the general welfare."). In 2005, the General Assembly recodified the 
authority of the PSB over the facility's operation, extending that authority beyond its 2010 license 
expiration date. The General Assembly's located its authority over the PSB's certification decision in 
the Assembly's regulatory authority over future spent fuel storage. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6522(c) 
(2011). This is not Vermont's first attempt at controlling initiatives involving radioactive materials. See 
generally Lisa Anne St. Amand, Note, Legislative Control Over the Uranium Industry in Vermont: 
Flirting with Preemption, 7 VT. L. REV. 315, 323 (1982) (discussing Vermont's earlier attempt to use its 
police powers to mandate legislative approval of uranium development proposals). 
145. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 420 (saying that the utility also agreed to abide by state 
rules regulating radioactive emissions and "to use its best efforts to secure AEC approval of the 
installation of any device that would restrict emissions"); id. (speculating that the reason Vermont 
Yankee signed the agreement was that "it was trying to secure the approval of the Vermont Public 
Service Board for a bond issue"). 
146. SeeWald, supra note 56, at Al6 ("When [the subsidiaries of Entergy Corporation] bought the 
plant from local utilities in 2002, they signed an agreement with Vermont's regulatory agency, the 
Public Service Board, agreeing that when the plant's 40-year license expired in March 20212, its 
'certificate of public good' would also need to be renewed."); Dave Gram, Nuke Plant VP Says Firm 
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In 2006, the General Assembly passed Vermont Act 160-the focus of 
this Article-that prevents the operation of Vermont Yankee beyond the 
expiration date of its license without the Assembly's authorization. 147 In 2008, 
the General Assembly passed Act 189, calling for a "thorough, independent, 
and public assessment" of the reliability of the plant's systems, structures, and 
components because of the plant's age. 148 Act 189 required the PSB to 
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the plant's safety when it initiated its 
review of Vermont Yankee's license extension. 149 This audit resulted in a 
"Comprehensive Reliability Assessment" of the plant's continued operation 
and safety beyond 2012 and, on balance, concluded that the plant could be 
operated safely for another twenty years. 150 Although Act 189 allows the PSB 
to start proceedings for the issuance of a certificate of public good, 151 Act 160 
prohibits the PSB from issuing the certificate without legislative approva1. 152 
By subjecting Vermont Yankee to the jurisdiction of both the state's PSB and 
General Assembly, Vermont Act 160 makes Vermont Yankee not only the sole 
Agreed to Vt. Oversight, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Nuke-
plant-VP-says-firm-apf-1869991089.html; see also Northey, supra note 124 ("Entergy argues that it 
bought the Vermont Yankee plant in 2002 under an agreement with the state that stipulated that the 
Vermont Public Service Board, not the state's legislature, would grant the plant's certificate."). 
Certificates of public good are required for all Vermont power plants. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16 
(saying Vermont "requires such certificates of all big power plants"). 
147. 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160. This Act amended title 30, section 248 of the Vermont Code 
by specifically prohibiting operation of a nuclear plant beyond the date permitted in its certificate of 
public good without the approval of the state general assembly and sets up a process for petitioning the 
PSB to gain such approval, including arranging for a study that looks at the need for the plant and its 
benefits, risks, costs, and alternatives that might promote the general welfare better than the nuclear 
plant. The study must also identify and analyze any long-term accountability and financial responsibility 
issues, as well as long-term environmental, economic, and public health issues, including issues related 
to dry cask storage of nuclear waste from the plant and decommissioning options. In spring 20 II, two 
bills were introduced in both houses of Vermont's legislature amending section 248(e)(2) by removing 
the requirement for legislative approval of the continued operation of a nuclear power plant beyond the 
date of its current certificate of public good and for the storage of spent fuel at the reactor beyond that 
date. SeeS. 84, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011); H. 331, 2011-2012 H., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011). As 
of the date of this Article, neither bill has passed either legislative body. 
148. An Act relating to a Comprehensive Vertical Audit and Reliability Assessment of the Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Facility, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 189. According to Entergy, the Act specifically 
requires an inquiry into (I) whether the "design of the system [is] in keeping with the expected initial 
conditions and its design basis"; (2) whether "plant records adequately represent the as-built condition of 
the plant'; (3) "[w]hat changes or compensations have been made to accommodate unanticipated 
operations outcomes"; (4) the results of periodic testing and inspection of the systems; (5) whether "the 
management system for aging components [has] been adequately maintained to assure the components 
meet the design basis"; (6) all repairs, modifications, and redesigns to plant systems; and (7) the efficacy 
of plant operator training. See Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 21. 
149. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 189. 
150. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 22. After the discovery of tritium in plant monitoring 
wells, Vermont Governor Shumlin ordered the PSB to appoint a "Reliability Oversight Committee" to 
provide "additional expertise on oversight of Vermont Yankee issues within the state's jurisdiction." /d. 
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
152. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 22. 
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nuclear reactor in the country facing two layers of state regulatory review, 153 
but also the only one where a state legislature can block its continued 
operation. 154 
In February 2010, after the discovery of tritium in the plant's monitoring 
wells, the state PSB opened an investigation of whether Vermont Yankee 
should be shut down or take other steps to stop radioactive and non-radioactive 
releases into the environment pending the completion of certain repairs, 
whether "good cause" existed to revoke or modify Entergy's 2002 Certificate 
of Public Good for the plant, and whether penalties should be issued because 
these releases violated Vermont law. 155 However, without waiting for the 
results of that investigation, at the urging of then-State Senator Peter Shumlin, 
the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 to direct the PSB not to issue a certificate of 
public good for the plant. 156 Explaining the Senate vote, now-Governor 
Shumlin said "the plant was too old to operate reliably." 157 In March 2011, 
despite findings by both the NRC and Vermont's nuclear engineer that the plant 
was safe, Governor Shumlin said: 
Given the serious radioactive tritium leaks and the recent tritium test 
results, the source of which has yet to be determined, and other almost 
weekly problems occurring at this facility, 1 remain convinced that it is not 
in the public good for the plant to remain open beyond its scheduled closing 
in 2012. 158 
Indicating its determination to press forward with the plant, Entergy announced 
153. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 432 n.221 ("The statute clearly provides that nuclear 
power plants are subject to the jurisdiction of the General Assembly in addition to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Board. Therefore, the statute does not merely shift evaluation of nuclear power plants 
from one state agency to the legislature but in fact subjects them to an additional layer of government 
review."); see also Wald, supra note 56, at A 16. 
154. See Hurst, supra note 6 ("[B]ecause the Vermont legislature must also approve the license 
extension, the only U.S. state where that is the case, the state decision and the NRC decision will stand 
in opposition to each other-and that has never happened in a rclicensing before."). 
155. Entergy/Vermont Yankee, Docket 7600 (Vt. Pub Serv. Bd. 2011), available at http:!/ 
psb.vermont.gov/docketandprojccts/electric/7600. 
156. SeeWald, supra note 56, at AI6 ("In February 2010, the State Senate voted 26-4, to refuse to 
grant such a certificate to V crmont Yankee, partly at the urging of the governor Peter Shumlin, who was 
then a state senator. The House did not vote."). Vermont is not the only state threatening the license 
extension of one of Entergy's nuclear plants. See Kaplan & Hakim, supra note 21, at A 18 (discussing 
Entergy's public relations campaign initiated in response to "intensified political opposition and public 
unease"); id. ("An advertising campaign would be the most visible sign yet of Entergy's concern that 
Mr. Cuomo and other opponents pose a serious threat to the future of the plant."). 
157. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16; id. ("Underlying the struggle is that the plant has had 
embarrassing operational lapses in recent years, and is the same vintage and design as No. I reactor at 
the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, which was damaged in the March II earthquake and tsunami."). 
158. Gram, supra note 136; see also Yankee Owner Tries New Strategy To Win Over Vermonters, 
VPRNEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/90481/ (According to Governor Shumlin, 
"1 don't think you can convince most Vermonters today ... that Vermont's best energy choice is to play 
Russian Roulette with an aging nuclear power plant."); Alan Wirzbicki, Vermont's Unique Nuclear 
Power Veto, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobc/ 
editorial_ opinion/ blogs/the _ angle/20 11103/vermonts _ unique.html (Governor Shumlin said "more 
states should follow Vermont's lead ... [by] 'tak[ing] control into their own hands about aging plants"'). 
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in July 2011 its intent to refuel the reactor to avoid having to shut it down. 159 
The company has been unsuccessfully trying to sell the plant for a while. 160 
The stage was set for a battle between the power company, which indicated no 
interest in shutting the plant, and the state, which had every intent that it be shut 
down. 
Predictably, Entergy filed suit to overturn the state law, 161 alleging that 
the AEA preempts Vermont Act 160. 162 Entergy's complaint asserted that the 
Senate had intruded into the province of the NRC by making a decision based 
on safety, as opposed to economic, concems. 163 Entergy denied that its lawsuit 
159. See Entergy Plans to Refuel Vermont Yankee Plant, GREENWIRE (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/201!/07/26/10 (saying that refueling will cost the company up 
to $65 million, but will earn the company $90 million if it can operate until March when its state 
certificate expires). 
160. SeeWald, supra note 56, at Al6 (Entcrgy has "tried to sell the troubled reactor, but no buyers 
stepped forward."); see also Green Mountain Power, Unwilling to get on Vermont Yankee, Looks East, 
GREENWIRE (May 25, 2011), http://www.cenews.net/Grcenwire/print/2011/05/25/12 (reporting that 
Green Mountain Power Corporation had instead reached a twenty-three year power purchase agreement 
to get electricity from Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire because of the "uncertainty 
around the future of Vermont Yankee which the state is pushing to close"); Third Vermont, Utility 
Declines Deal With Vermont Yankee, GREENWIRE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.ccnews.net/Grccnwire/ 
print/2011/04/27/14 (reporting that Vermont Electric Cooperative's board voted against entering into a 
twenty-year contract with Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant despite substantial savings). 
161. Entcrgy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-99-jgm, 2011 WL 2811317 (D. 
Vt. July 18, 2011); see also Wald, supra note 56, at Al6 (saying Entergy sued Vermont officials in 
federal district court in Burlington, Vermont "challenging the constitutionality of a state law giving the 
Vermont legislature veto power over operation of the reactor when its current license expires next 
March"). Prior to Entcrgy's lawsuit, a coalition of environmental groups sued the NRC for failing to 
obtain a section 40l(c) water quality certification from the state for the license extension or a waiver by 
the state of that requirement. See Lawsuit Alleges Clean Water Act Violations in Vermont Yankee 
License Extension, GREENWIRE (May 24, 2011), http://www.ccncws.net/Grccnwirc/print/2011/05/24110 
(discussing the lawsuit brought by the Vermont Department of Public Service and New England 
Coalition, an anti-nuclear group, claiming the NRC failed to obtain a section 401 water quality 
certificate or a state waiver of the requirement and seeking to enjoin "proposed license extension until 
Entergy Corp ... provides the water quality certificate to federal nuclear regulators"; Vermont Yankee's 
position is that the original Section 401 certificate "still applies today."). 
162. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 21-22. Entergy's nuclear subsidiary and Entcrgy 
Nuclear Vermont Yankee joined Entcrgy. The Defendants were Governor Shumlin, the state attorney 
general, and members of the V crmont PSB. See Wald, supra note 56, at A 16 (noting the suit was filed 
by Entcrgy subsidiaries Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee and Entergy Nuclear Operations and the 
defendants were Governor Shumlin, State Attorney General William Sorrell, and the members of the 
PSB). Massachusetts and three environmental organizations filed amicus briefs supporting Vermont; a 
local union filed in support of Entcrgy. Massachusetts argued that it had an interest in the future of the 
plant since it was located five miles from the border with Massachusetts and several towns in 
Massachusetts received electricity from the plant and were within its emergency evacuation zone. 
Should an accident happen, "Massachusetts communities could face contamination of soil, water, and 
agriculture resources that would force displacement of residents and businesses, conceivably devastating 
state or local economics for years into the Commonwealth's future." Brief for Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 4, Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. 
Shumlin, No. I: 11-cv-00099-jgm (D. Vt. Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/ 
files/Massachusctts%20Amicus%20in%20support%20of%20Vermonts%20opposition%20to%20PI.pdf. 
163. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16 (An Entergy executive "said the legislature had improperly 
taken the decision out of the hands of experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and given it to 
'political decision makers.' Only the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can make decisions about 
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breached the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding with the PSB in which it 
agreed to submit its relicensing application to the PSB, saying that it was not 
"going back on its word," rather the "general assembly changed the rules and 
left [it] with no other choices." 164 Although the company initially lost on its 
preliminary injunction motion to keep the plant running during the course of 
the litigation on the ground that it failed to show irreparable harm from the 
plant's closure, 165 it ultimately prevailed in the district court on its preemption 
argument. 166 
The case quickly gained national recognition, aided by comments like 
those from U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, to the effect that the 
lawsuit was none of the Justice Department's business. 167 But as Entergy sees 
it, what Vermont did is very much a matter of national concern because 
Vermont Act 160 conflicts with the AEA and its exclusive jurisdiction over the 
safety of nuclear power plants. According to Entergy, the NRC's decision to 
extend Vermont Yankee's license is proof positive of this conflict. 168 While 
Entergy seems correct in that there is little question that safety concerns played 
a role in the General Assembly's enactment of Act 160, the legislative history 
also reflects unease about the unpredictability of nuclear power plant costs. 169 
safety."); see also Northey, supra note 124 (quoting an Entergy official as saying "[t]hc 2006 law 'took 
the decision about Vermont Yankee's future away from the Public Service Board, a quasi-judicial expert 
decision-maker, independent of legislative control' and placed it into the 'hands of political 
individuals"'). Entergy additionally accused the state of being willing to issue the certificate of public 
good if the company gave "utility price breaks" to its Vermont customers, which, according to the 
lawsuit, would "violate the federal authority's exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce because it 
would result in consumers in New Hampshire and Massachusetts paying higher rates." Wald, supra note 
56, at Al6; see also Northey, supra note 124 (saying that Entergy contends that any agreement between 
it and Vermont that gave "preferential rates," compared to non-Vermont utilities, to Vermont residents 
would "favor in-state residents over out-of-state residents" and therefore violate the Commerce Clause). 
164. Wald, supra note 56, at Al6 (According to an Entergy executive: "You will hear that Entergy 
is going back on its word and breaking the deal it made in the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding. 
This is not true. We believe the general assembly changed the rules and left us with no other choices."). 
165. See Judge Rejects Bid to Keep Vermont Yankee open Amid Law Suit, GREENWIRE (July 19, 
20 II), http://www.ecnews.net/Greenwire/print/20 11/07/19/14. 
166. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012) (holding that the 
AEA preempted Vermont Act 160 and that plaintiff Entergy Vermont Yankee was also entitled to 
injunctive relief on its Commerce Clause claim). 
167. In a related maneuver, Senator Sanders, enraged that the NRC had held a secret vote on 
whether to ask the Department of Justice to intervene in the lawsuit in support of Entergy, blocked the 
nomination of a member of the NRC to a full term on the Commission. See Hannah Northey, Sanders 
Blocks Controversial NRC Pick Over Vermont Lawsuit, GREENWIRE (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.cenews.net/ Greenwire/print/2011/06/28/5. Senator Sanders only lifted the hold when the 
Department of Justice announced it would not intervene in the case. See Hannah Northey, DOJ Won't 
Intervene in Vermont Yankee Case-Sanders, E&ENEWSPM (June 30, 2010), 
http://eencws.net/eenewsprn/print/2011/06/30/05; see also Justice Department Confirms it Won't 
Intervene in Vermont Yankee Lawsuit, BERNIE SANDERS-U.S. SENATOR FOR VT. (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http:/ /www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroorn/news/?id=5dff44 78-cb04-41 Oa-9e5d-90353fl5c !3d. 
168. See generally Entergy Complaint, supra note 125. 
169. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 432 n.220 (noting rejection of the 1975 floor 
amendment that would have limited the General Assembly's approval to "non-radiological aspects of 
the construction and operation of the plant" and that legislative findings for the bill indicated "there were 
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The question is whether the state could block Vermont Yankee's relicensing to 
avoid those costs without being preempted by the AEA by straying into an area 
of exclusive federal regulation. 
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
I do not think the United States would come to an end, if we lost our power 
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled 
if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states. 
For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who 
are not trained to national views and how action is taken that embodies 
what the Commerce Clause was meant to end. 170 
This Part briefly sets out the preemption doctrine's general features, 
focusing on the presumption against preemption and the intent of the drafters of 
both the preempting and preempted law. The doctrine is examined within the 
context of general federalism principles and the policies that animate those 
principles. 
A. The Preemption Doctrine in Broad Strokes 
The preemption doctrine is entirely judge-made. It "is rooted in the 
juxtaposition of the powers reserved to the states and the supremacy of federal 
law over state law under the United States Constitution." 171 The doctrine is 
neither dictated by the Constitution nor required by our federal structure of 
government. 172 Rather than a characteristic of federal law, 173 preemption is a 
substantial questions concerning (I) the safety and effect on public health of nuclear fission plants, (2) 
the reliability of emergency core cooling systems, (3) the safe disposal of radioactive wastes, and (4) the 
economic costs of fission plants which arc unpredictable and often raise the final cost of electricity to 
prohibitive levels" (citing H. 127, 1975 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Scss. (Vt. 1975) (enacted as VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 30, § 248(c))). 
170. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 
(1920). 
171. Tribe, supra note 19, at 686. 
172. SeeS. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 
685, 754-55 (1991) ("[P]reemption adjudication docs not focus on a constitutional text, structural 
principle, or value. Preemption decisions instead interpret legislative, administrative, or common law 
schemes that issue from the federal and state governments, and determine whether the schemes can co-
regulate"). Hoke generally finds that constitutional jurisprudence is no help to a court faced with a 
conflict between federal and state law and that any reference to the Supremacy Clause is "superfluous" 
as the Clause operates at a "meta-constitutional level bereft of substantive content." !d. at 755; see also 
Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39,41 (2005) ("[A]lthough 
both supremacy and preemption displace (or supersede) state law, they operate to displace different 
types of state law and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and discretionary 
power respectively."). 
173. See Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 40-41 (Unlike preemption, "Supremacy is an attribute of 
federal law, specifying its hierarchical status vis-a-vis state law ... an attribute that automatically or 
inherently attaches to all federal law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and, like other attributes-for 
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power that Congress possesses and may choose to exercise at its discretion. 174 
Hence, congressional intent is central to any preemption analysis performed by 
a court. 
The preemption doctrine declares invalid state laws that "retard, impede, 
burden, or in any matter control[] the operation of federal law." 175 When a 
court finds that federal law preempts a state law, the state cannot take action 
based on that state law, 176 even if it would otherwise be free to act. 177 While 
example, being the law of the land directly upon enactment without need for state implementation-is not 
something that Congress can either bestow or change."); id. at 49 (identifying the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, "an enumerated power of Congress," as "the proper and best source of Congress's power of 
preemption"). 
174. See id. at 41 ("Preemption ... is a power of Congress rather than an automatic characteristic 
of federal law. Like all powers of Congress, it is discretionary and so may or may not be exercised."). 
Gardbaum argues that ''what is central to any preemption analysis is not conflict, not the Supremacy 
Clause, but the nature, source, and limits of Congress's power of preemption." !d. at 46. For this reason, 
he argues that Congress should be held to a higher standard of clarity for preemption determinations, 
similar to that imposed under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. !d. at 56-
57 ("Proper understanding of the nature of preemption as a power to abrogate concurrent state authority 
renders it sufficiently similar to Eleventh Amendment abrogation to require a similar standard, and the 
stated rationale behind the condition on both Eleventh Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause 
powers is exactly the same in the preemption context: namely, congressional altering of the 
Constitution's default position on federal-state relations."). 
175. Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling 
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 579, 585 (2008) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819)). Some 
scholars ascribe to the theory that affected individuals should only be required to respond to one master. 
See Kenneth L. Hirsh, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 525 (1972) 
(San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon/, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and other cases "like it suggest 
what may be called a 'one master' theory of preemption. This theory declares that private activities 
subject to regulation by a federal agency with broad regulatory powers should be subject to only one 
master; state laws imposing requirements which could be imposed by the federal agency are 
presumptively invalid."); see also id. ("The important point to note here is that the 'one master' theory is 
a judicially elaborated doctrine of preemption which is based on the principle that different types of laws 
require different types of preemption rules."); id. at 550 ("[T]he one-master theory is treated as a 
presumption rather than as an absolute rule; the Court applies it in cases where Congress has delegated 
regulatory powers to a federal agency unless there are substantial countervailing factors," and the theory 
"does not extend to cases where the delegated federal authority does not permit comprehensive federal 
regulation of what the Court perceives to be the relevant field." (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962))). 
176. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 27-28 ("[When the Court] forecloses state regulatory power by 
finding a state enactment preempted, the states cannot avoid the result but must cease to act in a field 
that may be of great local or regional concern. If the Court finds against preemption, however, the state 
remains capable of regulating the subject. If Congress disagrees, it can legislate away state authority 
explicitly. Thus a state-supportive presumption in preemption cases shows deference to primary 
congressional responsibility for the federal balance."); see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 687 n.4 ("The 
term 'preempted' surfaces in a wide range of legal contexts, often merely as a synonym for 'forbidden' 
or 'ousted.' In its strict sense, the term 'federal preemption' expresses the conclusion that state or local 
law must be disabled from operation because it conflicts with some aspect of a federal legislative 
scheme. Thus, federal statutes and administrative regulations constitute the potentially preemptive law in 
this strict sense. Other types of federal law, including federal constitutional law and federal common law 
principles, may also disable and displace state and local law, but those inquiries proceed under legal 
principles that diverge from legislative preemption .... "). 
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preemption allows the federal government to displace state law with respect to 
matters within the federal government's constitutional powers, 178 it allows 
state regulation to supplement federal initiatives so long as the state does not 
interfere with or otherwise obstruct the federal law's purposes. 179 
The preemption doctrine has evolved into what Professor Schroeder calls 
"a multipart universe consisting of express and implied preemption, the latter 
encompassing both field and conflict preemption, which is further divided into 
physical impossibility and obstacle preemption." 180 If the language of the 
federal law is explicit as to its preemptive effect, that is called express 
preemption; 181 otherwise, preemption is implied. 182 Implied preemption has 
177. See Susann J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the 
Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. I, 10 (1995); see also Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("Supremacy means 
that in the case of a conflict between federal and state law, federal law trumps or displaces the 
conflicting state law."); id. at 46 ("[S]upremacy is all about conflict. Conflict between federal and state 
laws is the only reason that state laws are displaced under the principle of supremacy. By contrast, 
preemption is not all about conflict between federal and state laws, but is primarily about a 
congressional power and its exercise. It is the exercise of this power that is the major reason state law is 
displaced-because Congress has said so-and not the existence of the resulting conflict."); Bradford R. 
Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, 167, 192-93 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 
2009) ("The negative implication of the [Supremacy] Clause, however, is that state law continues to 
govern in the absence of 'the supreme Law of the Land."'). Gardbaum refers to supremacy as a "lesser 
principle" compared to Congress's preemptive power. Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 48 ("[T]he 
Supremacy Clause is the only source of the (lesser) principle of supremacy and not the (greater) power 
of preemption."). 
178. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 4. 
179. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 687. But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court 
Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S 
CORE QUESTION 127 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 2009) ("When Congress has 
taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is 
not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." (quoting 
Charleston & W. Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (Holmes, J.))). 
Hoke makes the point that the Supremacy Clause is only one of the constitutional provisions that 
addresses the relationship between the federal and state governments. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 756 
n.337 ("[T]he supremacy clause is only one feature of the particular federalism which structures the 
national government and its interrelation with the states," with the ninth, tenth, and fourteenth 
amendments and the guarantee clause as other "specific texts upon which our federalism is structured."). 
180. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 143. But see id. at 125 n.23 ("Once we recognize that all 
preemption cases are about contradiction between state and federal law, we should begin to question the 
usefulness of dividing them into the separate analytical categories of 'express' preemption, 'field' 
preemption, and 'conflict' preemption." (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 
(2000))); Karen V. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretative Issues, 51 
VAND. L. REv. 1149, 1175 (1998) ("The slippery path between the frustration prong of conflict 
preemption and field preemption reinforces the view that the three categories of implied preemption are 
not 'rigidly distinct."'); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal 
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 69, 74 (2005) ("[T]here should be only two situations when there is 
preemption of state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law and state law are 
mutually exclusive so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both. This would then eliminate 
preemption based on states interfering with the achievement of the federal objective. It would eliminate 
implied preemption based on the intent of Congress."). 
181. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 586 ("As the name suggests, express preemption 
arises as a result of the explicit language of a federal statute."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 
2012] NUCLEAR GENIE 721 
the same preemptive effect as express preemption. 183 
One type of implied preemption, field or occupation preemption, requires 
a court to determine not only that the federal government has occupied a 
regulatory field, but also that a state has impermissibly intruded into it. 184 
Although field preemption can be implied from the pervasiveness of federal 
regulation, based on a "reasonable inference" that Congress intended not to 
allow state activity in the area, 185 courts today find pervasiveness less helpful 
than they once did. 186 For example, the mere fact that a federal agency has 
promulgated many complex regulations in a given field does not mean that a 
court will infer from this a congressional intent to preempt that field 
123, at I 02 n.99 (describing the proposition that Congress may preempt state law in express tenns 
(citing Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977))). 
182. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 590 ("Congress has the authority to expressly 
preempt state law, and its failure to do so is significant. Reading a statute to displace state regulatory 
authority in the absence of a textual provision based on general statutory purposes is precisely the sort of 
interpretive methodology that textualists criticize. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that there should be no 
such thing as implied preemption in the sense of displacing state authority."). But see Stabile, supra note 
177, at 86 ("The flexibility of an implied preemption analysis allows courts to consider whether their 
preemption decision is appropriate not only in terms of the statute in question but in the context of the 
regulation of that field as a whole."); id. ("[C]ourts engaging in implied preemption analysis can analyze 
and balance the competing federal and state interests with appropriate regard for the existing social, 
political and legal landscape, as well as for the regulation of the relevant field as a whole."). 
183. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 587 ("Field preemption is a form of implied 
preemption under which federal law completely displaces any state law in a given area-even if there is 
no apparent inconsistency between federal and state law."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 30 
("Preemption by occupation forecloses state authority even though Congress has not enacted legislation 
dealing with the precise subject under scrutiny."). 
184. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1169. 
185. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 31 (The factors used by courts to determine field preemption 
specifically include: "The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a 
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal 
law and the character of the obligation imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230-31 (1947))); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 ("[Federal 
occupation of a field] may be evinced by the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, by the 
overriding dominance of the federal interest, or by the nature of the federal purpose and the character of 
the obligations imposed by the federal law."); Schroeder, supra note 179, at 128 ("Field preemption in 
such areas of primary federal authority similarly amounts to the inverse of the 'presumption against 
preemption' that operates in areas where state regulation has historically been dominant. Here, the Court 
is using the criterion of dominant federal interest much as it has used the criterion of regulatory 
pervasiveness, as an indicator of whether or not the Congress intended to occupy the field."); Borchers 
& Dauer, supra note 123, at 103 n.IOO (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 
141, 153 (1982)). 
186. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 31 ("It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has 
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the 
States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide." (quoting Santa Fe, 331 U.S. at 
231)); id. at 33 ("A finding that the California Nuclear law invades a field exclusively occupied by 
federal regulatory authority must thus be based on a sounder footing than the mere fact of abundant 
federal legislative activity."). 
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entirely. 187 Findings of no field preemption also include instances where there 
is a federal licensing scheme. 188 According to Professor Wiggins, even where 
Congress has "enacted 'pervasive' legislation on a subject, its regulatory 
interest will not automatically be converted into preemption of state legislation 
in the same field."l89 
Additionally, field preemption will not automatically be found where there 
is an "important federal interest" in the subject area being regulated. 190 
However, the "national character" of the area being regulated, such as foreign 
affairs, as opposed to the importance of the federal interest, may still be key to 
a judicial decision. 191 Finally, unless there is an actual conflict between the 
federal and state law, the congressional purpose underlying the federal statute is 
also of limited importance in determining field or occupation preemption. 192 
187. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 47I U.S. 707, 718 (1985) ("[I]f an 
agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume 
and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt. Given the 
presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist 
with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, 
an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety."). 
188. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 n.48 (Huron Portland Cement Co. "demonstrates that the 
existence of a federal licensing scheme does not always imply preemption."); see also Ray v. At!. 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168--69 (1978) ("Of course, that a tanker is certified under federal law as a 
safe vessel insofar as its design and construction characteristics are concerned does not mean that it is 
free to ignore otherwise valid state or federal rules or regulations that do not constitute design or 
construction specifications."). 
189. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 33,40 ("The comprehensiveness of a federal legislative scheme no 
longer is held to indicate Congressional intent to occupy the field."); see also New York State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) ("We reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-
emption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive 
provisions . . . . The subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature 
require intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending 
its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 
U.S. 238, 239 (1984) ("[P]re-emption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal Government has 
so completely occupied the field of safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state 
standard in a damage action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law."). 
190. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1166 ("[B]ecause every subject that merits federal legislation is 
a subject of national concern, [field preemption] analysis requires a finding of some 'special features' 
warranting preemption."). 
191. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 34 (discussing "national character of the subject matter," 
adding labor regulation "to this list of preempted subjects," and noting that "[f]oreign affairs policy is a 
classic early example of a subject which should be regulated only at the federal level" (citing Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941))); id. at 41 ("The remaining Rice factor, the characterization of the 
subject matter regulated as either national or local, is the key to occupation analysis. The Court is 
familiar with the federalism balancing function involved in employing this standard because it has been 
used in dormant commerce clause cases since Cooley. It is also a sufficiently standardless guidepost to 
permit the value preferences of the Justices regarding appropriate federal-state authority over a 
particular subject matter to predominate."). 
I 92. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 40 ("The Court has also deemphasized the importance of the 
purpose for which Congress legislates .... "); id. at 40-41 ("In the less obvious cases which normally 
arise, however, the Court now seeks to compare the objectives of state and federal legislation to uphold 
both actions if possible. Thus, the purpose factor of Rice has been transplanted from occupation to 
conflict analysis."); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 692 (Ray "demonstrates that where the federal and 
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How a court defines the federal regulatory field is critical: 193 the narrower 
the scope of a preemptive federal field, the less likely a state law will intrude 
into it. 194 Narrowing the scope of the field thus lessens the likelihood that 
preemption will create an undesirable regulatory gap that may not be filled 
until, and if, Congress acts. 195 
Another type of implied preemption is conflict preemption. Conflict 
preemption may occur in two situations: when compliance with both federal 
and state law is impossible or when a state law presents an obstacle to meeting 
the objective and purpose of a federal law. 196 Impossibility preemption is 
rare, 197 and courts do not generally look for conflicts between federal and state 
laws. 198 For example, the mere existence of state standards that are different 
state means do not conflict, similarity of purpose will not necessarily result in a finding of 
preemption."). 
193. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 126 ("When the Federal Government completely occupies a 
given field or an identifiable portion of it ... the test of pre-emption is whether 'the matter on which the 
State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act' and not whether the state 
regulation conflicts with a specific federal requirement. In these cases, a critical question can often be 
how the 'field' that has been preempted is to be defined." (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 260)). 
194. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1167 ("[C]ase law also shows that the Court will seek to narrow 
the scope of the preemptive field to mitigate against the impact of field preemption." (citing Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983))); see also Robert L. 
Glicksman, Federal Preemption by Inaction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY 
OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 167, 181 n.33 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 
2009); Schroeder, supra note 179, at 123 ("The presumption against preemption instructs the courts to 
give federal statutes a 'narrow reading' in order to avoid interpretations that would override state law 
and to look for a 'clear' statement that Congress means to preempt state law."); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 180, at 75 ("Even as to express preemption, provisions of federal law that expressly preempt state 
law should be narrowly construed unless Congress has indicated otherwise."); Hoke, supra note 172, at 
763; Tribe, supra note 19, at 689; Baum, supra note 77, at 667 ("Even if some amount of federal 
preemption is found, the states' police power is not considered totally preempted, but is invalidated only 
'to the extent that it clearly has been preempted."' (quoting Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp., 677 
F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 1982))). 
195. But see Jordan, supra note 180, at 1167 (1998) ("Field preemption creates a regulatory 
vacuum that courts must honor because, in theory, Congress deliberately created the vacuum."); see also 
discussion of regulatory gaps supra notes 60--61. 
196. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("[C]onflict preemption arises in two ways. The 
first is when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law .... The second type of conflict 
preemption occurs when state law is an obstacle to the object and purpose of federal law."). Professor 
Schroeder notes that the Court's reluctance to find field preemption has led it to decide these cases on 
conflict grounds. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 131 ("The Supreme Court in recent years has shown 
reluctance to find additional federal statutes to have engaged in field preemption. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court continues to decide in numerous cases that 'conflict' preemption exists."). 
197. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("Impossibility of compliance is relatively 
rare, but when it is present, preemption is clear."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 103 
(citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), for the proposition 
that "state law is preempted when compliance with both state and federal standards 'is a physical 
impossibility'" and quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), for the proposition that state 
law is preempted when it "is 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress"'). 
198. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 ("The Court upheld a Detroit ordinance regulating smoke 
emitted while a ship's boilers were being cleaned, despite extensive federal licensing of such ships in 
interstate and foreign commerce. The Court, refusing to 'seek[] out conflicts between state and federal 
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from their federal counterparts does not create an impossibility situation if the 
regulated party can comply with both sets of standards simultaneously. 199 
The second type of conflict preemption-obstacle preemption-requires a 
reviewing court to determine whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress."200 Thus, a 
reviewing court must examine how the state and federal laws are interpreted 
and applied. 201 This requires courts to look beyond the federal statute's text 
and structure and to inquire about the relevant section's purpose. 202 This 
includes examining whether, given the broader legal context into which the 
regulation where none clearly exists,' found 'no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection 
laws' that set safety standards for federal licensing of sea-going vessels and the municipal control 
ordinance." (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,446 (1960))); id. at 720 ("In 
determining whether the state's nuclear provisions are preempted, a court must be cognizant of the 
'sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state 
sovereignties' and 'the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes with one 
another rather than holding one completely ousted."' (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. 
Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 123 (1971))). 
199. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("It is important to note that the existence of 
state standards that differ from federal standards does not always implicate impossibility of compliance, 
if the regulated party can physically comply with both standards."). See also Tribe, supra note 19, at 688 
n.44 ( "The Court noted that it 'must be careful to distinguish between those situations in which the 
concurrent exercise of a power ... may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where conflicts 
will necessarily arise.'" (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (sustaining 
California law "in the face of federal copyright laws"))); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 49 ("[T]he Court 
might have opted to find a conflict between the ordinance and federal law, because it was impossible to 
comply with the Detroit regulation using the boilers and fuel authorized by the Coast Guard. Instead, the 
Court held there was 'no overlap' between the two regulations because they were aimed at different 
purposes. . . . This difference in purpose prevented preemption, even though it left Huron with the 
unattractive option of making substantial modifications to its vessels' Coast Guard-approved boilers or 
avoiding the Port of Detroit." (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 
(1960))); id. at 84 ("At the policy level, then, there is reason for arguing that since the current Court will 
not find that a conflict between state and federal law 'will necessarily,' arise, a different result [from 
First Iowa preempting a state law requiring a hydroelectric facility to get a state permit as a condition 
precedent to securing a federal permit under the Federal Power Act] would be reached in the merits." 
(citing First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946))). 
200. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 43 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)). 
201. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1171 ("Whether a state 'law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ... requires [an analysis 
of] the relationship between the state and federal law as they are interpreted and applied."' (quoting 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977))); see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 10 ("Federal 
legislative goals and purposes cannot be viewed as standing in a vacuum; instead they must be weighed 
against the interests the state has in enacting its legislation."). 
202. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1225 ("Under a purposive approach to the question, a court 
would then look beyond the statute's language and structure in order to determine what purpose or 
policy or underlying principle ought to be attributed to the provisions at issue."); id. at 1203-04 
(discussing how courts "should consider relevant sources of information in addition to the statute's text, 
such as the law's legislative history and the circumstances surrounding the law's enactment" when 
trying to identify a law's purpose); id. at 1204 (Hart and Sacks posit "that in construing a statute to carry 
out its purpose, courts should take into account relevant overarching principles and policies and should 
ensure that the interpretation is in accord with any relevant 'policy of clear statement,' such as the 
premise underlying preemption that state laws should not be found preempted absent 'clear evidence' of 
congressional intent."). 
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federal law was enacted, Congress reasonably would have enacted such a 
provision. 2°3 Courts are increasingly willing to find obstacle preemption, 
perhaps because legislative purpose is often subject to interpretation and the 
analysis required to find obstacle preemption is becoming less rigorous. 204 
Scholars differ as to what must or should be shown to establish obstacle 
preemption. For Professor Wiggins, determining the existence of obstacle 
preemption is relatively simple-when a state law has the same purpose as a 
federal law, state law will more likely present an obstacle to the fulfillment of 
that federal law and, therefore, be preempted. 205 Professor Jordan argues, 
however, that the state and federal methods designed to achieve a shared goal 
must actually conflict. 206 Additionally, Professors Levy and Glicksman argue 
that since laws have many purposes, 207 less important purposes should not be 
used to support federal preemption of protective state laws208 unless Congress 
provides an indisputable and clear signal of preemptive intent. 209 Regardless of 
203. See id. at 1225 ("While a court could not attribute to the statute a meaning that the words 
would not bear, the court would treat the statute as not only having an immediate purpose, but also a 
larger and subtler purpose in its relation to the legal system as a whole. Thus, a court would consider the 
context of the statute's enactment and inquire why, given the state of the law, a reasonable legislator 
would have enacted the provision."). 
204. See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change 
Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, I SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 23, 47 (2009) 
[hereinafter Buzbee, Preemption Sword] (describing "a growing 'obstacle preemption' jurisprudence 
where a direct conflict need not be shown for preemptive outcomes; rather, challenges must merely 
demonstrate that a state or local law strikes a different balance than federal law"). But see Li, supra note 
44, at 1204 ( "[T]he Court has not read the Constitution as an absolute bar to any state action that affects 
foreign affairs" and "the Court's preemption doctrine has increasingly favored state interests."). 
205. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 55 (saying "when state and national regulation are aimed at the 
same purpose the Court seems more willing to find the state statute obstructs federal law and is therefore 
unconstitutional"); id. ("The majority opinion in Area [Ray] demonstrates again that the characterization 
of the state purpose remains very important in conflict preemption decisionmaking."). But see Gade v. 
Nat'! Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) ("In determining whether state law 'stands as 
an obstacle' to the full implementation of a federal law, 'it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of 
both federal and state law' is the same ... 'A state law also is pre-empted if interferes with the methods 
by which the federal statute was designed to reach th[at] goal."'). 
206. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1174 (State law can be preempted if it "hinders either the 
primary substantive purpose underlying the federal law or the secondary purpose of avoiding duplicative 
regulation." (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 103)). 
207. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of State 
Remedies in Collective Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919, 929 (2009) ("[M)ost federal 
laws have multiple purposes of varying degrees of centrality ... [and] it is important to distinguish 
between the primary or principal purposes of a statute-those justifications that were central to a 
statute's adoption-and secondary purposes that might have been articulated during the legislative 
process."). 
208. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 610 ("[G]eneral references to minimizing 
regulatory burdens, protecting businesses, or balancing environmental protection and economic growth 
should not, standing alone, justify the conclusion that federal law precludes states from adopting a 
different balance that is more protective of the environment than the federal standard is."). 
209. See id. at 642 ( "The analysis in the [Ninth Circuit's] fuel additive case does not preclude 
Congress from preempting state regulation that would frustrate the secondary purposes associated with 
environmental legislation. It simply cautions courts not to find preemption based on conflicts with those 
purposes absent clear indication of congressional intent, preferably on the face of the statute."); see also 
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what scholars believe the showing must be to establish obstacle preemption, 
those who are more protective of state laws oppose preemption's increasing use 
to strike down state laws. 210 
There is little question that Congress has the power to preempt state law 
when acting within its constitutional limits. 211 When preemption occurs, 
however, it "strikes at the distribution of federal and state power in a federal 
system"212 and, therefore, according to Professor Tribe, should not be taken 
lightly. 213 By preempting state law, Congress transforms a mixed federal-state 
regulatory area into one that is exclusively federal, either totally or partially 
depriving states of their pre-existing legislative authority. 214 When federal law 
Goxem, supra note I 0, at 450 ("Pursuant to the decisions in Pacific Gas and Silkwood, all state and local 
regulation of implementation of an offsite plan should not be preempted. Rather a determination of 
whether a particulate state action is preempted is dependent upon an examination of the particular 
purpose behind each individual legislative action. In the alternative, when state and local governments 
are acting pursuant to their traditional police powers, courts should focus on whether there is a clear 
congressional intent to displace such action. This is true even though the action may constitute 
regulation of nuclear power safety."). 
210. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 183 ("If the only reason that a state reaches a different 
decision on the desirability of regulation is that the two levels of government assess comparative risks 
differently-because, for example, the state places a higher priority than the federal government does in 
addressing a particular form of market failure, as compared to alternative uses of government 
resources-{;onflict or obstacle preemption is not justified on the ground that state regulation would 
interfere with the achievement of federal objectives."); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 
(2009) ("If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have 
enacted an express pre-emption provision."); William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, 
Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and lntergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 1521, 1572 n. 237 ("[A] grant of authority to an agency to set standards 'did not include the 
authority to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute because no such delegation regarding the 
statute's enforcement provisions is evident in the statute."' (quoting Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 
u.s. 638,649-50 (1990)). 
211. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 124 ("It is well established that within constitutional limits 
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms."). 
212. Tribe, supra note 19, at 686 ("Preemption by the federal government of the states' power to 
regulate an activity strikes at the distribution of federal and state power in a federal system."); see also 
Hoke, supra note 172, at 752 ("As a nonnative matter, existing preemption jurisprudence warrants 
revision because it has eroded meaningful constitutional federalism as well as the political space 
available for civic republican activities."); id at 714 ("Civic republicanism constructs a normative lens 
through which to measure the social and political costs of current preemption adjudication, and counsels 
an interpretive approach that promotes maximum preservation of state and local regulatory power."); 
Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("[B]y exercising its power of preemption, Congress can displace state 
law even where the latter is not in conflict with federal law" and "by exercising its preemption power, 
Congress may ... [also] redistribute general legislative competence between itself and the states"). 
213. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 143 ("Because the ultimate issue in preemption cases is so 
fundamental and important, the doctrines the Supreme Court has developed to resolve preemption 
controversies have been and will continue to be the subject of controversy."); see also Kenneth W. Starr, 
Reflections on Hines v. Davidowitz: The Future of Obstacle Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. I (2005) 
("For decades, the doctrine of preemption has been a fecund source of confusion and division."); 
Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("Congress's power of preemption, when exercised to the full, has a 
far more radical impact on state law than the automatic characteristic of federal supremacy."). 
214. Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41; see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 9 ("There are at least 
three identifiable principles that should underlie preemption analysis: (I) appropriate regard for 
federalism, which involves consideration of both the federal interest in Congress' substantive regulation 
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preempts state law it "kills off ... an entire scheme of a particular community's 
law," a result Professor Hoke calls "jurispathic."215 She finds this result 
troubling because it allows judges applying the preemption doctrine to overrule 
a law enacted by state legislators who, arguably, better understand the needs 
and desires of their constituents than unelected federal judges.216 Thus, 
according to some, although Congress has the power to preempt, courts should 
rarely find preemption because it disrupts the delicate balance between federal 
and state power in our federal structure by eliminating one of the contributors 
to that balance. 
In contrast, scholars who envision a cooperative federal-state regulatory 
regime217 find this "jurisdictional line drawing" between federal and state 
governments pointless. 218 In the modem federal state, where law and reality 
and the states' interest in enacting their legislation and in preserving their spheres of power; (2) 
predictability; and (3) ease of administration."). 
215. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 694 ("The shortcomings resulting from current preemption 
practice have a broader impact than that of fortifYing the substantive injuries to the public that flow from 
misguided or weak national regulation ... a ruling of federal preemption is inherently 'jurispathic,' it 
kills off one line, perhaps even an entire scheme, of a particular community's law." (quoting Robert 
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword-Nomos and Narrative, 87 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 
(1983))). 
216. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 694 ("The law slayed by a preemption ruling arises from the 
political and legal bodies that are both closest and most amenable to practical political efforts by average 
citizen."). 
217. See Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1669 (2009) ("A 
dynamic, polyphonic view of federalism-a workable government where federal, state, tribal, and local 
authorities are appropriately matched with geographic and socioeconomic issues-should encourage 
stronger, more coherent and more cooperative forms of problem solving and leadership."); see also 
Tribe, supra note 19, at 687 (The Merrill Lynch Court "noted that 'the proper approach is to reconcile 
the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'" 
(quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973))); Edward J. Larson, 
Building a Nation from Thirteen States: The Constitutional Convention and Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. 
REv. 7, 14 (2005) (According to Madison's Convention notes in support of a proposal to have state 
legislatures appoint Senators: "[W]hatever power may be necessary for the Nat[iona)l Gov[emmen]t a 
certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the 
extreme parts of the U.S. [sic] so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to 
have some means of defending themselves ag[ain]st encroachments of the Nat[iona]l Gov[ernmen]t. In 
every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defense. Shall we leave the 
States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than 
the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Nat[iona]l 
Establishment[?])."). 
218. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature 
of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. I, 17 (2007) ("The world is growing more complex, and 
regulation is following suit. In particular-and perhaps most relevant for present purposes-the ensuing 
articles paint a picture in which jurisdictional line-drawing is increasingly futile."); id. ("The emergence 
of an array of new actors; heightened mobility; increasing external effects driven by new and varied 
technologies, and a litany of related trends have collectively undermined the meaning-and perhaps the 
singular utility--of boundaries."); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive 
Environmental Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 277, 296 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 2009) 
("As a general matter ... efforts to identity the optimal level of government for federal regulation are 
misconceived."). 
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are constantly changing in response to new social, political, and economic 
conditions, 219 power is "flattening"; the hierarchy between different levels of 
government is becoming less important as power is allocated and 
reallocated. 22° Coordination, not conflict, is what is called for between and 
among different levels of government,221 with overlap the growing reality in 
law and regulation. 222 These scholars therefore argue the critical question is 
how to manage this jurisdictional overlap and federal-state interface 
effectively. 223 
The mismanagement of this fluid distribution of power between states and 
the federal government could cause serious "negative consequences," such as 
preventing a state from achieving its goals without justification. 224 To some, 
this possibility means that courts should proceed cautiously when faced with 
the potential of changing that power distribution. 225 It also means that, since 
219. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 17. 
220. /d. at 24-25 ("In important respects, the articles herein can be read to tell a story of the 
flattening of power ... a softening of the sharp edges of hierarchy in law and regulation. If not quite 
democratic, the allocations of power described herein are at least more dispersed."). To Ahdieh, this 
phenomenon leads to new "operative strategies." !d. at 24 ("In a coordination game dynamic, the 
operative strategic need is to align expectations, rather than alter incentives."); id. at 25 ("A flattening of 
power, and resulting need for regulatory institutions to engage in persuasion to advance their aims, 
follows quite naturally from the generalized sense of complexity . . . . "). Reflecting this flattening, 
Resnik sees states interacting among themselves, "resulting in individual localities or states adopting 
specific measures." Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light ofTranslocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 86 (2007). 
221. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 5 (identifying "four facets of modern jurisdiction," what 
Ahdieh calls "intersystemic governance," reflected in "regulatory design" as "complexity and overlap," 
"dynamic of coordination," "patterns of dependence among regulatory institutions," and "a growing role 
of persuasion, rather than hierarchical mechanisms of control"); id. at 18 (discussing the need for 
coordination given "the patterns of jurisdictional overlap" and how "bargains" or what Mark Tushnet 
calls "political deals," "define federalism in the United States," and how these "bargains, at heart, are 
coordination games"); see also Resnik, supra note 220, at 42 ("Despite the ideology of each state acting 
alone as one of fifty within the United States, the practice is increasingly coordinated, in part in response 
to translocal businesses and NGOs, lobbying across jurisdictions, and to a media similarly unleashed 
from territorial constraints."); id. at 87-88 (discussing "the degree to which local and state actors work 
in conjunction with their counterparts as they shape and are in tum affected by policies that transcend 
the boundaries of their jurisdictions"). 
222. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 17; see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 277 
(describing the "current system of environmental federalism" as "a dynamic one of overlapping federal 
and state jurisdiction"). 
223. See Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-
Westphalian World, EMORY L.J. 115, 120-21 (2007) [hereinafter Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic 
Governance] ("Federalism is a system in which there are multiple nodes of political authority within a 
country. Polyphonic federalism focuses on the creative overlap of these different legal regimes."). 
224. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 10 ("When the preemption balance is struck incorrectly, 
negative consequences result. In some cases, there will be an improper interference with a state sphere 
of authority, preventing the state's attainment of its goals without appropriate justification."). For 
additional arguments why preemption is a bad idea, see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text. 
225. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 763 ("Because a judgment of federal preemption implicates 
federal structure and civic republican activities, it is appropriate to constrain and direct judicial 
interpretation of allegedly preemptive federal statutes ... these vital capabilities must be channeled to 
protect republican federalisin and participatory politics."). 
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this is "a field of constitutional law in which policy and law are inextricably 
intertwined,"226 any redistribution of that balance will cause friction. 227 
Despite these scholarly arguments and Professor Buzbee's statement that 
"the federal versus state choice is, in a sense, the wrong question because 
interaction and mutual learning has been the norm in most areas of federal risk, 
product, and environmental regulation,"228 it is still a choice that courts grapple 
with when deciding whether federal law preempts a state law or course of 
action. Determining whether state law supplements federal law, rather than 
interferes or conflicts with it, can be very difficult. 229 Given the indeterminacy 
of the answer to the factual question whether a federal law preempts a state 
law, the arguments among legal scholars are shedding little light on the answer, 
except possibly those scholars who suggest that the courts proceed with caution 
because of the federalism consequences of their actions. 
Concern about disabling otherwise legitimate state legislation and 
disrupting the delicate balance between state and federal authority is 
particularly sharp in the environmental law context. Environmental problems 
are typically "multifaceted" and multi- or inter-jurisdictional230 and harms can 
226. Schroeder, supra note 179 at 143. 
227. See Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 62 ("The existence of concurrent powers necessarily 
presumes a certain amount of unavoidable inconvenience and friction when they are both exercised. 
Supremacy is designed to do away with the most extreme form of such friction-namely, 
irreconcilability-but not all forms."). Perhaps for this reason, Professor Chemerinisky recommends 
looking at preemption through the lens of federalism, in which federalism is seen as empowering 
different levels of government to deal effectively with society's ills. See Chemerinsky, supra note 180, 
at 74 (proposing "an alternative thesis with regards to preemption and federalism ... [namely] 
federalism as empowerment"); id. at 75 ("In this way, I think, we achieve the optimal level of 
federalism, empowering government at all levels to deal with society's serious social problems."). 
228. William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for 
Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1544 (2009) [hereinafter 
Buzbee, Hard Look]. But see Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 33 (William W. Buzbee 
ed., Cambridge University Press 2009) [hereinafter Schapiro, Polyphony] ("[P)reemption is 
fundamentally a question of institutional choice" about whether the federal government should be "the 
sole regulator in a particular area or should state and federal laws operate concurrently," which level can 
"promise the best regulatory design," which design (unilateral or cooperative) should Congress or 
federal agencies select, "and how should courts discern this regulatory choice in specific situations."). 
229. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1661 ("One can hardly dispute that preemption issues are 
complex and highly nuanced, involving both federalism and separation of powers-congressional 
prerogatives, agency competence, and judicial deference-as well as efficiency, equity, victim 
compensation, and cost-shifting objectives."); see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 80 n.313 ("Less 
charitably, it might be countered that judicial determination of when federal law preempts state law 
means that preemption analysis will be subject to the Supreme Court's 'vacillating perspective on 
federalism."' (quoting William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on 
Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 623,626 (1975))). 
230. Professor Robert Shapiro describes contemporary federalism in this country as "layered 
governance." Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 115 (describing 
"contemporary federalism" in the United States as "layered governance"). But see Schapiro, Polyphony, 
supra note 228, at 42 ("Political scientists have debated whether a 'layer cake' or a 'marble cake' best 
reflects federalism. However, either of these spatial/gastronomic metaphors envisions state and federal 
regulation as inhabiting separate regions. It is difficult to imagine two things occupying the same space 
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be caused by a variety of market and regulatory failures, which "arise along 
numerous dimensions and at different scales."231 As a result, the wherewithal 
to attend to environmental problems generally occurs at more than one level of 
government, depending on the mix of political, economic, and environmental 
factors involved. 232 Therefore, the consequences of preempting a state 
environmental law are particularly severe as it removes a critical layer of 
government implementation and enforcement of environmental norms. 
B. Judicial Presumptions and Congressional Intent 
This section examines two predominate features of the preemption 
doctrine: the judicial presumption disfavoring preemption and the importance 
of congressional intent. 233 The application of each involves wide swathes of 
judicial discretion, making any particular outcome of a preemption case highly 
unpredictable. 
1. A Judicial Presumption Against Preemption 
The presumption against preemption of state law is a "consistent 
overarching" doctrinal principle in preemption cases, amounting to a 
"substantive canon disfavoring the result of preemption."234 The underlying 
premise for the presumption is that Congress does not intend to preempt state 
law. 235 As the Supreme Court said in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, "because States 
without combining into a new undifferentiated whole. The choice is layer cake, marble cake, or stew."). 
He calls the concurrent exercise of authority "polyphonic federalism." See Schapiro, Federalism as 
Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 120 ("Polyphonic federalism emphasizes that, as a 
descriptive matter, states and the federal government in fact exercise concurrent authority."). 
231. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 278 (explaining that the authors' approach "rejects the 
static matching principle for an adaptive model" because environmental problems are "multifaceted; 
[s]ources of environmental harm may be the manifestation of numerous failures, market as well as 
regulatory, that arise along numerous dimensions and at different scales"). The authors are particularly 
interested in what adaptive models can teach about "the benefits of a more dynamic federalism, as well 
as the appropriateness of an adaptive approach to federalism in managing a highly complex and 
changing system such as the natural environment and the human impacts upon it." !d. at 279 (explaining 
the authors' interest in determining "whether the strategy embodied in adaptive systems adds additional 
support for arguments for over-lapping federal and state jurisdictions and against static attempts to carve 
out separate state and federal regulatory roles"). 
232. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 278. 
233. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 585 (calling these two features "foundational 
premises" of traditional preemption doctrine). 
234. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563; id. at 1570--71 ("As a matter of Supreme 
Court doctrine, however, the decided weight of preemption and administrative law precedents favors the 
presumption in favor of preserving 'state-created rights."'); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 122 
("In dealing with [express preemption cases], the Supreme Court frequently articulates one particular 
principle or canon of statutory interpretation. This is the 'presumption against preemption,' which is 
designed to implement respect for federalism values."); Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 
48. 
235. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption cases, and 
particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied, we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
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are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that 
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."236 The 
presumption thus originates in federalism concems237 about preserving state 
"sovereign authority to regulate for the well-being of their people, even if the 
Constitution contemplates that state power will be restricted in some ways and 
that federal law will be supreme in case of a conflict."238 In this view, federal 
laws like the AEA are merely "interstitial," acting against a "backdrop" of state 
law and policies.239 Accordingly, courts use the presumption against 
preemption because they should not infer congressional intent to displace state 
authority without serious consideration. 240 
The presumption against preemption is particularly strong when 
"Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the states have traditionally 
occupied."241 Thus, the presumption against preemption is robust when the 
basis for state action is its traditional police powers. 242 However, courts will 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purposes of Congress."'); see also 
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650-51 (1990) ("[F]ederal rights should be regarded as 
supplementing state-created rights unless otherwise indicated."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 
589-90. 
236. Medtronic Inc., 518 U.S. at 485. 
237. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 589 ("The presumption against preemption is based 
principally on federalism concerns, but we [the authors] think that those federalism principles are 
reinforced by principles oftextualism in statutory construction."); id. at 590 ("[Textualism] ensures that 
Congress makes a conscious choice to displace state regulatory authority, a choice that has been 
approved through the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment. This ensures in tum that 
the political safeguards of federalism are operative."). 
238. !d. at 589 (calling this concern "(a]n essential principle of (American] federalism"); see also 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ("Although the Constitution grants broad powers to 
Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status 
as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."); Rice v. Sante Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Suffice it to say that due regard 
for our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival of the reserved authority of a State over 
matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all 
State authority, or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered."). 
239. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 752 ("Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature .... 
Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish 
limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting 
them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of 
the total corpus juris ofthe states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of 
the common law .... "); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 28 n.lOl (saying that state-supportive 
presumption "also 'comports with the basic conception of federal law as interstitial in nature"' (quoting 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384 n.l (1978))); Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic 
Governance, supra note 223, at 122 (quoting Justice Kennedy as saying "in creating federalism, the 
framers 'split the atom of sovereignty'"); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
240. Glicksman & Levy, supra note I 75, at 589. 
241. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; see also Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1564. 
242. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 123 ("Sometimes the Supreme Court also notes that the 
presumption is especially strong when the state law at issue amounts to an exercise of the states' 
traditional powers to protect the public health, safety, and morals."); see also Zellmer, supra note 217, at 
1666; Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1572 (citing Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook Cnty v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001), as an example of the Court rejecting a federal 
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not apply the presumption to sustain state law in the face of conflicting federal 
law where doing so would be contrary to the goals of national uniformity or 
would disrupt a "careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."243 
Thus, even in areas of traditional state regulation, if the state law conflicts with 
some other federalism norm, like the achievement of national uniformity, the 
presumption will not protect it from preemption. 
Because of the importance of states in our federal structure, the 
presumption against preemption can only be overcome by clear evidence of 
contrary congressional intent. 244 For example, contrary intent can be found in a 
assertion of power to protect isolated wetlands because "federal Jaw was impinging on state land-use 
regulation, an area of traditional state authority"); Hirsh, supra note 175, at 551 ("[T]he countervailing 
factors [in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers] were a tradition of local regulation of foodstuffs for 
market, and the absence of a finding of an important national interest (such as the freedom of interstate 
commerce from unjustifiable state discrimination) which would require the preemption of the state 
regulation."); id. at 552 (One reason the Parker Court did not preempt state regulation was that the 
"federal Act authorized the Secretary to cooperate with state programs. This authority indicated that 
Congress contemplated the existence of state programs consistent with the federal Act" (citing Parker v. 
Brown, 271 U.S. 341 (1943))). But see Hirsh, supra note 175, at 551 (discussing Cloverleaf Butter Co. 
v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1952), and saying the Court rejected state arguments that state cooperation 
with federal officials was not impeding federal efforts, state inspectors filled inspection gap created by 
too few inspectors and therefore supplemented incomplete federal inspections, and state seizure of 
product only effective way to protect butter's purity where visual inspections more effective than 
infrequent federal lab tests). 
243. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1707-08 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2002), and 
arguing that giving broad effect to a savings clause in the Ports and WateiWays Safety Act would 
"disrupt national uniformity" and finding "the presumption against preemption inapplicable when the 
state regulates activities marked by a his;ory of substantial federal presence, such as maritime law"); see 
also Michael S. Greve, Federal Preemption: James Madison, Call Your Office, Symposium, 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 77, 88 (2005) ("The logical extension of that basic insight ... is to afford federal statutes broad 
preemptive force where such statutes are demonstrably targeted to curtail the federalism risks that 
alarmed the Framers-in particular, the risk of interstate exploitation and interferences with interstate 
commerce."). But see Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that California regulations requiring oceangoing vessels near the coast to switch to low-sulfur fuels were 
not preempted by the federal Submerged Lands Act and rejecting an argument that presumption against 
preemption should not apply where there is a long history of federal regulation). The Pacific Merchant 
court was persuaded by Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), where the Supreme Court rejected such a 
claim despite a long history of federal regulation given the "historic presence of state Jaw" in the field. 
Pac. Merch., 639 F.3d at 1166-67. The court also noted states "have long sought to protect their own 
residents from the undisputedly harmful effects of air pollution and other firms of environmental 
harms." !d. at 1167. However, the shipping association filed a petition for certiorari filed June 23, 20 II 
on grounds that the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses bar California's extraterritorial exercise of its 
police powers and the federal Submerged Lands Act preempts state regulation and limits the state's 
seaward boundary to three geographical miles from coastline. See U.S. Supreme Court Asked to Review 
State's Maritime Fuel Use Regulations, Env't. Rep. Online (BNA) No. 42 at 1544 (2011). 
244. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1227 ("Effectuating a presumption against preemption means 
that the analysis must be approached from the perspective that the assumption must be overcome by 
clear evidence of congressional intent: a 'silent implication' simply would not suffice."). In 
environmental preemption cases, courts look at the strength of the federal law's purpose. See Glicksman 
& Levy, supra note 175, at 585 (The "critical question" for the court's preemption analysis in an 
environmental case "is whether, in a particular case, the congressionally declared purposes of federal 
environmental Jaw provide a sufficiently strong justification to overcome the presumption."); see also 
Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563-64 ("[S]tart with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
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clear congressional statement of preemptive intent or a clear delegation of 
preemptive power to an agency. 245 Professor Buzbee likens this clear statement 
requirement to "hard look review" of agency decision making, since it serves a 
similar "analytical function of requiring heightened political burdens of clarity 
and justification."246 In the case of overcoming the presumption against 
preemption, the burden is placed on Congress to legislate its intent clearly and 
courts will look closely to see if that burden has been met. 
How a court uses the presumption is dependent on how it construes "the 
proper balance of federal and state regulatory power over a given subject 
matter."247 According to Professor Wiggins, a court should give heavy weight 
to the presumption unless there is a "persuasive reason[]" to do otherwise, such 
as when the subject area being regulated "permits no other conclusion" than to 
favor federal regulation or Congress has explicitly "ordained" federal 
regulation. 248 Professor Resnik would agree but for a different reason. The 
purpose of Congress." (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). The 
presumption against preemption also plays a role in interpreting statutory purpose by, providing a reason 
to distinguish between primary and secondary statutory purposes. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 
207, at 929 (noting that characterizing statutory purposes as primary or secondary "may be disputed," 
but the distinction has been drawn "to underscore the basic point that the sovereign interests of the states 
are entitled to respect and one way in which that respect is manifested is in the consistent application of 
a strong presumption against preemption"). On the topic of what to do when a statute's purpose is 
unclear, see id. at 929 (discussing the importance of maintaining state remedies in the face of federal 
preemption). See also Jordan, supra note 180, at 1226 ("Under the purposive approach as conceived by 
Hart and Sacks, when doubt still remains as to the [statute's] purpose ... a court may resort to an 
appropriate presumption drawn from some general policy oflaw."). 
245. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1564 ("Cases embracing the presumption against 
preemption look for a clear statement of preemptive legislative intent or a clear delegation to an agency 
of power to preempt, but they do not instruct agencies how, procedurally, they must assert preemptive 
effect."); see also Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 55 ("(W]hether Congress has the enumerated power to 
abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
enforcement power, its rule of express textual abrogation has been continuously affirmed under both 
powers."); Greve, supra note 243, at 88-89 ("Nothing in federalism's constitutional architecture 
warrants a judicial presumption in favor of the federal government. In fact, in these sorts of contexts, a 
'presumption against preemption' and a 'clear statement rule' look like sensible ways of approximating 
the logic of the constitutional, enumerated powers architecture."). 
246. Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563; see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 
589 ("The presumption against preemption should be understood as a drafting principle or as a quasi-
constitutional clear statement requirement."); Hoke, supra note 172, at 760-61. (discussing the 
"presumption disfavoring preemption" and saying that the Court's justifications for the presumption 
"include the desire for 'assurance that the federal-state balance will not be disturbed unintentionally by 
Congress or the courts' and the need to 'prevent[] Congress from using ambiguous statutory intent to 
conceal its failure to accommodate competing interests bearing on the federal-state balance of power"'). 
But see id. at 761 (criticizing the "clear statement rule" because the Court has failed to "elaborate[] in 
conventional evidentiary terms the burden for demonstrating a clear congressional statement of 
preemptive intent"). Hoke also criticizes the clear statement rule because it is not "defensible from the 
standpoint of larger jurisprudential theory, and should not be embraced merely because of its 
instrumental value in achieving even vital substantive outcomes." Jd. at 762. 
247. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 30. 
248. See id. ("The state-supportive presumption should figure heavily in deciding occupation 
preemption cases, since 'federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of 
state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the subject matter 
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problem, according to Resnik, is that "the law of federalism" has not changed 
to "correspond to the transformation in the landscape of federalism"; 249 a 
landscape that is increasingly "penneable" due to "seepage. "250 In this 
changing federalism landscape, states and local communities "engage in robust 
multi-faceted discourse" with each other and with foreign nations that 
"compete[s] with and lessen[s] the hegemony of the national government."251 
Because Resnik sees jurisdictional boundaries as "fragile,"252 she urges courts 
to proceed with caution when they are inclined to invalidate a state or local 
initiative and to require exacting proof of specific and immediate harm before 
doing so. 253 The congressional presumption against preemption should play a 
more definitive role, but perhaps because of the difficult federalism questions 
that are implicated in any preemption decision, 254 courts have used the 
presumption erratically, lessening its use as a bright line interpretative. rule. 255 
2. Determining Congressional Intent 
Congressional intent is the "'touchstone' in every preemption case."256 
Courts discern evidence of intent from traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, as well as from the circumstances in which the statute was 
enacted, and its legislative history. 257 Regardless of whether the type of 
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."' (quoting Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963))). 
249. Resnik, supra note 220, at 42-43. 
250. !d. at 60. 
251. !d. at 64. 
252. !d. at 91. 
253. !d. at 87. 
254. See id. at 65 ("[U]ndergirding" this interpretative process are difficult "questions of separation 
of powers and judicial role as well as questions about the degree to which states ought to be centers of 
robust authority and potential sites of experimentation and variation."). 
255. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563 ("[A]Ithough erratically used, it remains the 
most consistently stated interpretive guide for how courts should review claims of preemptive effect"); 
see also Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 49 ("The bottom line is that the 'presumption 
against preemption' no longer is applied predictably or consistently."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 
175, at 589 ("The Court has often stated that there is a presumption against preemption, but its scope and 
force are not entirely clear."); Greve, supra note 243, at 83 ("[T]here is a real limit to the extent to which 
one can squeeze a coherent 'preemption law' out of the presumption lemon."). 
256. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479,485 (1996); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 120 
("So the crucial question is now to interpret the content of the federal law and that depends on 
congressional intent."). But see Stabile, supra note I 77, at 89 ("Just as many modem theories of 
statutory interpretation reject the notion that what courts should be doing in interpreting statutes 
generally is striving to follow legislative intent, legislative intent should not be determinative of the 
issue of whether federal law should preempt state law."). 
257. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at I667 ("[E]vidence of congressional intent would be gleaned 
from canons of statutory interpretation, the historic context of the statute in question, and legislative 
history."); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 587 ("The scope of the preemption provision 
presents an interpretative question that may be resolved using the traditional tools of statutory 
construction."); Tribe, supra note 19, at 688 (contending preemption is a matter of statutory 
construction). But see Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1668 (attributing to Professor Roderick Hills the 
thought that "preemption cases exhibit a type of 'faux textualism in which the Court invokes the alleged 
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preemption is express or implied, a court is saddled with trying to divine the 
intent of Congress. 258 According to Professor Schroeder, this can make the 
outcome of the court's review "far from certain."259 Other factors, such as the 
circumstances giving rise to a case, could also make judicial attempts to 
determine congressional intent ad hoc and nuanced. 260 To some scholars, this 
type of inquiry is misplaced.26l 
Courts generally hold that for express preemption, congressional intent to 
preempt state law must be specific and a "statement of general purpose" is not 
sufficient to preempt state action that might interfere with the achievement of 
that purpose. 262 This is especially true when the state law being preempted is 
plain meaning of two wholly ambiguous words' in a statutory clause to reach antiregulatory results"). 
For Professor Hoke, this inquiry into legislative purpose should include an identification of the problems 
that Congress wanted to address by enacting the law. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 763. 
258. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 589 ("In sum, the purposes offederal regulation are 
implicated in all three categories of preemption. In express preemption, purposes are relevant to the 
congressional determination of whether and to what extent state authority should be preempted and to 
the judicial construction of the scope of ambiguous express preemption provisions. For field preemption, 
the purposes of federal regulation are relevant to determining whether the field has been occupied and 
defining the scope of that field. Finally, the displacement of state authority in cases of conflict 
preemption depends upon a determination that state regulation stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of federal purposes."). 
259. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 119; see also Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 439 ("[T]he 
difficulty of deriving any fixed standards of preemption is compounded by the fact that the Court has 
used a broad range of terms, often imprecisely and inconsistently, to announce its determination that 
state law is superseded. At the same time, while the Court's general views of the appropriate bounds of 
federal and state authority have undergone significant changes, it has purported to apply the same 'tests' 
of preemption."); Stabile, supra note 177, at 86 n.328 ("Even if one accepts the notion that preemption 
should be an exercise in determining congressional intent, that would not compel the conclusion that 
preemption must be dealt with expressly. That argument assumes that the final version of the statute 
reflects some coherent notion of the intent of the body of Congress. Some commentators would argue 
that it does not, suggesting that legislation is a product of public choice theory."). 
260. See Hirsh, supr.a note 175, at 520 ("The need for focusing on these specifics [relevant 
statutory provisions, the matters they regulate, and the circumstances giving rise to the case] means that 
the Court's preemption decisions are largely based on ad hoc considerations, especially on the exact 
statutes in question."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 24 ("Our prior cases on pre-emption are not 
precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each case turns on the particularities and special 
features of the federal regulatory scheme in question." (quoting City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air 
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (I 973))); Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 59 n.90 (What Congress says 
when it "speak[s] to the issue of preemption in the statutory text" may "not be 'clear' or 'plain,"' in 
which case courts have the duty of interpreting the ambiguity."). 
261. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 89 n.335 ("It is submitted that the Supreme Court abdicates its 
duty as arbiter of the federal system when it makes the test of preemption the intent of Congress .... 
First, it is questionable whether the action of Congress should be allowed to conclusively preclude state 
action in any given area .... It is equally doubtful whether Congress should have the sole power .... 
The framers intended the Supreme Court, not the Congress, to determine where the demands of 
federalism should require the line to be drawn." (quoting Harrop A. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and 
the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 630, 638 (1972))). 
262. See Baum, supra note 77, at 679 ("A statement of general purpose does not demonstrate a 
congressional intent to preempt any state action that might hamper the achievement of that purpose." 
(citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981) (finding that the Power-Plant 
and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978's congressional objective to "encourage and foster great use of 
coal" not reflective of intent to preempt all state action having adverse impact on coal use))); see also 
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within a state's traditional regulatory power.263 However, even when Congress 
appears to specifically preempt state action, problems arise due to Congress's 
difficulties in drafting precise and enduring preemption provisions. 264 When 
Congress writes an express preemption provision, it does so with "the then-
existing social and legal landscape in mind. "265 A carefully drafted preemption 
provision may not work well, however, when the circumstances that provoked 
it have changed, 266 such as changes in views about the appropriate federalism 
Shattuck, supra note 17, at 265 ("The pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care, 
understanding and imagination should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged 
in irresponsible or undisciplined use of language. In the keeping of legislatures perhaps more than any 
other group is the wellbeing of fellow men. Their responsibility is discharged by words. They are under 
a special duty therefore to observe that 'Exactness in the use of words is the basis of all serious thinking. 
You will get nowhere without it."' (quoting Justice Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 246 (1947))); Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. ISA 
Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988) ("Without a text that can ... plausibly be interpreted as 
prescribing federal pre-emption it is impossible to find that a free market was mandated by federal 
law."); Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 (discussing how Congress can specifically delegate 
preemptive power to a federal agency, but "the courts should not find preemption unless the agency has 
clearly exercised that power"); Jordan, supra note 180, at 1227 ("[A] court would approach the analysis 
from the perspective that, ' [ s ]o long as full scope can be given to the amendatory legislation without 
undermining non-conflicting State laws, nothing but the clearest expression should persuade [the court] 
that the federal Act wiped out ... State requirements deeply rooted in their laws."' (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 245 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); Nishimura-Paige, 
supra note 81, at 1032 ("The Court [in Commonwealth Edison] refused to equate general policy 
statements encouraging the use of coal with an intent to preempt all potentially adverse state 
legislation."). 
263. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 691 ("(W]here the subject is traditionally 'local' and the states' 
interest in retaining significant authority to regulate is thus greater, total federal preemption will not be 
inferred in the absence of especially plain congressional intent to bar state authority over the same 
subject matter."). 
264. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 2 (It is difficult for Congress to draft "satisfactory preemption 
provisions ... [and] [o]ften, Congress' desire to achieve quite legitimate goals may result in preemption 
language that is overinclusive, operating to prevent the attainment of important state interests even when 
no federal goal is advanced by preemption."); see also Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal 
Preemption: Reformulating the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 28-29 (2005) ("(T]here are fifty 
sovereign States that might potentially infringe the policies of Congress or the Executive Branch," 
increasing exponentially the complexity for a Congress attempting to frame "meta laws restricting state 
lawmaking."). But see Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("Congress is fully capable of making such 
intent explicit."). 
265. Stabile, supra note 177, at 2; see also id. at 89-90 ("Even assuming Congress' intent about the 
general contours of a preemption provision can be accurately and reliably ascertained, it is clear that 
Congress did not and could not have anticipated the circumstances in which preemption claims have 
arisen under many of the statutes containing express preemption provisions."); id. at 89 ("[F]ocusing on 
intent fixes the point of reference at the time Congress was enacting legislation, thus limiting the inquiry 
to the problems Congress was then addressing and the times in which it was acting"). 
266. See id. at 2 ("(A]ny express preemption provision is drafted with a particular set of problems . 
. . in mind. The problems and landscape change dramatically over time, yet the express preemption 
provision remains largely fixed."); id. at 30 ("Congress cannot make a comprehensive and accurate 
determination at the time it enacts legislation regarding the appropriate breadth of that statute's 
preemptive reach."); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 135 ("One particularly vexing problem 
arises when an older federal statute containing an express preemption clause confronts regulatory issues 
that were unanticipated at the time of the federal enactment."); Gasaway, supra note 264, at 30 ("No 
legislature can envision the full effects of ordinary laws; it is especially impossible for a legislature to 
2012] NUCLEAR GENIE 737 
balance. 267 Thus, even when Congress has expressly stated its intent on 
preemption of state law, the clear statement rule may not help when the context 
in which that statement was made changes. 
Despite the clear statement rule, some courts have implied preemption 
when Congress has only considered the idea of preemption. 268 However, many 
scholars oppose the idea of implied preemption in cases of congressional 
inaction. 269 They contend implied preemption creates excess regulatory 
uncertainty 270 and results in adverse consequences, such as giving too much 
power to private entities and courts. 271 
pre-envision the need for preemptive laws; and it is even more unrealistic to expect a legislature to pre-
interdict state action that occurs simultaneously on fifty fronts, and that, as a matter of hydraulic politic 
pressure, will center in those States most opposed to federal policies. Likewise, a divided federal 
legislature cannot possibly negate, after-the-fact, all of the intrusions one expects from fifty quasi-
independent and potentially hostile sovereigns."). 
267. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 80 ("An express preemption provision written with one set of 
conditions in mind may not work well when the conditions to which it is being applied change."); id. 
("Static statutory language can not [sic] easily adapt to such a change."). 
268. See id. at 6; see also Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 
(1983) ("A federal decision to forego regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative 
determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much preemptive 
force as a decision to regulate"). But see Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 59 ("Congress has no power to 
impliedly preempt the states."); Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 (Some courts "have appropriately 
recognized a distinction between an agency's 'mere failure' to act and its affirmative decision that 
regulation at any level of government would be inappropriate."); id. ("Inaction alone thus represents 
only 'the absence of a real regulatory decision,' which should be afforded no preemptive effect." 
(quoting Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 116 (3d Cir. 1988))); Ark. Elec., 461 U.S. at 
387 n.ll ('The relevant inquiry is not whether Congress authorized or expected [state] regulation, but 
whether it indicated by its own actions to forbid it."). 
269. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("A court should not assume that Congress 
wanted to preempt to avoid the adverse spillover effects of state regulation, prevent interference with 
federal goals such as uniformity, or prohibit the states from seeking a cleaner environment or less risk 
that the market would produce on its own."). 
270. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 439 ("[T]he scope of the doctrine of implied 
preemption is uncertain. The Court must construe the state statute and its operation as well as the federal 
statute, and the interrelation of any two statutes may assume myriad forms ranging from direct conflict 
through to tangential interference to complementary coincidence."). 
271. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 716 ("Private parties independently determine what aspects of 
state law hinder their interests and, under the weak standards for determining implied preemption, are 
permitted to achieve through litigation the preemptive impact that the political institution did not, and 
perhaps because of internal disagreement could not, reach. This substitution of judicial policyrnaking for 
political decision undermines democratic accountability and public decisionmaking at the national level, 
as well as the democratic process and regulatory space of states and localities."). The same problem 
arises in the administrative context, where an agency's inaction is construed by courts as foreclosing 
comparable regulation at the state level. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 ("[A]n agency's failure 
to regulate has preemptive effect only where that failure 'takes on the character of a ruling that no such 
regulation [by any level of government] is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the 
statute."' (quoting Ray v. At!. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978))); id. at 187 ("[T]he courts 
should lend greater credence to an agency's determination that its inaction preempts state law if that 
determination is made during the course of a rulemaking proceeding, in which the agency invited and 
considered public comments than if it first asserts that its inaction preempts state law in the course of 
litigation." (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 535 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001))). Professor Glicksman 
proposes applying the same clear statement rule that the courts apply to Congress to agency declarations 
so that only courts should only find agency preemption where there is a clear declarations of preemptive 
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One can hardly think of a clearer statement of congressional intent not to 
preempt than the inclusion of a saving clause in a statute. For example, the 
savings clause in the AEA 272 explicitly preserves a state's ability to use a 
variety of legislative, regulatory, and common law tools to protect the public 
health and wellbeing of its citizens. 273 Congress may include a savings clause 
to reflect its view of the comparative institutional competence and efficiency of 
the states and the federal government. On the other hand, a savings clause may 
indicate Congress's desire to achieve comprehensive regulation by allowing 
overlap.274 Despite their apparent clarity, however, savings clauses embroil 
courts in the same task of divining legislative intent. 275 
Under traditional rules of statutory interpretation, Congress's act of saving 
state law should be indicative of congressional intent not to displace it276 and 
should cause courts to be reluctant to disrupt the careful federalism balance 
Congress struck. 277 But, how courts treat statutory savings clauses is not cut 
and dry and, according to some scholars, can depend on whether the interest 
being regulated by the state constrains business interests. 278 For example, 
intent. See id. at 186 ("Unless the agency explicitly declares that its own decision not to regulate also 
bars states from doing so, the courts should not find conflict preemption based on interference with 
federal purposes."). 
272. See Atomic Energy Act§ 271, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the 
generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed 
by the Commission."); § 274(k), 42 U.S.C. §202l(k) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection 
against radiation hazards."). See also Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1704 (arguing that the savings clauses 
found in sections 271 and 274(k) "played a role in the resolution of' Pacific Gas). 
273. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1732 ("Savings clauses preserve the states' ability to use a 
variety of regulatory and common law tools to provide increased protection for their citizens and the 
environment over and above the federal regulatory floor."). 
274. See id. at 1731. 
275. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 85 n.328 ("[L]egislation simply reflects the conflicting 
interactions of interest groups; the resulting law sometimes reflects their private, selfish interest, and 
sometimes serves no purpose at all." (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 49-56 (2006))). 
276. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1733 ("Where Congress has included a savings clause, 
straightforward rules of statutory construction dictate that state laws and remedies related to the subject 
matter of the clause should not be displaced. If the clause does not strictly apply to the state law or 
activity in question, implied preemption arguments may still be raised to defeat the state law, but the 
savings clause should be seen as evidencing congressional intent not to occupy the field. Moreover, the 
savings clause should weigh against a blanket determination that state law poses an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of federal purposes."). See also id. at 1732 ("Statutory savings clauses have been 
included in many federal regulatory statutes in order to temper Congress's 'extraordinary power' to 
displace state laws." (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991))). 
277. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1732 ("Ignoring explicit savings clauses or construing them 
unduly narrowly undermines congressional policy in the highly sensitive, politically charged area of 
federal-state relations. Conversely, giving savings clauses appropriate weight honors congressional 
choices, avoids regulatory gaps, fosters innovative measures to protect human health and the 
environment, and enhances institutional competency by empowering government at all levels to protect 
the public at appropriate scales."). 
278. See, e.g., id. at 1731. 
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Professor Zellmer finds that if state regulations impose a burden on economic 
interests, then pro-business courts will be inclined to ignore a savings clause; if 
they do not, then those courts will likely give a savings clause full effect. 279 
Therefore, local regulation of business interests is particularly vulnerable to 
preemption in recent years. 280 Given this trend, Vermont's law, which burdens 
an economic interest, may be vulnerable to preemption despite the savings 
clauses in the AEA. 
IV. POLICY REASONS FAVORING AND DISFAVORING PREEMPTION 
This Part examines policy arguments supporting and opposing preemption 
and, thus, provides the last piece of background information necessary to 
analyze whether the AEA preempts Vermont Act 160. 
A. Why Preemption May Be a Good Idea 
A voiding collective action problems is one of the strongest rationales 
supporting federal preemption. 281 Additional rationales favoring preemption 
include the creation of economies of scale, the prevention of burdens on 
interstate commerce, the coordination of the management of interstate 
resources, and the creation of uniform national standards. 
Collective action problems arise when states are motivated to act in 
furtherance of their individual interests to the detriment of the interests of other 
279. Jd. ("With the exception of certain agricultural practices, where states have imposed 
constraints on economic interests, statutory savings clauses have been given short shrift or even ignored. 
Conversely, in cases where state laws are less onerous on economic pursuits than federal regulation 
would be, prodevelopment interests have been upheld under the guise of saving state law. Despite the 
presence of savings clauses, progressive state regulatory programs have been even more vulnerable to 
judicial preemption than have state common law claims, particularly where the state, for whatever 
reason, was not a party to the litigation."). 
280. See id. at 1703 ("In the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, progressive state and local regulatory 
programs have been exceptionally vulnerable to judicial preemption despite the presence of statutory 
savings clauses. During the past decade in particular, such regulations have been struck down almost 
without exception whenever they would impose greater economic burdens on industry than those 
established by the federal regulatory floor. The recent trend, which began in the mid-1990s, has 
prompted some scholars to equate the modern day preemption doctrine with the Lochner Era of the early 
1900s, where the Court employed an array of tools to strike down progressive state and local economic 
and social regulation."); see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 718 n.l47 ("The judicial veto of legislative 
acts highlights preemption's threat to usher in a new Lochner era, supplying a doctrinal cover for 
judicial meddling with the policy decisions of elected representatives at all levels of government."). But 
see Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1700 (In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-608 
(1991), "the Rehnquist Court gave weight to the savings clause to afford room for local governments ... 
to restrict or even prohibit aerial spraying in order to protect the health of their citizens."). 
281. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 929 ("[F]ederalism is a structural response to 
collective action problems among states," which "arise when individual states have incentives to act in a 
manner that is contrary to the interests of states as a collective, and transaction and enforcement costs 
would prevent an effective agreement among states to act collectively."); see also Glicksman & Levy, 
supra note 175, at 593 ("Under McCulloch's analysis, federal environmental regulation is most justified 
when collective action problems create incentives for states acting individually to regulate in ways that 
are contrary to the interests of the states as a collective."). 
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states or the nation, 282 such as transferring its regulatory burdens to other 
states. 283 When a state acts in its own self-interest, it might enact laws or 
regulations that protect its citizens, but potentially harm everyone else. 284 An 
example is the "Not-In-My-Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome, where a state 
blocks the siting of facilities that benefit the public-at-large, but create 
environmental harms for that state. 285 Other collective action problems include 
transboundary pollution caused by a facility in one state that creates negative 
externalities in other states. Resource pooling, 286 where states share resources 
282. See Victor Flatt, The History of State Action in the Environmental Realm: A Presumption 
against Preemption in Climate Change Law?, I SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 63, 67 (2009) 
("[P]reemption in the environmental arena would, thus, be justified if and when 'collective action 
problems create incentives for states to act individually to regulate in ways that are contrary to the 
interests of the states as a collective."'); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 592 ("Federal 
power is most appropriate when the cost-benefit analysis of state policymakers is distorted by collective 
action problems."); Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaption: A Collective Action Perspective on 
Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1175 (2010) ("The exercise of federal authority is most 
justified in response to collective action problems that provide incentives for states to act in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the interest of the nation as a whole .... In other words, the federal action is 
necessary or justified when state regulation is unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the 
perspective of the United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual states and the interest of 
the states as a collective run in different directions."). 
283. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 935-36 ("[C]eiling preemption is not ordinarily 
justified if the purpose of federal regulation is to prevent the export of health and safety risks to other 
states, because that kind of externality would tend to cause underregulation," but it "may be justified in 
one of two circumstances: (I) when states have incentives to export regulatory burdens, or (2) when 
states have incentives to overregulate an activity that exports benefits to other states."); see also 
Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 125 ("Scholars argue that states 
may seek to apply their laws to those not represented in their political systems. States might attempt to 
impose costly regulations on out-of-state entities that happen to do business in the states. States might 
also adopt regulatory schemes that have the practical effect of dictating standards to other jurisdictions . 
. . . Either situation presents the potential for political-process failures. Jurisdictions would be imposing 
regulatory costs on those not democratically represented in the polity."). 
284. See Flatt, supra note 282, at 79 ("States will rarely use their power to create unique regulatory 
schemes, and when they do, they only do so when it is necessary to protect the health and well-being of 
their citizens-a state's most important role."). Flatt describes this as creating a commons problem. See 
id. at 67 ("Unfettered, such behavior would result in a state economic competition in which all states 
would create policies that initially might benefit their own citizens but, in the aggregate, hurt 
everyone-a 'commons' problem."). 
285. See id. (This justification "also validates preemption of some state Not-In-My-Back-Yard 
(NIMBY) policies, which would restrict locations of environmental negatives when the benefits are 
important to everyone"); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 593-94 ("Thus, it is not 
surprising that the traditional justifications for federal environmental regulation reflect commonly 
understood collective action problems, including negative environmental externalities, resource pooling, 
the 'race to the bottom,' uniform standards, and the 'NIMBY' []phenomenon."); id. at 608 ("[C]eiling 
preemption makes sense when federal environmental regulation responds to a NIMBY problem because 
stringent state regulation may have the purpose and effect of forcing environmentally damaging 
activities to locate somewhere else," as demonstrated by the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (1986)), the purpose of which is to prevent 
the forty-seven states without low level radioactive waste storage capacity "from unfairly burdening" the 
three states that have it "with the risks and costs created by the disposal of the entire nation's low level 
wastes."). 
286. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1178 ("In the environmental context, resource pooling has 
the capacity to generate efficiencies in the collection and distribution of scientific and technical 
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like data collection systems, is another type of collective action problem, which 
may create an incentive for individual states to "free ride on the efforts of 
others. "287 
Thus, states' self-dealing and the unpopularity of certain types of 
activities, such as nuclear or hazardous waste storage facilities, may lead to 
states blocking such facilities, even though their siting creates positive spillover 
effects for other states. The loss of these positive spillover effects can 
negatively affect those states as well as the entire country's social welfare. 288 
To Professor Pierce, the likelihood of a state's regulations creating positive and 
negative spillover effects is the defining issue for determining at what level of 
government regulations should take effect.289 Following the logic of Professor 
Pierce's thinking would mean that state laws that eliminate significant positive 
spillover effects for other states, as well as those laws which would create 
negative spillover effects for other states, should be preempted. 290 
For example, the federal government may need to prevent states from 
lowering their environmental standards to encourage the siting of new 
industries. 291 When powerful economic interests benefit from low standards or 
information."); see also Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of 
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE 
QUESTION 13, 18 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009) ("A federal rather than a 
state-focused approach is more likely to effectively address problems that cross state lines."). 
287. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1176-81 (listing collective action situations justifying a 
federal role, including: transboundary negative externalities, resource pooling race-to-the-bottom 
potential, uniformity of standards, the "NIMBY syndrome," and the "threat of under and overregulation 
by the states"). Resource pooling achieves economies of scale and synergistic effects create a '"public 
good,' which in collective action terms creates an incentive for each state to free ride on the efforts of 
others". !d. at 1177; see Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 931 (listing collective bargaining, 
national defense, and scientific research as examples of resource pooling where "states individually lack 
the resources or incentives to act effectively"). 
288. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency 
Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 607,651-52 (1985). 
289. !d. at 610 ("Thus, the issue of whether regulation should be imposed on a national level or on 
a state level should be resolved primarily by determining whether, and to what extent, state regulation 
would create interstate spillovers."). According to Pierce, making this determination when there is a 
federalism dispute involving "'incomparables,' like safety and economics," involves a two-step analysis, 
the first of which is empirical research of predictable in- and out-of-state impacts and the second of 
which calls for "a decisionmaking process [that] balance[s] benefits of one type of regulation (e.g. 
environmental) with the costs of another (e.g. economics)." !d. at 662. 
290. See id. at 651, 652 ("States should not be permitted to make regulatory decisions when those 
decisions have the potential to create or to eliminate large positive spillover to other states."). 
291. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1165 (listing among the benefits of "federal participation 
and leadership" that states may not have necessary resources and "are likely to have incentives to put 
their citizens at an advantage vis-a-vis those of other jurisdictions fighting for the scarce resources such 
as water, the actions of one jurisdiction may have spillover effects in other places, and coordination of 
the policies of multiple jurisdictions may be needed to ensure effectiveness"); see also Verchick & 
Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("A uniform federal approach will minimize the risk that states will 
'race to the bottom,' competing with each other to loosen their environmental or other standards so as to 
attract new business."). But see id. at 18 (noting the difference of opinion among scholars on this point, 
but saying "at a minimum, this scholarship raises important questions about whether state regulation 
may sometimes be affected by pathologies causing state regulators to choose less-than-optimal levels of 
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when the adoption of a tougher standard would impose significant costs on 
those interests, the state in which they operate may not have an incentive to 
make its standards equivalent to states with higher standards. 292 Professors 
Glicksman and Levy find little support for the conjecture that some states might 
become overenthusiastic regulators and "race to the top."293 Professor Schapiro 
agrees, finding that the dormant commerce clause, the constitutional 
protections of free speech, the power of out-of-state money to block 
unfavorable laws, and the interlocking nature of the country's economy check 
such behavior. 294 Also, interstate competition and the costs of regulating laws 
make it unlikely that states will become enthusiastic over-regulators. 295 Under-
regulation, however, is much more likely. 
But reliance on the federal government to take care of collective action 
problems may be misplaced. Congress does not act as an effective check on 
state tendencies to enact laws where the in-state benefits exceed in-state 
costs, 296 even in circumstances where the national costs of those laws exceed 
environmental protection"); Resnik, supra note 220, at 88 ('The literature's focus on the 'race to the 
bottom' presumes interstate effects but singular state incentive structures. Yet, the evidence of 
cooperative action among state actors suggests their increasing awareness of spillover effects that 
require coordinated action."). 
292. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 606 ("It is conceivable that some states or localities 
might engage in a 'race to the top,' competing to be the most environmentally friendly so as to attract 
some preferred group of citizens or businesses (for example, wealthy taxpayers)."); see also Levy & 
Glicksman, supra note 207, at 935 ("If ... an activity within a state produces economic benefits that are 
exported to other states, but causes health and safety burdens within the state, then the state may have an 
incentive to overregulate. This is, in essence, the NIMBY problem."); id. at 930 ("[D]isplacement of 
state authority is justified when collective action principles would suggest that state courts have 
incentives to 'overregulate' in ways that interfere with the interests of the nation as a whole."). 
293. Glicksman and Levy also note that there is little evidence supporting the idea that the 
Prisoner's Dilemma forces states to overregulate to improve their competitive posture vis-a-vis other 
states or that a "race to the top" exists that might lead a state to overregulate. Glicksman & Levy, supra 
note 175, at 606. 
294. See Schapiro, Federalism as !ntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 131-32 (Checks on 
states "targeting their regulations to have only out-of-state effects" include the fact that "federal and 
state laws all occur within a democratic field"; that states operate within a constitutional framework 
which "imposes norms of procedural and substantive fairness on state regulations"; and that "principles 
of free speech allow out-of-state entities to participate in the political debates within a given state, even 
if votes are limited to citizens of the state"; the "interconnectedness of the national economy," which 
prevents "cost shifting; and that states would bear at least part of the costs for any inefficient regulatory 
scheme that is promulgated."). 
295. See Greve, supra note 243, at 88 ("The regulating state will at all events have to live with the 
costs as well as the benefits of their laws, and state competition acts as a potent disciplining 
mechanism."). 
296. See Lori A. Martin, The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 965, 996 (1988) 
("Congress does not have a mechanism for learning about state and local rules that intrude upon either 
regulated or unregulated matters of federal interest."). But see Tribe, supra note 19, at 721 ("Should a 
state exercise its power to reject this nuclear option notwithstanding a federal policy to make the option 
as attractive as possible, a court faced with a preemption challenge must remember that Congress 
remains free to decide that vital national interests require overriding the state's choice and then to use 
unambiguous statutory language to that effect."). 
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national benefits. 297 There are too many other matters on Congress's agenda 
for its focus to be as a watchdog over potential state interference with national 
policies298 and playing that role puts Congress in conflict with another level of 
government, the courts. 299 Congress is also ill-suited to act sufficiently quickly 
to prevent a state from enforcing a local law that interferes with some national 
objective. 300 
Beyond avoiding collective action problems, federal regulation may also 
prevent burdens on interstate commerce and be politically easier to adopt at the 
national level. 301 Many environmental problems present difficult dynamics that 
limit the effectiveness of state regulation. For example, managing water 
resources calls for coordination among various jurisdictions, which states have 
difficulty implementing. The federal government is also better at dealing with 
inter-jurisdictional problems because states lack the technical and information-
gathering resources necessary for effective regulation and because states cannot 
provide forward-looking and uniform solutions to problems that lack a 
geographic boundary. 302 Additionally, states may be competing with each 
297. See Martin, supra note 296, at 994. 
298. See id. at 995 (discussing the reasons Congress can cabin negative tendencies in the states and 
saying "under the pressure of the usual business of Congress, evaluation of state intrusions on foreign 
affairs policy may not receive high priority"); id. at 996 ("Judicial review of state encroachment on 
federal power does not deny Congress the power to amend the court's decision through statute. But if 
Congress is overcome by legislative inertia, the advantage of judicial review is that a federal body, 
subject to national checks, will have passed on the state statute."). 
299. See id. ("Many of the matters that command the attention of Congress are positive measures 
that set the policy and programs of the country. Evaluating state actions places Congress in the position 
of reacting defensively to the goals set by another political body."). When Congress fails to act, the 
responsibility to decide which level of government should regulate a given activity is foisted onto the 
courts. See id. at 997 ("Congress is a more representative body than the courts to pass on state actions 
that encroach on national foreign policy. But representative government is not attained if Congress fails 
to act, not out of a positive assessment of the impact of state legislation on national foreign policy, but 
due to a failure to deliberate at all."); id. ("If the courts sit uneasily as arbiters of federalism challenges 
to local [nuclear free zones], they do so because the political branches have evaded their responsibility 
to define better the role ofthe states in the regulation of nuclear weapons."). 
300. See id. at 996 ("Lobbyists are able to present their grievances to Congress, but if a party seeks 
immediate redress, such as an injunction against enforcement of the local measure, only courts provide 
timely relief."); id. ("Congress is not suited to the task of determining whether local ordinances are 
incompatible, on an 'ad hoc basis,' with the federal system .... [To do so] Congress would have to study 
the effects and legislative history of each local rule, a task better handled in an adjudicative fashion."). 
30 I. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 646 (Boyden Gray "recognized ... that federal regulation 
sometimes can provide benefits that more than offset the advantages of permitting regulatory power to 
be exercised primarily at the state and local level .... [H]e argued that federal regulation sometimes is 
superior to state regulation for one of four reasons: (I) federal regulation can prevent burdens on 
interstate commerce; (2) some socially beneficial programs are easier to adopt as a political matter on 
the federal level; (3) states may compete on the stringency of regulation to the detriment of the nation; 
and (4) the federal government usually has greater access to sources of relatively scarce expertise 
essential to some types of regulatory programs."); see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 292 
("In modem environmental law, federal regulation is premised on several standard grounds, including 
the need for uniform regulations for interstate commerce, the economies of scale that come with federal-
level regulation, and the distorting effects of externalities on state laws."). 
302. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1665. 
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other for scarce resources, requiring the presence of a federal regulatory 
scheme. 303 
The goals of uniformity and the elimination of transaction costs that 
burden interstate commerce also support federal regulation. 304 States may 
"undervalue" these benefits because they are realized in other states. 305 "The 
transaction costs of nonuniform regulations are particularly high for goods 
produced in large numbers that move from state to state, like cars and 
trucks."306 The federal government can more easily equalize the balance of 
regulatory benefits and costs and achieve economies of scale by eliminating 
divergent state laws. 307 
However, for a stationary source, like a power plant, transaction costs are 
significantly lower than the costs for transitory goods like cars that are mass 
produced and sold nationally. 308 For non-transitory goods, such as power 
plants, it makes sense to regulate conditions of sale, like the cost of power, at 
the state level because the impacts of such regulations are entirely in-state. 309 
303. Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1165; see also Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 18 ("Federalism, as 
such, represents a regime of coordination."); Angela Durbin, Comment, Striking a Delicate Balance: 
Developing a New Rationale for Preemption While Protecting the Public's Role in Siting Liquefied 
Natural Gas Terminals, 56 EMORY L.J. 507, 539 (2006) (discussing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of 
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998), and 
explaining Heller's thesis that "where too many parties are given the right to exclude others, a 'tragedy 
of the anticommons' is created" that "lies in the 'underuse' of the resource at issue"). 
304. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 932 (noting that "[a] common justification for 
federal regulation is the need for uniformity, particularly as a means of removing obstructions to 
interstate commerce" and seeing "this federal purpose as the rationalization of regulatory standards so as 
to reduce transaction costs associated with a national market"); see also Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 
228, at 45 ("State regulation of interstate business may have differential effects in different states. A 
state's laws might impose burdens on out-of-state firms, while benefiting in-state consumers. Product 
safety rules, for example, might protect consumers in one state, while imposing costs on manufacturing 
processes that take place in other states. Depending on the structure of the market, firms might not be 
able to customize their price structure so as to force a state to internalize the costs of regulation."). 
305. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 932; see also id. at 930 (Collective action problems for 
states typically "include negative externalities, resource pooling, the race to the bottom, uniformity and 
rationalization of standards, and the 'NIMBY' phenomenon. In the broadest sense, the benefits of 
collective action in these situations produce a public or collective good for all states."). 
306. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 627. 
307. See Buzbee, supra note 228, at 1571; see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 693 n.36 ("Even if a 
firm's bargaining power is high in most states, it may still seek national regulation because the benefits 
of uniformity may outweigh the costs resulting from higher average level of regulation. National 
regulation may produce scale economies and thereby provide large national concerns an advantage over 
their local or regional competitors. In short, large national firms may actively seek federal preemption 
legislation to avoid the costs of diversity." (quoting Jerry L. Marshaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 101, 134 (G. 
Eads & M. Fix eds., 1984))); Pierce, supra note 288, at 658 (discussing Professor Foote's regulatory 
classifications "for purposes of determining whether they should be imposed on a national or state 
level"); Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("Notwithstanding the federalism-related benefits 
of preserving state authority to regulate, there still may be reason to limit state control over a particular 
regulatory issue or to supplement it with federal regulation."). 
308. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 635. 
309. Pierce, supra note 288, at 659 (citing Elizabeth Foote, Beyond the Policies of Federalism: An 
Alternative Model, 1 YALE J. REG. 217 (1984)); see also Greve, supra note 243, at 88 ("Conversely, 
2012] NUCLEAR GENIE 745 
Where an industry is evolving, as is the nuclear industry,310 and the context in 
which it functions is dynamic and uncertain because different problems can be 
encountered at different locations, preemption of alternative regulatory 
approaches is "risky." This is because preemption eliminates an additional 
layer of protection and increases the risk that the industry will be unable to 
adapt to changing circumstances. 311 
There are benefits to uniform regulatory standards: such standards assure 
citizens that their level of protection will be the same regardless of where they 
live. 312 National standards also guarantee industry that regulations are certain 
and consistent regardless of where their facilities are located. Having only 
national standards avoids multiple layers of regulation, which can be expensive 
to comply with and interpret. 313 A "unitary federal approach" saves 
where Congress purports to regulate economic activities and preempts state legislation that has no 
adverse effects on interstate commerce, a more restrictive interpretation seems warranted. Statutes 
regulating workplace conditions or localized environmental events fit this description."). 
310. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 129-35 (discussing the changes in reactor design and plant 
licensing procedures after the accident at Three Mile Island); id. at 143 n.403 (referring to a new 
generation of reactor designs); id. at 143 n.405 (describing more recent changes in the licensing 
process). 
311. William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and 
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 158 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction's Promise]; 
see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 290 ("[I]n many, if not most, areas of environmental 
regulation, uniformity is as much a problem as it is a virtue .... Finality, which is often in opposition to 
adaptability, is also a double-edged sword in constantly changing natural, technological, and commercial 
environments that otherwise would create at least the possibility of new information and beneficial 
policy experimentation."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 648 ("[C]eiling preemption of state 
restrictions on GHG emissions is not supported by most of the principal justifications for federal 
environmental regulation, including interstate externalities, resource pooling, a race to the bottom, and 
NIMBYism. The desire to achieve uniformity in regulation in order to avoid burdening regulated entities 
with excessive transaction costs provides limited justification for ceiling preemption of programs to 
control GHG emissions from motor vehicles, but not of stationary source controls."). Professor Flatt 
distinguishes between product and production standards and health and safety standards, fmding cause 
for federal preemption of the former where there is a national market for these standards. See Flatt, 
supra note 282, at 65 (drawing a distinction between product and production standards and other health 
and safety standards and suggesting "[ e ]ven proponents of a strong state role in environmental 
policymaking advocate federal preemption for the regulation of products for which there is a national 
market" (quoting Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REv. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 63, 67 (2008)); id. ("This, of course, fits with the general breakdown of power between the 
states and the federal government, in that the federal government is given exclusive jurisdiction over 
interstate commerce (to the benefit of all), but state and local governments are generally seen as better 
able to operate to protect health and safety interests through the exercise of localized police power."). 
312. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("[A] national standard can give each 
citizen an assurance-even something of an entitlement-to a minimum level of safety, health, or 
environmental protection, no matter where he or she resides."). 
313. See id. at 18-19 ("A single federal approach, without separate state standard-setting, also has 
advantages for regulated entities. . . . [They] can face a regulatory regime that is more certain and 
uniform and thereby avoid multiple layers of regulation, which not only may be costly to comply with 
but also may be costly to figure out."). But see Buzbee, Interaction 's Promise, supra note 3 II, at 158 
("A place surely exists for strongly preemptive federal standards that provide no latitude for deviation 
and eliminate multiple regulators retaining roles with the associated possibility of divergent regulatory 
approaches. However, such settings are few and the risks of such approaches are considerable."). 
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government resources, as only one level of government has to invest in 
developing regulatory standards. 314 
But uniformity may be an exaggerated value315 and, in this era of timid 
federal regulation, states have taken an aggressive regulatory posture to 
environmental problems. 316 Also, the localized nature of regulations limiting 
land and water use strongly suggests they should be designed at the state 
level. 317 States also are in a better position to protect the health, safety, and 
economic interests of their constituents because local elected officials are more 
directly accountable to their constituents and have greater knowledge of local 
factors. 318 Because of the mixed benefits of uniformity and preemption's 
intrusive effect, Professors Levy and Glicksman warn that before a court 
preempts local standards because of a desire to achieve uniformity, the 
preemptive federal law should clearly state achievement of uniformity as a 
"primary purpose." 319 
314. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 19 ("A unitary federal approach might also 
save resources, as only one government, the federal government, would invest its resources in 
developing regulatory standards. A fully encompassing federal regulation thus might benefit from 
economies of scale."). 
315. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 79 ("[U]niformity, insofar as it refers to the application of a 
uniform national legal rule, is not universally desirable. Although there are certain circumstances in 
which uniformity is valuable, there are often equally compelling reasons for allowing different law to 
address local needs or individual circumstances."). Uniformity is problematic when it is used solely to 
justify broad preemptive statutory language. See id. at 30 ("Uniformity may be a legitimate federal goal; 
there assuredly will be situations where allowing differing state laws to operate will frustrate federal 
interest. However, using uniformity to justify broad express preemptive language elevates uniformity to 
an unjustified degree. There must be some advantage or value to uniformity before it can be used as a 
basis to displace state law. Yet, the consequence of express language is to preempt state law even when 
there is no such federal benefit."); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 34 ("In most other areas, on the other 
hand, the balkanization of regulation that occurs when each state constructs a system of control is not a 
sufficient problem to warrant the ouster of legitimate desires to maintain some local control. There is no 
catalogue dividing the myriad subjects of regulatory action into these two categories, so an ad hoc 
determination is necessary as each case arises."). The Court's jurisprudence reflects diminishing reliance 
on uniformity as a preemption rationale. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 35 ("The Court's recent 
preemption opinions are not totally consistent, but they do suggest an increasing reluctance to infer 
preemption because the subject matter regulated by the state requires uniform national rules."). 
316. This is especially true with global climate change regulation. See generally Buzbee, 
Preemption Sword, supra note 204; Flatt, supra note 282. 
317. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1712 ("'[T]he Government's expansive interpretation would 
'result in a significant impingement of the States' tradition and primary power over land and water use.' 
Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits ... is a quintessential states 
and local power. ... We ordinarily expect a 'clear and manifest' statement from Congress to authorize 
an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority."' (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 737-38 (2006))); id. at 1714 ('"Changes in the river like these fall within a State's legitimate 
legislative business, and the Clean Water Act provides for a system that respects the States' concerns."' 
(quoting S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006))). 
318. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 592 ("Because state governments are more directly 
accountable and more familiar with regional conditions, they are generally in a better position than the 
federal government to make policy judgments for their constituencies."). 
319. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 934 ("To avoid the intrusion on state autonomy that 
would result from preemption of a broad swath of state regulation, the purpose of promoting uniformity 
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In contrast, according to Professor Adelman, the federal government's 
greater ability to widely disperse regulatory innovations, because of its status as 
the "top regulator" and its "unique relationship" with every state in the union, 
further supports preemption. 320 Another "virtue" of regulating at the national 
level is that it avoids the myopia and tendency to be "overwhelmed" by the 
high level of uncertainty that may accompany regulation by lower level 
policymakers.321 Increased stability can also result from looking at problems in 
the aggregate level. 322 As with many of the perceived benefits of preemption 
discussed in this part, except for the benefits that flow from preventing self-
dealing among states, these regulatory benefits can be offset by the benefits of 
localism. They are also dependent on the debatable views of states as ill-
equipped to handle complex regulatory tasks and the need to achieve 
uniformity in all regulatory matters. 
B. Why Preemption May Be a Bad Idea 
A principal reason why preemption is not preferable is the strong, 
independent role states play in a "decentralized government."323 In addition, 
having states as concurrent centers of regulatory authority minimizes regulatory 
risk of error, increases the opportunity for learning at both levels of 
government, creates multiple entry points for citizens into the governing 
process, and preserves states as laboratories for innovation. 
Having states play an independent role in a decentralized government 
enables them to respond to the "needs of a heterogeneous democratic society by 
preventing 'capture' by industry, increasing opportumttes for public 
involvement, and encouraging governmental creativity by making states 
compete to satisfy a mobile citizenry."324 By acting as "rival centers of 
power,"325 states can limit the excesses of the national government or moderate 
to rationalize standards and thereby reduce transaction costs for regulated entities should be a clear, 
primary purpose of the federal law before it justifies preemption of state law."). 
320. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 293. 
321. !d. at 294. 
322. !d. 
323. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 9 (Justice Black described federalism as representing "a system 
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in 
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and 
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States" (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971))). Perhaps this is why the 
Framers rejected various proposals to curtail the power of the states in favor of a strong central 
government. See Larson, supra note 218, at 14 (According to Madison's Convention notes, "[o]n Friday, 
June 8, the delegates debated whether the national legislature should have the power to veto state laws. 
Madison strongly supported the proposal, but this effort to radically curtail the power of the states was 
decisively rejected, just as his effort to prevent the state legislatures from electing senators was defeated 
the day before."). 
324. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1663. 
325. Greve, supra note 243, at 78 ("The point of endowing subordinate (state) sovereigns with 
authority over the same citizens and territory-while limiting the central authority's sphere of authority-
is to create rival centers of power, to make '[a]mbition ... counteract ambition,' and in that fashion to 
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its policies. 326 
Robust state governments with regulatory structures that overlap or 
complement federal regulations offer clear benefits. 327 For example, having 
more than one regulator making decisions reduces risk of error. 328 
Furthermore, it puts less of a premium on an initial decision, as other regulatory 
venues are available to question that approach and, by testing other approaches, 
correct errors. 329 Preemption "eliminates the possibility of plurality, dialogue, 
make government control and discipline itself." (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison))); 
see also Larson, supra note 217, at 13 (Madison's Convention notes reported that John Dickinson 
argued, "The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce 
that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. 
To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be 
impracticable, would be ruinous. [Dickinson] compared the proposed National System to the Solar 
System, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits"); 
Shattuck, supra note 17, at 252 ("[I]t has remained a fundamental premise of federalism doctrine that 
'[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
states."' (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,725 (1869))). 
326. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 16; see also Greve, supra note 243, at 78 n.6 
("Madison noted that by dividing the powers 'between two distinct governments' America created a 
'double security' as 'to the rights of the people.' ... This design would cause '[t]he different 
governments [to] control each other; at the same time that each [would] be controled [sic] by itself.'" 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)); Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1664 ("American 
federalism is defined generally as the extent to which state autonomy limits the exercise of federal 
power .... At its best, federalism safeguards the public from dangerous, tyrannical impulses at the 
national level by allowing flexible, decentralized institutions to flourish."). 
327. See Durbin, supra note 75, at 540-4\ {discussing William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory 
Fragmentation Continuum, Westwcry and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323 (2005) 
[hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum], and attributing to Buzbee the ideas that 
"the division of authority between different regulatory bodies is not always a bad thing" because 
"[f]ragmentation can serve to slow down or even halt projects whose harms might otherwise be 
overlooked in a more streamlined regulatory scheme" and that "regulatory fragmentation is especially 
important at 'the intersection of environmental and land use laws,' where multiple layers of regulators at 
the federal, state, and local levels have all played important roles during the past four decades"). 
328. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1577 ("More interactive, multi-actor regulatory 
strategies, however, greatly reduce several pervasive sources of regulatory risk and also improve the 
odds of superior regulatory outcomes."); see also Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance, 
supra note 223, at 121 ("[T]he concurrence of state and federal power promotes several benefits, 
including a plurality of regulatory perspectives, a dialogue among regulators, and a system of 
redundancy to guard against errors by state or federal regulators.''); Durbin, supra note 75, at 542 
("[F]inal review by a single federal agency ... rather than a multi-layered, multi-tiered review by 
several state and federal agencies, has the potential to create a situation in which negative aspects of the 
project might ... be overlooked.'' (quoting Buzbee, Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, supra note 
327, at 324); id. (explaining why FERC should welcome the participation of states and localities in the 
siting process for LNG terminals, especially with respect to "regional safety and security hazards .... 
Otherwise, although the number of LNG terminals will increase at a faster rate due to centralized 
regulation, the siting of those terminals may be insufficiently analysed, causing the public to be subject 
to unwarranted safety and security risks."). 
329. See Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126; see also 
Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at \577 ("[I]f all regulatory power is handed to one actor, all is 
dependent on the initial regulatory judgment being right. If it falls short, or is imprudent at the moment 
of creation, the absence of other actors or regulatory venues to reconsider that judgment can freeze the 
law. Not only will no better approach be tested or revealed, but incentives to critique the status quo will 
exist only if that single actor is amenable to persuasion. When one factors in reluctance to engage in 
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and redundancy"; where the only regulatory authority is federal, there is "no 
backup system" should the federal approach not work. 330 Preemption also can 
destroy the positive results of state and local political efforts. 331 
Concurrent and overlapping regulatory actors also create mutual learning 
opportunities and possibilities for adjusting a given regulatory approach. 332 
They create multiple venues and means for citizens and stakeholders to 
participate in government, 333 and represent a move away from centralized 
power. 334 This, in tum, lessens the likelihood of federal error and regulatory 
"stasis" and "fosters 'democratic experimentalism. "'335 Federal regulators, 
legislators, and courts are more removed from the average citizen and lack 
inexpensive ways for citizens to submit direct communications. This removes 
citizens from the democratic process. 336 Thus, preemption, which works within 
self-criticism, giving sole regulatory turf to one actor is risky"); Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra 
note 311, at 157 ("Handing all regulatory power to one actor is the antithesis of the diversity of actors 
called for in experimentalist literature. With complete displacement, ... no actor or institution outside 
the federal regulatory venue has any room or incentive to criticize and seek change."). 
330. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126; see also Adelman 
& Engel, supra note 218, at 293 ("The hierarchy inherent in the federal system ... clearly has its place. 
Yet, as the Framers understood from the outset, it poses many risks as well. From the standpoint of 
adaptive systems and traditional theories of federalism, the most obvious one is the dramatic loss in 
diversity that can result from preemptive federal regulation. This loss may be a direct result of a strict 
standard or may arise more subtly from the highly aggregated level at which federal regulators view 
environmental problems."). 
331. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 721-22 ("Federal preemption edicts often eviscerate the 
substantive achievements of these state and local political efforts."). 
332. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1577-78 ("[A]llowing multiple actors to retain 
roles reduces the risk of a single actor monopolizing the regulatory field without opportunities for 
dynamic learning."); Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 164 ("[F]loor preemption's 
retention of multiple institutions and the different modalities and incentives of common law litigation 
mean that one need not rely on hyper-involved citizens and selfless bureaucrats to prompt regulatory 
reexamination and adjustment."). 
333. See Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 53-55 (listing among the benefits of dual 
regulation that states and local government "provide additional venues in which citizens and 
stakeholders can participate and nudge governments"); see also Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, 
at 17 ("Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens to participate in 
governance and seek responsive government. That may result in greater 'civic virtue' in citizens by 
encouraging them to become better informed and more actively engaged in all levels of government."). 
334. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 688-89 (noting de Tocqueville would have been concerned by 
"[t]he transmutation of political issues into not merely judicial questions but also federal preemption 
issues" because "embedded in this metamorphosis is a move toward greater administrative centralization 
of power, and a concomitant decline in the competing centers of political power which he had praised 
for protecting our democratic republic"). 
335. Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 55 (quoting Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-88 ( 1998) ). 
336. Hoke, supra note 172, at 687, 695 ("Federal preemption decisions impede the ability of those 
governmental bodies that are structured to be more responsive to citizens' public values and ideas-state 
and local governments-and have concomitantly undermined citizens' rights to participate directly in 
governing themselves."); Pierce, supra note 288, at 645 (noting that Boyden Gray identified as a major 
disadvantage of federal regulation the fact that "it is implemented by a massive, inefficient bureaucracy 
remote from the needs of the people in each locality"). Hoke calls this an "odd 'tragedy of the 
commons."' Hoke, supra note 172, at 695 ("As each public issue and particular industry's regulatory 
apparatus is nationalized, fewer and fewer issues of substance remain for the political activity of average 
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"a bipolar model of federalism," shuts off "the political space within which 
grass-roots citizens" work to change government or its policies. 337 Because of 
these social costs, Professor Resnik is a "critic of the new preemption rules in 
which judges shape quasi-constitutional doctrines limiting federalism's 
iterative opportunities."338 
However, regulatory overlap has "potential pitfalls."339 These include 
undermining uniformity, finality, and accountability, and causing inefficiencies 
if different or even contradictory regulations apply to the same activity or 
product. 340 When there is regulatory overlap, "lines of responsibility" may 
become blurred, and citizens who are dissatisfied with a particular government 
initiative may not know which level of government to hold responsible. 341 
Conversely, Professor Schapiro claims that polyphonic federalism, in which the 
federal and state governments exercise concurrent authority, can effectively 
manage jurisdictional overlap. 342 Concurrent authority may produce a more 
innovative and resilient form of government that "advances the valuable 
characteristics of plurality, dialogue, and redundancy," and "encourage policy 
citizens on a local or state level."); id. at 696 ("[E]ach additional industry or other interest group's 
success in nationalizing a regulatory issue divests from states, localities, and citizens the ability to create 
meaningful change through democratic political activity, compressing the legislative and regulatory 
space available for meaningful self-government"). 
337. Hoke, supra note 172, at 696; see also Resnik, supra note 220, at 41 ("These multiple sites for 
conflicts about social norms are the opportunities provided by democratic federalism to permit problems 
to be argued in more than one forum and more than once .... I do not suggest that the outcomes of such 
contestation are either optimal or to my personal liking, nor that problems of aggrandizement, capture, 
cartels, and overreaching are absent. But the reiterated conflicts are desirable because they enable us to 
watch and to participate in struggles over the content of the law of the United States."). 
338. Resnik, supra note 220, at 41; see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 696 ("Most theories of 
federalism ... fail to recognize that federalism is not properly understood as bipolar or dichotomous, but 
is three-dimensional, with the availability of citizen participation and citizen power supplying the third 
plane of analysis."); Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126 
("Preemption prevents the interplay of state and federal law that constitutes one of the chief benefits of 
federalism."). 
339. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 44. 
340. See also Adelman & Engelet al., supra note 218, at 290 ("The multilevel approach of adaptive 
(and dynamic) federalism is not costless. Uniformity, accountability, and finality are all sacrificed to 
some degree by allowing multiple jurisdictions to address environmental problems simultaneously."); id. 
at 295 ("Clearly, where a proliferating polyglot of state-level regulations becomes enormously 
disruptive to the economy, federal preemption may be warranted."). 
341. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 45. 
342. Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 120-21; see also id. at 
121 ("Federalism is a system in which there are multiple nodes of political authority within a country. 
Polyphonic federalism focuses on the creative overlap of these different legal regimes."); Resnik, supra 
note 220, at 42 (The question is "how to weave the fact of such joint action into legal theories that aspire 
to celebrate the diversity, the potential for redundancy, the distribution of power entailed in the potential 
singularity of each state, and the differences among states."); id. at 86 ("Non-uniformity is a predicate of 
federalist systems, which can impose a national norm but which ought to be dedicated to local 
divergence wherever tolerable."). 
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experimentation."343 Professor Schapiro sees preemption under circumstances 
of "broad participation and shared interest" as "an unduly blunt and generally 
unnecessary mechanism to protect an abstract principle of democratic 
control."344 
When not preempted, state regulations can fill regulatory gaps left by 
federal inaction and overcome the "status quo bias" of federal regulatory 
decisions. 345 States may offer a more finely tuned layer of regulation, which 
can be adjusted quickly in response to changes in perceived local needs or 
conditions. 346 Businesses use the preemption doctrine to block state health and 
safety laws that are more aggressive than their federal counterparts or civil 
rights laws that require broader protection. 347 When businesses are successful 
and state law is preempted, states and local communities cannot move to fill a 
343. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 43; see also Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 
1544 (indicating his preference for the phrase "polyphonic federalism" because it reflects current 
practice and "serves numerous salutary ends"). 
344. Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 132; see also Adelman 
& Engel, supra note 218, at 296 (The "findings suggest further that federal preemption should be used 
sparingly, and that exclusive federal control of environmental regulation should be reserved for 
exceptional circumstances."). 
345. See Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 155-56 ("Any regulatory design choice 
needs to take into account and adjust for numerous regulatory failure risks. Among those common risks 
are regulatory inertia, capture, poor initial choice or error, outdated choices, and inadequate funding of 
administrative agencies. Creation of effective regulatory schemes must further anticipate status quo bias, 
which can make any initial choice sticky, and risk-averse regulators."). 
346. See V erchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 16 ("[I]f states possess robust authority to 
regulate, the policies chosen within a state will tend to be tailored to local concerns and to citizen 
preferences."); see also Pierce, supra note 288, at 645-46 (saying that Boyden Gray identifies as 
advantages of state and local regulation that "(I) it produces programs tailored to local needs with 
correspondingly greater ability to respond promptly to changes in local needs; (2) it permits 
experimentation with a variety of approaches to regulation; and (3) it provides for greater political 
accountability and legitimacy"); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Enforcement of Federalist-Based Constitutional 
Limitations: Some Skeptical Comparative Observations, 57 EMORY L.J. 135, 138 (2007) ("Consider 
finally the best general statement of federalism's normative basis, the principle of subsidiarity, 
according to which governmental activities should be conducted on the lowest level at which they can 
effectively be carried out."). 
347. Hoke, supra note 172, at 721 ("Whether it is greater concern for the dangers posed by nuclear 
power plants and toxic wastes, or by the loss of privacy rights and reproductive freedoms, some states 
have enacted regulation that is far more public-regarding than has the national government."); see also 
Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 19 (discussing the virtues of "a hybrid, power-sharing 
arrangement between the federal government and the states" and saying "[e]ven with federal 
environmental standards in place, some citizens may still face acute localized risks, called 'hot spots' by 
environmentalists; preserving state authority to go beyond federal standards can allow an effective 
response to these local problems"); Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1570-71 ("Of course, 
preemption advocates prefer preemptive outcomes precisely to reduce regulatory and legal burdens."). 
Professor Zellmer finds disturbing the pro-development, anti-regulatory tilt of the current Supreme 
Court. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1662 ("Although an empirical study of the full range of 
preemption cases issued by the Rehnquist Court indicated that preemption may be less likely when a 
state is a party to the dispute, in the cases surveyed in this Article, judicial outcomes reflect an 
antiregulatory sentiment, whether or not a state played a role in the litigation."); id. at 1731 ("Since the 
mid-1990s, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have consistently shielded industry from progressive state 
regulations in areas of traditional state concern ranging from pollution prevention to workplace safety."). 
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regulatory void, leaving their citizens exposed to harm348 and reducing states 
to little more than administrative arms of the federal government. 349 It is not 
easy for states to get Congress to restore their legislative power. 350 The result 
is that the level of protection of citizens is less complete than it otherwise might 
have been had state law not been preempted. 
In addition, when state regulations are preempted, short-term economic 
benefits may be created for indust:ry,351 which generally prefers more lax 
federal regulation to more aggressive state regulation. 352 Professor Hoke 
argues that federal preemption benefits larger corporations because they can 
bear the higher costs of complying with federal laws and have the resources to 
influence the content of federal laws. 353 But one level of regulation leaves 
federal agencies vulnerable to capture by industries354 and removes states as a 
potential "stabilizing device."355 Citizens lack the resources and wherewithal 
to offer a counterbalance to industry's preferences. 356 Since preemptive 
federalism undermines "the dynamism of a healthy system of overlapping 
jurisdiction," powerful feedback loops may emerge, one of which, according to 
Professor Adelman, is a shift in industry's lobbying efforts to the federal 
level. 357 As industry representatives are "substantially fitter" players at this 
348. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 718. 
349. See id. 
350. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 
183, 214 (1988) (noting that many of Justice Blackmun's critics accused him of overestimating "the 
states' ability to protect their interest through their representatives in Congress"). 
351. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 692-93 ("In an era when federal regulations are frequently 
outdated, substantively lax, or ineffectually enforced by an underfunded agency, compliance with only 
the federal regulations may provide distinct short-term economic benefits to regulated industry."); id. at 
693 ("With a 'friendly' regulatory apparatus on the national capital, elimination of the increasingly 
active, and arguably more public-oriented, state regulatory power appears to be sound business 
strategy."). 
352. See id. at 721 ("While evaluating the social costs of eliminating dual regulation via federal 
preemption, we should recognize the substantive import of many of the laws challenged as 
preempted."); see also Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1703 ("As the states become more aggressive in 
filling gaps left by lax federal regulatory schemes and federal enforcement failures, for-profit 
corporations, developers, and other antiregulatory forces have become equally aggressive-and quite 
effective-in wielding preemption as an obstacle to the implementation of protective state 
regulations."). 
353. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 719. 
354. See id. at 693 ("When an industry has achieved a federal regulatory regime that is conducive 
to its self-determined interests, known in the literature as 'agency capture,' a parallel system of state 
regulatory law may threaten to dilute or to vitiate the advantages amassed on the federal level.") 
355. !d. at 719. 
356. See Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 161 ("Industry will not want such 
change, nor will regulators. Citizens will be outgunned, and even issue-based not-for-profits will often 
lack the resources to stick with the ongoing process of adjustment."); see also Adelman & Engel, supra 
note 218, at 294 ("[P]ublic-choice theory predicts which interest groups are likely to prevail. 
Concentrated industry interest groups negatively impacted by environmental regulation will have a 
competitive advantage over the diffuse, poorly organized public threatened by regulatory inaction."). 
357. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 295. For a discussion of complex, dynamic adaptive 
system and feedback loops, see Hope M. Babcock, Democracy's Discontent in a Complex World: Can 
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"game," they will disproportionately gain from these feedback loops, 358 
reaping the benefits from preemption. 
Refraining from preempting state regulation preserves states as 
laboratories; 359 while investing sole regulatory authority in the national 
government eliminates the effects of local conditions providing support for 
strong regulation.36° Federal regulators learn from state experimentation and 
states often improve on federal laws, 361 creating "room for pragmatic 
adjustment."362 States are more likely to innovate and experiment than the 
federal government, which is reluctant to change regulatory standards because 
of the time-consuming, resource-intensive nature of the rulemaking process, 
followed by the uncertainty of hard-look judicial review.363 Moreover, 
regulators may better assess regulatory choices when states go beyond the 
federal government or are willing to step into a regulatory gap. 364 Taking 
authority away from the states limits their capacity to innovate and thwarts 
possible state "solutions to social problems that may later be adopted at a 
Avalanches, Sandpiles. and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel's Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. 
L.J 0 2085 (1997). 
358. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 295. 
359. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 609 ('"Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).; Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 293 ("The value of 
innovation is one of the oldest justifications for a federalist system, encouraging, as it does, the role of 
states as 'laboratories of democracy."'). 
360. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 294-95 ("The benefits of greater predictive stability 
and full cost internalization that come with elevating an issue to the federal level sacrifices other factors 
as well," such as attenuating the feedback loop "between the benefits and costs of individual variation," 
which are "strong and swift ... at a small scale ... [because] individual species are inherently more 
vulnerable than ecosystems collectively. These tight feedbacks are essential to adaptive change, as 
buffering mechanisms, by their very nature, diminish sensitivity to exogenous pressures. Accordingly, 
although aggregation promotes stability and resiliency, it increases the inertia of a system and its ability 
to respond to changing environmental conditions."). 
361. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 656 ("Federal regulation is not inconsistent with regulatory 
experimentation; it is inconsistent only with regulatory experimentation initiated on a decentralized basis 
by states. Still, decentralized regulatory experimentation probably does have advantages, simply because 
regulatory wisdom does not reside exclusively in federal agencies."). 
362. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1544 ("Federal actors have learned from state 
innovations. At other times, states have modeled law on federal law, but then improved on it. Most areas 
of social and environmental policy reveal federal leadership but then ongoing interaction and 
improvement that is fostered by the latitude left for political and legal contributions of state and local 
governments and courts. This reality of regulatory interaction has been critical to regulatory progress."). 
363. See id. at 1569-70. 
364. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 183 (arguing that when a state "takes a more precautionary 
approach to a health and environmental risk than the federal government, and is willing to regulate 
despite uncertainties," not only will this not thwart federal purposes, but "[s]uch state experimentation 
may help all levels of government, as well as targets of regulation and those seeking its protections, by 
allowing more informed assessment of regulatory options"). 
754 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:691 
nationallevel."365 
States are also in a better position to respond to and care for the needs of 
their citizens than the national government. 366 Indeed, states are often in the 
forefront in terms of enacting protective laws and regulations367 and state 
regulators may be more protective than their federal counterparts. 368 
Concentrating too much power in the hands of federal regulators can also have 
"perverse" consequences, such as preventing states from regulating an area that 
the federal government avoids addressing, like climate change, 369 perpetuating 
a regulatory gap. 370 Since it is the states and not the federal government that 
regulate the intra-state generation, sale, and transmission of electrical power, 371 
365. Stabile, supra note 177, at I 0 ("[l]mproper preemption decisions give insufficient regard to 
the purposes and goals of Congress in passing federal legislation."). Professor Adelman claims that 
limiting environmental regulation to the federal government undermines the competition dynamic that is 
essential to the survival of complex adaptive systems, like our federal system. See Adelman & Engel, 
supra note 218, at 294 ("A defining characteristic of adaptive systems and ecosystems, in particular, is 
the variation in competition for resources that occurs over time and space. Without this variability, much 
of the diversity in an ecosystem would be lost to natural selection-the fittest species would win out in 
the absence of localized disturbances and ecological niches. Limiting environmental policy making to 
the federal government through the doctrine of preemption undermines this essential dynamic."). 
366. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 296, at 994 ("Three principal arguments favor a strong, 
independent state power ... states can better respond to the diverse interests and preferences of their 
citizens ... [they] can compete against one another for citizens and economic growth through 
innovation in government ... [and] states are often thought to be better protectors of private rights than 
either the larger national Congress of the President."); see also Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 
43 ("People in different states can experiment with different legal solutions to common problems .... 
Federalism allows different states to try out different possibilities. The states and federal government 
can operate as 'laboratories,' experimenting with divergent regulatory regimes .... No single best 
solution will dominate. In other areas, the states and the national government will converge on a single, 
preferred outcome."). 
367. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 721. 
368. See id. at 694-95 ("[T]he power transferred or confirmed to exist only in national political 
institutions may remain unexercised, thus creating a regulatory vacuum if the question has not yet been 
addressed by national legislation or agency regulations and is not on the current national political 
agenda."). 
3 69. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 141 ("The most perverse consequences of allocating too 
much authority to the federal government through doctrines governing congressional and agency 
preemption creates a similar problem of 'states who can't and federal authorities who won't."' 
(discussing Judge Henry Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who 
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963))); id. at 142 ("lfattacks grounded in preemption are successful in 
stifling the initiatives states are taking with respect to [greenhouse gases] and global warming, while 
Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) remain stalemated and silent, global 
warming will become a poster child for the perverse effects of states who can't and federal authorities 
who won't."). 
370. See id. at 142-43 (identifYing as one of "four problem areas" that arise when state law is 
preempted "the 'regulatory vacuum' that can result from concentrating too much authority at the federal 
level"); see also Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("[P]reemption in the face of federal inaction leaves 
the state whose law is preempted at the mercy of the market failure that prompted it to regulate in the 
first place because no substitute federal regulatory regime exists."). On the topic of regulatory gaps 
generally, see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. I (2003). 
371. Tribe, supra note 19, at 702 ("It is therefore clear that the states retain the right to regulate 
nuclear energy activities at least for non-radiation purposes that relate to the generation, sale, or 
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preempting state authority in this area is an example of how a "regulatory gap" 
might arise and not be filled. 372 The result of this particular} regulatory gap 
would then be fewer checks against "utility discretion" to choose nuclear 
power, even though Vermont might consider the nuclear option to be imprudent 
and harmful to its citizens. 373 
Additionally, federal bureaucracies can be less efficient than local ones, 
requiring more time and resources to make decisions. 374 This inefficiency can 
increase the social cost of regulation375 and discourage the resolution of 
federalism controversies through national regulations. 376 In contrast, state 
agencies must make decisions quickly because they lack the resources and 
expertise to conduct a thorough regulatory analysis; however, quick decisions 
can have their own social cost if states make mistakes. 377 As in the case of 
preemption's benefits, which are often offset by negative consequences, there 
are negative consequences from placing regulatory burdens on states when their 
laws are not preempted. 
Thus, there are several persuasive reasons to oppose preemption, such as 
the importance of promoting democratic experimentalism by preserving states 
as robust centers of alternative regulation and experimentation. States may also 
act as regulatory gap fillers when federal regulators hesitate to act, and prevent 
errors and bureaucratic stasis. 
transmiSSion of electric power generally."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 104 
("Congress 'underscored the distinction drawn in 1954' between regulation of nuclear power plants for 
safety reasons, and elemental decisions of state governments as to whether nuclear power plants are 
desirable from other perspectives."); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 72 ("Section 274 was concerned solely 
with allocating responsibility for protecting against radiation hazards between the federal and state 
governments. Such matters as zoning, land use, and arguably, the required authorization to commence a 
nuclear power project-'matters on the fringe of the preempted area'-were left to state authority."). 
372. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 208, 
225 (1983) ("While the NRC does evaluate the dangers of generating nuclear power, it does not balance 
those dangers against the risks, costs, and benefits of other choices available to the State .... It is almost 
inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that 
Congress intended the States to continue to make these judgments."). 
373. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 64 (Unless state utility commissions are allowed to make "a 
general evaluation of feasibility, on broad grounds of social, economic and ideological policy, then the 
decision whether to build a nuclear facility in a state will ultimately be made only by the public utility 
seeking its construction. So long as a reactor's design specifications meet NRC requirements, there 
could be no public check whatsoever on utility discretion."). 
374. , See Pierce, supra note 288, at 655 ("[M]ost observers of the regulatory process would accept 
Boyden Gray's assertion that federal agencies tend to require more time to make regulatory decisions 
than state agencies. This phenomenon is probably attributable to some combination of bureaucratic 
diseconomies of scale, crowded agendas, and the increased number and nature of parties affected when a 
regulatory decision is made on a national level."). 
375. /d. at 655-56. 
376. /d. at 655. 
377. !d. at 656. 
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V. APPLYING THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND ITS UNDERLYING 
POLICY CONCERNS TO VERMONT ACT 160 
Two principal legal arguments demonstrate why the AEA does not 
preempt Vermont Act 160: (1) the absence of an express or implied preemption 
of laws like Act 160 in the AEA; and, (2) the call for the application of a 
presumption against preemption to protect the exercise of traditional state 
police powers and maintain states as strong alternative centers of governance. 
Although the NRC's jurisdiction over nuclear power plants is broad, it is not 
all-encompassing. A combination of statutory language, other environmental 
laws, and Supreme Court opinions, as well as the development that commercial 
nuclear power is no longer a national imperative, have cabined the NRC's 
authority, leaving room for states to act within increasingly wide jurisdictional 
borders. 378 Lastly, a finding that the AEA does not preempt Vermont Act 160 
is consistent with recognized federalism principles. 
A. Vermont Act 160 Neither Expressly nor Impliedly Conflicts with the 
AEA 
Because the AEA contains only a limited express preemption of state 
regulation of nuclear power plants and specifically preserves traditional state 
authority over the generation, transmission, and sale of power, as well as 
nonradiological matters at the plants, there is no express or field preemption of 
Vermont Act 160. While there may be tension between the two levels of 
regulation because their application may lead to different results, as applied 
here, there is no conflict between them. Thus, there is also no implied 
preemption of Vermont Act 160. 
1. There Is No Express or Implied Field Preemption of Vermont Act 160 
The AEA does not expressly give the federal government exclusive power 
over nuclear reactors. 379 In fact, Congress carved out a sphere of state 
378. See Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 103 (The Pacific Gas Court noted that "although the 
AEA is broad in its regulation of nuclear power plants, it is not all-encompassing, and substantial room 
exists for state regulation of nuclear power," since section 271 "provides that '[n]othing in this chapter 
shall be construed to affect the authority ... of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the 
generation, sale of transmission of electrical power produced through the use of nuclear facilities .... "' 
(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 208)). 
379. See Baum, supra note 77, at 669 (noting despite the 1959 AEA amendment adding Section 
271, "the AEA still fails to state expressly that the federal government has sole and exclusive authority 
to regulate radiation hazards" (citing N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 
1971), ajf'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972))). But see Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 446-47 
("[T]he congressional declaration in the Atomic Energy Act that federal regulation was to be exclusive 
was made in the context of total, existing federal control and regulation. Thus, the determination by 
Congress that exclusive federal regulation was to be continued gives to the preemption provision a 
degree of precision absent in other cases. In this context, the determination that exclusive federal 
regulation was to be continued constitutes an explicit statement of broad supersession of all state 
regulation of the construction and operation of nuclear power plants for purposes of controlling radiation 
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regulation of nuclear reactors in the AEA. 380 By assuring states that nothing in 
the AEA circumscribed their traditional authority over power generation and 
transmission within a state,381 and by allowing states to regulate certain types 
of nuclear materials and nonradiological hazards, 382 Congress made clear that 
states had a defined space in the nuclear regulatory orbit383 ; it certainly did not 
expressly preempt that authority. Therefore, the AEA does not expressly 
preempt Vermont Act 160 and, in fact, the Act functions in an area expressly 
reserved to the states. 
hazards."). Having failed to find express preemption in the AEA, Professors Murphy and La Pierre find 
implied or obstacle preemption. See id. at 447-48 ("Even if courts do not find in section 274 an 
unambiguous declaration of express preemption, the conclusion that state bills imposing a prohibition or 
moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants are impliedly inescapable .... They are in 
irreconcilable conflict with the federal law in a number of respects .... [for example] the conflict 
between these bills and the federal policy of developing nuclear energy for the production of electric 
power."). 
380. Atomic Energy Act§ 271,42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2006). 
381. /d.; see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 701 n.ll2 (quoting section 271 and explaining that 
Congress added the proviso clause "to prevent the section being construed to achieve" an '"intolerable' 
result," namely that local ordinances and regulations having to do with the generation, sale, or 
transmission of electric energy might place "an unacceptable burden" on the Commission); Murphy & 
La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453 ("Unlike other possible state regulation for purposes other than 
protection against radiation hazards, state public utility regulation is expressly contemplated by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In providing in section 271 for the preservation of state public utility 
regulation, Congress considered that the states would retain the authority to regulate the rates and 
services of electric power produced in nuclear power plants. When Congress amended this section in 
1965, it did so precisely to confirm that state regulation is to be confined to rates and services."). 
382. 42 U.S.C. § 2021. See Cavers, supra note 19, at 31 ("In adopting section 274, the Congress 
has opened the door part way to compatible state regulation; perhaps it should go further."); id. at 35 n. 7 
("' [T]he Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until 
such time as the State enters into an agreement with the Commission to assume such responsibility."' 
(quoting S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., lst Sess., at 12 (1959))); Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 
103-04 (discussing the Court's reliance in Pacific Gas on section 274(k) and concluding this section 
was "not an affirmative grant of power to the states; rather, Congress added section 274(k) to make clear 
that the 1959 amendments had not drawn any more authority from the states than the original act passed 
in 1946, as amended in 1954"); Tribe, supra note 19, at 701 ("[S]ubsection K is intended to make it 
clear that the bill does not impair the State[s'] authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the 
manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection." (quoting S. REP. No. 
870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1959))); Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1704 (While section 274(k) was 
"narrowly circumscribed to apply only to the particular topic addressed in that section ... certain 
federal-state agreements," the Court recognized that "Congress, by permitting regulation for 'purposes 
other than protection against radiation hazards' underscored the distinction ... between the spheres of 
activity left respectively to the Federal Government and the States." (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 210 (1983))); Baum, supra note 77, at 
674 ("Section 2021(g) [requiring NRC 'to cooperate with the states to be sure that "State and 
Commission programs for protection against hazards of radiation will be coordinated and compatible'], 
therefore, must contemplate some cooperation between the NRC and the state before the state enters 
such an agreement. ... Yet, if some cooperation is anticipated before the state enters into an agreement 
with the NRC, arguably the AEA contemplates some state regulatory authority." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
2021(g) (1976))). Anticipating the enactment of section 274, some states prior to 1959 had begun to 
promulgate nuclear safety regulations. See id. at 676. 
383. Interestingly, in 1957, the AEC proposed legislation that would have allowed states to 
establish concurrent state radiation standards so long as they those standards did not conflict with federal 
ones; the proposal never got out of committee. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 69. 
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That the AEA contemplates some form of state regulation of nuclear 
power plants also means that the federal government has not exclusively 
occupied the field of regulating nuclear power plants. While the AEA makes 
clear that the federal government has occupied the field of how nuclear power 
plants should be constructed and operated, it "has not even entered the field" of 
determining whether such plants should be constructed at all. 384 Determining 
whether a nuclear plant should be built, or in this case continue to operate, 
involves the state in a wide array of non-radiological matters, 385 such as the 
need for the plant, its relative costs and benefits, its environmental and 
economic impacts, and an assessment of alternatives. In contrast, the NRC is 
concerned with a single factor-protecting the public from radiation harm. It 
does not consider, let alone attempt to regulate, other factors relevant to the 
selection of a particular source of power for a community. 386 
But, drawing a line between nuclear reactor safety and a state's interest in 
protecting the welfare of its citizens is not easy. 387 Nor is it simple to 
determine what qualifies as a radiation hazard. 388 The line between an 
economic and radiological safety effect of a nuclear reactor's operation may 
384. ld. at 61. 
385. ld. But see Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 215,299 ("Finding that the 
Utah statutes were intended to regulate nuclear safety, the court held that 'in the matter of nuclear safety, 
Congress has determined that it is the federal government, and not the states, that must address the 
problem.'" (citing Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254 (lOth Cir. 
2004))). 
386. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 61-62 ("This 'whether' decision involves a broad range of 
economic, social, safety, environmental, and ideological factors. By contrast, the NRC concerns itself 
almost exclusively with only one such factor-protection against 'radiation hazards'-and does not 
attempt to deal with all the other influences bearing on the selection of a type of power source to meet 
the energy needs of a particular community."); id. at 7D-71 (citing New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 
170 (I st Cir. 1969) (upholding the AEC's position that its jurisdiction did not include thermal pollution 
because its jurisdiction was limited to radiation hazards)). 
387. See Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 100 (Northern States held "that the AEA preempted 
a Minnesota law regulating radioactive emissions of nuclear power plants more strictly than federal 
laws" and noted that the "AEA is a complex and pervasive scheme." (citing N. States Power Co. v. 
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), ajf'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972})); see also Recent 
Developments in Utah Law, supra note 385, at 292-99 (2005) (discussing Nielson, which preempted 
various state laws, including "laws requiring counties to pass ordinances rejecting all spent nuclear fuel 
repositories" or, alternatively, to create "detailed plans" allowing for their regulation and requiring 
compensation for unfunded potential liabilities created by those storage facilities). 
388. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 680 ("Defining the state and federal roles-both unraveling that 
design and subjecting it to constitutional review-is a delicate task inasmuch as both sovereignties have 
important interests in exercising authority over the activity in question. With respect to nuclear power 
plants, Congress has declared that national regulation is necessary to provide for the common defense 
and to assure the safe operation of such facilities. Yet the states also have an interest in the safety of 
nuclear power plants as well as an important interest in the economic, environmental, and social 
implications of using nuclear fuel to generate electricity for their citizens."); see also Baum, supra note 
77, at 680 n.ll3 (citing Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 1982), as an 
example of a federal court recognizing "the difficulty in distinguishing what is or is not a regulation of a 
radiation hazard"). 
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also be blurry. 389 In fact, there is no way that a state can regulate a nuclear 
power plant's rates and services without at least some consideration of the 
"radiation safety aspects" of the plant's operation. 390 Utility rates reflect the 
safety of the plant's operation to some degree. 391 For example, if a plant is 
shutdown or its power output is reduced to correct a safety problem "the level 
of services and rates charged to consumers will be affected."392 Indeed, a 
public utility commission could decide to block construction of a new nuclear 
plant because safety problems may cause it to shut down frequently, resulting 
in an expensive, unpredictable supply of power.393 Alternatively, a public 
utility commission may decide to prevent a nuclear power plant's construction 
because the commission decides it is unwise to rely on nuclear power when 
alternative, more reliable, or cheaper forms of power are available. 394 Thus, 
389. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673 ("The Pacific Gas Court drew an ambiguous distinction 
between safety and economic concerns. In adhering to the distinction, the Court significantly affected 
nuclear energy policymaking by allowing the states to enter a regulatory sphere earlier reserved for the 
federal government. The Court failed to recognize, however, that safety and economics are not separate 
questions."); see also Murphy, supra note 96, at 885 ("[T]he line between environmental protection and 
safety issues is often blurry both legally and physically." (citing Brown v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp., 
767 F.2d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir. 1985) (authorizing private parties to sue chemical companies under state 
laws governing pollution standards, building codes, and public nuisance, as long as radiological matters 
were not involved))). 
390. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453. The authors find various state laws that would 
impose conditions on authorizing the construction of new nuclear power plants susceptible to 
preemption by section 274 because they reflect the states' concern about radiological safety and would 
result in delaying or prohibition of the construction of nuclear plants. See id. at 447 (commenting on 
pending bills in California, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin). But see TOMAIN, supra note 
21, at 15 ("Safety and finances are not discrete topics. Waste disposal is a radiological hazard as much 
as it is an accounting entry on the utility's books."). 
391. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 691-93 (discussing the NRC's Individual Plant Examinations 
policy and how, under the Pacific Gas decision, state agencies can "disallow the utility from recovering 
the implementation costs by increasing rates to energy consumers," calling these disallowances 
"prudence disallowances," revir.wing how these disallowances can prevent utilities from "recouping 
safety maintenance costs," and saying how courts will only prevent states from using prudent 
disallowances "if the end results are not just and reasonable" (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 
US. 299 (1989))). 
392. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453. 
393. /d. at 454. 
394. See id. ("Even if nuclear power reactors and conventional power plants were determined to 
have comparable records of service, a state agency might still decide to prohibit the construction of an 
additional nuclear facility on the ground that it was unwise for the state 'to put all its eggs in one basket' 
and that there should be an equal development of a variety of power sources within the state."). 
According to Professor Reilly, a state might even be able to override federal authority over nuclear 
safety "simply by claiming that some aspect of nuclear power generation is too costly." Reilly, supra 
note 43, at 685. See also Goxem, supra note 10, at 443 ("Such nonparticipation by state or local 
governments has the potential effect of delaying or even halting the licensing of a nuclear power plant. 
Even though nonparticipation conflicts with the concept that the federal government has exclusive 
control over safety regulation, the court allowed this result."). But see Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 
44, at 454 ("There is no easy answer to ... whether such state public utility regulation would be 
preempted. The command of section 274 of the 1954 Act that the NRC have exclusive control over the 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants cannot be reconciled in all cases with the authority of 
state and local governments under the Act to regulate the rates and services of electric power."); id. at 
448-49 (First Iowa "strongly indicates that the states cannot bar a federal licensee from constructing and 
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safety concerns can infuse a public utility commission's economic decisions 
about a nuclear power plant's rates and services. 
Vermont Act 160 did not stray into a field exclusively occupied by the 
federal government-the radiological safety of nuclear power plants. Quite the 
contrary, the Vermont Act focused on the socio-economic impacts on Vermont 
citizens from the plant's continued operation. For example, the Act required the 
PSB to identify and analyze the continuing need for Vermont Yankee; the 
costs, benefits, and risks of its continued operation; alternatives that might 
better promote the welfare of Vermont citizens; long-term accountability and 
financial responsibility issues; and long-term environmental, economic, and 
public health issues. 395 None of these topics relates to radiological safety, let 
alone the design or operation of the plant-the focus of federal legislation. The 
legitimacy of Vermont Act 160' s considerations and the difficulty of separating 
safety from economic concerns lessen the likelihood that Vermont's law is a 
"subterfuge" to block the continuing operation of a nuclear plant. 396 Even if 
Vermont Act 160 is an outgrowth of legislative concern about the safe 
operation of Vermont Yankee, it is "unrealistic" to assume that a state that 
looks at the economics of a nuclear power plant's operation can at the same 
time ignore its operational risks, given the economic consequences of those 
risks. 397 To suggest that a state must ignore the risks that attend the selection of 
the nuclear option is to blindfold the state to nuclear power's very real 
economic risks. 398 Thus, there is no implied field preemption of Vermont Act 
operating a nuclear power plant producing electric power for interstate commerce" and state bills 
imposing prohibitions on constructing nuclear power plants or other conflicting requirements "would 
seriously disrupt the national plan and policy of Congress for the development of nuclear energy to 
produce electric power for interstate commerce." (citing First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power 
Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946))). 
395. See 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 160; see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 718 ("The placement 
of California's nuclear provisions within a comprehensive administrative scheme to achieve such 
purposes as ensuring a reliable supply of electrical energy, conserving energy resources, and assuring 
attainment of statewide environmental, public safety, and land use goals, is a further indication of 
California's pursuit of legitimate interests in enacting these provisions.") The California Act established 
siting procedures and criteria for non-nuclear plants. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 718. 
396. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 454 ("In the final analysis, the validity of state 
public utility regulation will rest on a determination whether its actual purpose is one other than a 
concern about radiation hazards and the degree of conflict which the state restriction imposes on the 
national plan for the development of nuclear energy."); id. at 455 ("Although the proposed [state 
moratoria] bills are sometimes justified as state regulation, in most cases the claim of regulation is 
patently a subterfuge for the real objective-prohibition. Although the bills are phrased in terms of 
'conditions' to be met before further construction, the conditions are, as a practical matter, incapable of 
fulfillment"). 
397. Reilly, supra note 43, at 70 I ("[I]t is unrealistic to assume that states consider nuclear energy 
solely in terms of 'economics' and ignore the fact that nuclear energy presents safety risks. Such 
restraint would require an inordinate amount of willpower. Instead, states almost certainly evaluate the 
advantages of nuclear power based on their own estimation of nuclear safety."). 
398. !d. at 70 I n.I26 ('"In making its traditional policy choices about what kinds of power are best 
suited to its needs, a State would be forced to ignore the undeniable fact that nuclear power entails 
certain risks."' (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 225 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring))). 
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160. 
Moreover, as long as Vermont Act 160 is directed at a different problem 
than the AEA, a federal court is unlikely to find it field preempted because any 
overlap is "incidental" to the field of nuclear regulation rather than essential to 
it. 399 Here, the purposes of the federal and state law are quite different and 
there is no overlap. 400 Vermont's law is directed at protecting the citizens of 
Vermont from unnecessary expenditures, from potential environmental harm, 
and from anxiety caused by an aging nuclear power plant; the AEA is directed 
at improving the safety of plant operations and preventing the release of 
radiological substances. Vermont has not entered the field of radiological safety 
standards-nothing about the reactor's design would need to be changed for the 
plant to comply with Vermont Act 160. Nor has the state entered the field of 
regulating the reactor's routine operation. Therefore, any impermissible overlap 
between Vermont Act 160 and the AEA is incidental and not fatal to the state 
law. 
Vermont's law empowering the PSB to deny a certificate ofpublic good to 
Vermont Yankee is an exercise of its reserved authority under the AEA to 
protect its ratepayers from unwarranted and unwanted economic costs and 
anxiety.401 As such, it has not intruded into an exclusive field of federal 
regulation. Therefore, Vermont Act 160 is safe from express or implied field 
preemption. 
2. There Is No Implied Conflict or Obstacle Preemption of Vermont Act 
160 
Although there may be tension between the two levels of regulatory 
authority, 402 no actual conflict between state and federal law exists here that 
399. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 56 (When "state and national power is utilized to solve 
different problems, the state's actions should be encouraged if the degree of overlap between the two 
provisions is found to be incidental to the operation of both."). 
400. See id. ("The state-supportive presumption will require those advocating preemption to 
establish that a conflict with some federal enactment 'will necessarily arise' because California has 
postponed granting land use to proposed nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Huron principle will 
militate against preemption if the objective [of] the California Nuclear Law is found to differ 
significantly from the purposes of applicable federal law."). 
401. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 712 ("A state's rejection of an electric power source that 
reasonably appears to create a source of indefinitely growing back-charges to ratepayers no more than 
exercises the authority recognized by section 271."); see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text 
(discussing the costs of building and operating a nuclear power plant). 
402. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 881 (The Supreme Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
464 U.S. 238 (1984), "emphasized the point that Congress expected tension between state and federal 
law .... Accordingly, this tension implies coexistence."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 675 
("The Silkwood Court also recognized that punitive damage awards could force utilities to conform to 
safety standards determined at the state level. ... [T]he Court admitted that allowing state law punitive 
damage awards, which have the effect of regulating safety standards, was inconsistent with the notion of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over radiological safety. Nevertheless, the majority found that Congress 
intended to recognize both concepts-the NRC's exclusive authority to set safety standards and the 
ability of states to award punitive damages if a jury decided that a plant's safety standards were not 
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makes it impossible for a regulated entity to comply with applicable federal and 
state laws. 403 Vermont has not enacted a law that conflicts with any NRC 
regulation. Since the NRC's decision to authorize Vermont Yankee's continued 
operation was safety-based, Vermont's decision to deny the plant a certificate 
for non-safety reasons did not conflict with the federal agency's safety rationale 
for its decision. Nor was the state's impact on the basis for the NRC's decision 
direct or substantiai.404 Vermont's law authorized the PSB to deny Entergy a 
certificate of public good to continue to operate Vermont Yankee based on an 
assessment of the plant's economic and social risks, while the AEA authorizes 
the NRC to extend the operating life of the plant based solely on safety 
considerations. 405 There is also no impossibility problem; Entergy could take 
steps to lessen the risk of economic surprises from the plant's operation and 
demonstrate that the concerns raised in association with Act 160 are 
groundless. 
Moreover, Vermont Act 160 does not create an obstacle to the fulfillment 
of any legislative purposes of the AEA. There is no mandate in the AEA that 
nuclear power be the preferred future source of energy.406 Nor is there any 
indication that Congress intended to prevent state public service commissions 
from choosing to not certify nuclear power plants. 407 There is nothing in the 
statute or its legislative history directing states to choose the nuclear option; 
instead, Professor Wiggins finds a clear statement of legislative intent to make 
nuclear power an option a state might choose. 408 
reasonable. The Court paused over the potential conflict between these two policies, yet ultimately 
concluded that Congress intended to 'tolerate whatever tension there was between them."' (quoting 
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256)). 
403. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text (discussing implied conflict and obstacle 
preemption). 
404. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) ("[F]for a state law to fall within the 
pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who 
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels," and the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim "may have some effect" on safety concerns, but that the effect was "neither 
direct nor substantial." (emphasis added)). But see Scott S. Smith, Federal Preemption and the AEA: 
How Federal Preemption Law "Nukes" State Law that Affects Nuclear Waste, 9 MO. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y REV. Ill, 119-20 (2002) (discussing Brown v. Kerr-McGee, 767 F.2d 1134, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 
1985), and saying that even though radioactive and nonradioactive materials were '"inextricably 
mixed,'" Congress did not intend to preempt applicable state laws, and the state law "did not fall within 
a specific field occupied by the federal government," the district court injunction ordering Kerr-McGee 
to remove byproduct material from the site "would substitute the judgment of the district court for that 
of the NRC as to the best method of storing the waste material" and, therefore, the state law was 
preempted). 
405. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529 ("[G]iven the danger associated with fission reactions 
and the radioactive waste generated by the process as well as the potential national security threat it 
poses, nuclear energy is regulated under a strict legal regime that gives the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the safety of nuclear power plants."). 
406. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 65. 
407. See id. at 78 ("[T]here is simply no room for the conclusion that Congress 'unmistakably' 
intended to prohibit states from disfavoring nuclear plants when certifying public utility applications."). 
408. See id. (The AEA "inaugurated the very beginning of the private nonmilitary use of nuclear 
energy .... In this setting, it would be surprising indeed to find Congress intending to eliminate states' 
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Regardless of whether the AEA's initial primary purpose was the safe 
development of commercial nuclear power, the passage of time has made any 
such legislative directive less clear as alternative forms of energy have become 
available and, in some cases, more appealing.409 Indeed, the Court in Pacific 
Gas specifically stated that the pro-development bias of the AEA did not 
require that nuclear power plants should be built regardless of their costs. 41 0 
Absent a manifest directive in the AEA to construct nuclear power plants,411 
states like Vermont, that choose to conserve energy or develop alternative 
energy production technologies like wind or solar power, should not be bound 
by what Professor Wiggins calls a "nationally standardized selection of nuclear 
discretion to utilize nonnuclear energy facilities. Far more likely, what was to be 'promoted' was not 
nuclear power at the expense of alternatives but the development of the technology that would permit 
nuclear power plants to be one of the alternatives"). But see Baum, supra note 77, at 668 ("The primary 
purpose of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) is to foster the safe development of nuclear energy as 
a power source." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
u.s. 190,221 (1983))). 
409. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 721 ("Since [California's] nuclear provisions may result in an 
indefinite exclusion of nuclear power plants from California, it may be argued that the state is interfering 
with activity that Congress set out to promote through the Atomic Energy Act. Congress, however, has 
neither made a judgment nor enacted any requirement that the nation as a whole must 'go nuclear.' On 
the contrary, by separating promotional from regulatory activities in the nuclear field, and by recently 
permitting states to subject nuclear power plants to state health regulations no less stringent than those 
applicable to other energy sources [in Clean Air Act § 122], Congress has clearly indicated its intent to 
provide the states with a nuclear option, not a nuclear mandate."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 80 
(saying the enactment of the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, "which completely restructured federal 
regulation of atomic energy," indicated Congress's unwillingness "to give nuclear power a legislative 
preference, and instead provided for a balanced system of meeting national energy demands"). 
410. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 221-23 (saying the AEA's primary purpose of developing 
commercial use nuclear power did not imply congressional intent to do so "at all costs" and states 
retained "sufficient authority . . . to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even 
stopped for economic reasons"); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 104 ("The Court noted 
that while a basic purpose of the AEA is to promote nuclear power, the objective of promoting nuclear 
power is to be achieved economically" and, thus, the California law, which the Court "construed as a 
guarantor of economically viable nuclear development, was not at cross-purposes with the AEA .... "); 
Li, supra note 44, at 1203-04 (Local nuclear free zones "do not conflict with federal statutes or obstruct 
federal purposes. Because the AEA does not require the manufacture of nuclear weapons 'at all costs,' 
and because nuclear free zones do not impose unacceptable costs on the production of nuclear weapons, 
their impact on federal defense policy does not require invalidation."). But see Martin, supra note 296, at 
996 ("[l]f Congress does not act, and the courts are precluded from reviewing local enactments, 'the 
effective final decision weighing state and federal interests would ... rest with ... state and local 
lawmaking bodies' likely to emphasize local concerns and discount the federal interest in an 
unobstructed foreign policy."); Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 674 ("This result in Pacific Gas undercuts 
Congress's promotional objectives for nuclear power as set forth in the AEA and gave individual states a 
means to exercise leverage over the safer development and use of nuclear power."). 
411. Even the granting of a construction permit is not a mandate to build and operate a plant. See 
Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 672 ("NRC licensing permits the construction of a nuclear power plant 
without compelling it ... . ");see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 703 ('"[T]he license granted by the AEC 
is merely a permit to construct a power plant, not a Federal order to do so.' Therefore, if legitimate state 
interests lead a state to delay, relocate, or even reject a proposed nuclear power plant, the 1954 Act as 
amended cannot be treated as mandating a contrary choice." (quoting Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 
237 N.W.2d 266,280 (1975))). 
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energy."412 Thus, Vermont Act 160 presents no threat of obstacle 
preemption. 413 
B. Vermont Act 160 Is Protected by the Presumption Against Preemption 
The presumption against preemption is particularly strong when the basis 
for state action is its traditional police powers, as is the case with Vermont Act 
160, and where there is no expression of contrary intent in the federal law, as 
with the AEA.414 One sacrosanct area of state regulation is determining electric 
utility rates,41 5 including electricity from nuclear power plants;41 6 another is 
determining whether a particular power plant is necessary.417 "[T]o require that 
commercial electric power shall not be generated until it is clear that the 
economic burden of using such power can be fully discharged in a finite time[] 
is only to impose a rational economic constraint on the generation and sale of 
electricity."418 This authority to require a utility to demonstrate the need for the 
power a plant will generate fits squarely within a state's traditional power to 
regulate utilities that operate within its borders419 and to protect its ratepayers 
from unsound investments, even if the exercise of that authority enables the 
public utility commission to exclude an investment in a nuclear plant from the 
412. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 66-67 (highlighting "California's unique position" as a reason 
why "states should be free to establish their own priorities and guidelines for meeting energy needs," 
listing among these features California's leadership in environmental consciousness resulting in a public 
"debate over the desirability of nuclear power" and that it is "geographically and geologically well 
situated" to use nonnuclear energy, mentioning "solar, wind, geothermal and tidal sources," and stating 
that the argument that "California cannot choose to develop alternative energy technologies, but that it 
must be bound by some nationally standardized selection of nuclear power, makes very little sense in the 
absence of an unambiguous showing of congressional intent"); see also supra notes 2~5 and 
accompanying text (discussing the clear statement rule). 
413. Cf Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1032 ("In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, [453 
U.S. 609 (1981),] the Court rejected a claim that congressional policy favoring the use of coal as a fuel 
source preempted state legislation that may have had an adverse effect on the use of coal."). 
414. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial presumption against 
preemption). 
415. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 67. 
416. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 686 {The nuclear provisions of the California Public Resources 
Code "are not preempted by federal law. On the contrary, they properly serve the vital interests of the 
people of California in providing California citizens with a plan of maximal accountability for the 
development of a responsible and economical state energy program within the framework of national 
energy policy and federal law."); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 208 {1983) (holding that the statutory language and history of section 271 
"confirm[ ed] that while the safety of nuclear technology was the exclusive business of the federal 
government, state power over the production of electricity was not otherwise displaced" (citing 100 
CONG. REc. 12015, 12196-202 (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper)). For a general discussion of the rate-
setting process, see Tomain, supra note 16. 
417. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978) ("There is little 
doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are 
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power."). 
418. Tribe, supra note 19, at 712. 
419. See id. ("(S]uch an economic preference would fall within the traditional state function of 
regulating public utilities-insuring that they provide adequate services at reasonable rates."). 
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rate base, making the nuclear plant a financially unattractive investment for the 
utility. 420 Thus, to the extent that Vermont Act 160 represented a determination 
by the state that the safety problems at the plant created untenable economic 
uncertainties for the company's ratepayers and citizens of Vermont, then the 
state's decision not to extend its operating lifetime until a complete cost-benefit 
evaluation had been done for the plant should be protected by the presumption 
against preemption. 
It is hard to imagine a more "frontal assault" on state authority than a 
federal directive dictating to states what form of energy source they must invest 
in.421 If a court construed the AEA to preempt Act 160, it would be telling 
Vermont that the state must continue to rely on nuclear power as its preferred 
energy source and dedicate the plant site to that use. Surely, after forty years of 
fraught experience with Vermont Yankee, Vermont should be able to change its 
mind. Indeed, if Vermont were not allowed to protect its citizens from the risk 
considerations of Act 160, there would be a regulatory vacuum leaving the state 
exposed to those risks. 422 
Another police power is a state's ability to determine land uses within its 
borders, which has long been considered a matter of exclusive state control. 423 
This power remains plenary even when it might be used to block construction 
420. !d. at 712 n.l57 ("[A] state under its regulatory authority could inquire into the prudence of 
investments by public utility companies into nuclear power reactors, and could exclude such investments 
from the rate base if they were determined to be imprudent," even if that resulted in "prevent[ing] the 
development of nuclear energy within the state .... [I]t is not clear that the federal government could 
compel a state to invest its resources in a losing venture."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673 
("By employing economic considerations to justify state laws that block the operation of nuclear power 
plants, even though safety is the genuine but undisclosed goal of such laws, state legislatures effectively 
can prevent the further development of nuclear energy within their jurisdictions."); Guastella, supra note 
I 0,. at 759 ("Two tests have traditionally been used by regulatory commissions for implementing this 
allocation of risk policy [between investors and ratepayers]. The prudent investment test disallows the 
use of plant costs in determining rates if the investment was imprudent in light of information that was 
reasonably available to management at the time the investment decision was made."). 
421. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 722 ("If, as the Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery, a 
congressional command that the states pay their public health and recreation employees a minimum 
wage must be struck down as a forbidden attempt to 'devour the essentials of state sovereignty,' then 
what is one to say of a congressional command that states invest their resources in nuclear energy rather 
than rely on a combination of fossil fuels, solar power, geothermal power and energy sources?" (quoting 
Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976))); id. ("If Congress requires California to 
open its gates to nuclear reactors, however, it is exercising a far more delicate power that, under 
National League of Cities, appears to call for extraordinary justification, such as a showing of 'an 
extremely serious problem which endanger[s] the well-being of all the component parts of our federal 
system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall."' (quoting Nat'/ 
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53)). 
422. See id. at 714 ("[S]tate requirements not directed at radiation safety would not be duplicative 
of federal efforts, and a holding of preemption in such a case would create a legal vacuum."); see also 
supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for an example of a regulatory gap. 
423. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing a state's traditional authority to regulate 
land use). 
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of a nuclear power p1ant.424 Additionally, a state has a legitimate interest in 
shielding its environment from hann and protecting its citizens from anxiety 
caused by the operation of a nuclear power plant. 425 To the extent it may be 
difficult to tease apart radiological impacts from other forms or causes of 
environmental harm and public anxiety, courts should give deference to a 
state's determination of where the dividing line should fall. 426 Therefore, the 
determination by Vermont in Act 160 that the continuing use of land within the 
state's borders for the use of V ennont Yankee is unwarranted because of 
potential harm to its citizens is an exercise of the state's traditional police 
powers. 
However, since a contrary federal interest can overcome the exercise of a 
state's police power authority,427 an argument might be made that Vermont 
Act 160 should be preempted because it could start a landslide of similar 
attempts by states to block the extension of their nuclear power plants' 
operating licenses. 428 This might undermine important national goals like 
achieving energy independence, maintaining a strong electric power grid, and 
avoiding the short-term need to build new coal-fired power plants.429 But even 
in the wake of Fukushima Daichii, several states have reiterated their 
424. See Baum, supra note 77, at 679 (noting many ways states can "prevent the development of 
nuclear power plants by means of stringent land use requirements, or by using the authority granted the 
states under the Clean Air Act Amendments of I 977"). 
425. See Tribe, supra note I 9, at 703...{)4 ("In order to meet its responsibilities towards its citizens 
for regulating public utilities, managing public resources, and maintaining public tranquility, and also its 
responsibilities towards future generations, a state has a duty and a right to: (I) require economy and 
efficiency in the generation of electricity, (2) minimize the economic and social burdens of nuclear 
reactor failure or catastrophe, (3) guarantee its citizens maximum peace of mind concerning nuclear 
energy activity, and (4) avoid irreconcilable conflict with sound principles of ecological management."); 
id. at 708 ("Other problems flow from the public anxiety inevitably associated with the manifest 
difficulties of this [nuclear waste] containment, and from the many tangible and troubling symptoms of 
social unrest to which such unrelieved anxiety can contribute."); see also Cavers, supra note 19, at 5 I 
(arguing that a state law banning construction of nuclear reactors near major population centers because 
of the anxiety this might cause city residents, regardless of the objective safety of a reactor "seems ... a 
purpose distinct from 'protection against radiation hazards,' ... [and] would be sheltered by subsection 
k against attack based on a theory of pre-emption"). 
426. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 877 (arguing that the court in Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. 
Bonsey, 107 F. Supp. 2d 47, 55-56 (D. Me. 2000), held "deference must be given to the state assertions 
that the state did not intend to regulate radiological areas, and, therefore, federal law did not preempt the 
state investigation"). 
427. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 55-56 ("Of course the asserted purpose must first be found an 
appropriate use of the state's police power .... Next, this state interest must be balanced against the 
equally justifiable federal interest in regulating the same subject."). 
428. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 450. 
429. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 679 ('The extent to which the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(AEA) allows the states to regulate the siting, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants is a 
question of great significance to the entire nation at a time when the rising costs of traditional fuels have 
caused suppliers and consumers alike to search for safe, economical, and reliable alternative sources of 
energy."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 665 (Pacific Gas and Silkwood allow "all the states to 
circumvent federal policy favoring continued development of nuclear energy by clearing the way for the 
enactment of stringent safety regulations, which can be used to block the operation of privately owned 
nuclear power plants."). 
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continuing commitment to nuclear power,430 in part because of the difficulty of 
building new coal-fired plants given Clean Air Act restrictions. Moreover, 
taking existing power plants offline has a cost: replacement power must be 
purchased, power failures may increase, and electricity prices will likely 
rise. 431 In the short term, only Vermont will bear the costs of its action, as it 
will need to find replacement power to assure uninterrupted service to Vermont 
Yankee's customers and will have to shoulder the cost of lost jobs and 
revenue. 432 These costs make it doubtful that many states will rush to follow 
Vermont's lead. Therefore, little disruption to the national grid would occur if 
only one state, Vermont, prevails in its attempt to close its nuclear plant. 
In the absence of a conflicting national policy requiring Vermont 
Yankee's continued operation, the presumption against preemption protects 
Vermont's decision to abandon what is becoming an unreliable and risky 
source of power. This presumption protects state laws enacted under a state's 
traditional police powers and can only be overcome by clear evidence of 
contrary congressional intent.433 A reliable supply of electric energy for its 
citizens falls within a state's traditional police power and is a matter of state, 
not federal, concern. 434 Vermont Act 160, which authorizes the state to 
exercise that power to assure its citizens of a reliable source of electric energy 
and, thus, protect their general welfare, is a legitimate use of the state's police 
power and, therefore, should not be preempted. 
Strong policy reasons underlying the presumption against preemption also 
support this conclusion, particularly the importance of maintaining states as 
robust centers of independent authority in our federal structures. Vermont's law 
reflects the state's interest in being an active player in the fate of its only 
nuclear reactor, and as the state's recent denial of a Clean Water Act section 
401 certification for plant discharges illustrates,435 Vermont offers its citizens 
the prospect of greater environmental protection than the national 
government.436 Given Vermont Yankee's accident record, the history of lax 
430. See Christa Marshall, Nuclear Revival Plans Continue in Some States, CLIMATEWIRE (March 
21, 20 II), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/20 11103/21/archive/4 (citing Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Iowa, Utah, and Missouri as states considering the nuclear option). 
431. See generally Matthew L. Wald, If Indian Point Closes, Plenty of Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 20 II, at A21; see also Patrick McGeehan, Dirtier Air and Higher Costs Possible if Indian Point 
Closes, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at Al9. 
432. See RICHARD W. HEAPS, NORTHERN ECONOMIC CONSULTING, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF THE VY STATION (2010), available at http://www.vtep.org%2Fstudies%2F!BEW%2520Heaps% 
2520VY%2520Economic%2520Report.pdf (discussing the economic benefits of Vermont Yankee, 
which presumably would be lost if the plant ceases operation). 
433. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text (describing the basic elements of the judicial 
presumption against preemption). 
434. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text (discussing the division of authority over 
nuclear power plants between the federal and state governments). 
435. See supra note 161. 
436. Cavers objects to a Minnesota law authorizing the state Board of Health to reject nuclear 
reactors that endanger public health because: 
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NRC oversight of its operation, and Entergy's dissembling information about 
the plant's problems, additional oversight by the state provides an overlapping 
layer of regulation and the chance to avoid re-experiencing the NRC's 
errors.437 Indeed, the state's denial of the section 401 certification corrected an 
error that the NRC made when it authorized the license extension without 
complying with section 401.438 Therefore, protecting Vermont Act 160 from 
federal preemption assures Vermont citizens a higher level of protection from 
potential environmental harm. 
Vermont Act 160 also promotes deliberative democracy.439 The law 
requires a "public engagement process," including at least three public 
meetings to discuss the issues raised by the public review of the plant. 440 This 
kind of public engagement in a governmental decision-making process can 
happen more easily and effectively at the state or local level, where access for 
citizens is more direct and immediate, and there is less likelihood of agency 
capture by large economic interests than at the federallevel. 441 Preempting the 
state law would foreclose such participation with the attendant risks of federal 
agency capture and the loss of public input into the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has largely settled the question of 
whether states should be robust centers of nuclear power plant regulation. 442 In 
Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Court effectively decentralized nuclear 
regulation. 443 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions affirmed that result despite 
unless Minnesota were prepared to rubber-stamp the AEC's decisions, its exercise of 
concurrent licensing power might actually result in the imposition of stricter controls than 
those imposed by the Federal agency" and would require a "parallel process be conducted 
before a state agency [that] would add to the already serious costs of the licensing process 
in terms of the applicant's time and man-power and might readily lead to expensive 
delays in getting the reactor built and into operation. 
Cavers, supra note 19, at 33-34. 
437. See supra notes 327-44 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of, and problems with, 
regulatory overlap). 
438. See supra note 161 (citing a GREENWIRE article discussing the state's lawsuit against the NRC 
for extending the plant's operating license without a water quality certificate or a waiver of the statutory 
requirement). 
439. See supra notes 351-58 and accompanying text (discussing how preemption squashes citizen 
participation in the process of governing). 
440. 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 160 § 4(b). 
441. See supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of public 
participation at the local level); supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text (noting the role of public 
participation in avoiding agency capture). 
442. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 684 ("The Court agreed that the Federal Government 'has 
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns' .... Consequently, state regulation of nuclear 
power plant construction based on public health and safety concerns 'would ... be in the teeth of the 
Atomic Energy Act's objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread 
development and use-and would be pre-empted for that reason."' (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,212-13 (1983))). 
443. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673-74 ("[B]ecause the Supreme Court sanctioned direct state 
regulation of all 'non-safety' matters, it effectively decentralized government decisionmaking over the 
nuclear power industry."); id. at 677 ("In Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Court reassessed the extent of 
federal preemption under the AEA and interpreted the Act to permit greater state authority over the 
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the strong federal interest in assuring nuclear reactor safety, achieving national 
energy independence and an uninterrupted supply of power for the country, and 
reducing the country's carbon footprint. 444 The Court may have done this in 
response to increasing public concern about nuclear safety445 or, perhaps, 
because it realized that concentrating nuclear regulation in the federal 
government might increase the likelihood of error and stifle regulatory 
creativity at the state level. 
Because of the desirability of having states as robust centers of 
governance and the strong tradition of preserving a state's traditional governing 
authority, absent a clear statement of preemptive intent in the AEA and 
conditions favoring preemption, Vermont should be free to choose the source 
of energy for its citizens.446 
C. Overcoming Collective Action Problems Created by Vermont Act 160 
Since Vermont Act 160 affects a single nuclear power plant, and not state 
regulatory standards or other plants, many of the arguments set forth in Part IV 
supporting preemption of state laws are inapplicable to the argument in this 
Article, such as the need for uniformity, the ability to achieve economies of 
scale at the national level, the avoidance of burdens on interstate commerce, 
and the need to facilitate interstate markets and resource management. 
nuclear power industry. The Court thus cleared the way for joint regulation of nuclear power plants by 
both the states and the NRC, notwithstanding the potential future impact of this policy upon the 
congressional desire to promote nuclear energy."). But see Cavers, supra note 19, at 31 n.7 ("Licensing 
and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as nuclear reactors-will remain the exclusive 
responsibility of the Commission. It is not intended to leave room for the exercise of dual or concurrent 
jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating by-product, source, or special nuclear 
materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed by the Commission, or by the State 
and local governments, but not by both."' (quoting S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-9 
(1959))). 
444. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 665 ("Despite its emphasis on the indirect effect of the 
regulations at issue, the Goodyear Atomic Court again provided specific precedent that allowed states to 
participate more significantly in the safety regulation of nuclear plants-an area inherently bound to 
national security and over which the states previously had been denied authority." (citing Goodyear 
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988))); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 
(1990) (holding the state law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not "fall within 
the pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases"). 
445. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 689-90 ("The Court's somewhat inconsistent positions in 
Pacific Gas, Silkwood, and Goodyear Atomic might best be interpreted when viewed in their historical 
context. Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has faced increasing public sensitivity to inadequate 
regulation by the NRC and, after the Three Mile Island accident, growing doubts about the safety of 
nuclear power. Aware of this public sentiment and under mounting pressure from state legislatures 
seeking to involve themselves in regulating nuclear safety, the Court in Silkwood and Goodyear Atomic 
may have decided to adopt an analytical interpretation of the AEA which broadens the permissible scope 
of state control over the nuclear industry."). 
446. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 82 ("[I]n keeping with the state-supportive presumption in 
preemption cases generally, the states themselves may determine priorities for types of power plants to 
be constructed within their borders. Until Congress 'unmistakably' declares a preference for a specific 
fuel source, which it has not yet done, the states should retain responsibility to monitor choices made 
initially by a public utility. In this way their traditional police power authority can best be maintained."). 
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However, Vermont's enactment of Act 160 was clearly motivated by its self-
interest. In all likelihood, the state based its assessment of its sole nuclear 
plant's costs, benefits, and risks on parochial concerns,447 ignoring benefits and 
harms beyond its borders. 448 This motivation provides a strong justification for 
federal preemption.449 Following Professors Glicksman and Levy's suggestion 
that a court should only find preemption when collective action problems could 
not be overcome, this Part examines whether Vermont Act 160 creates 
collective action problems and, if it does, whether those problems could be 
surmounted without the law's preemption.450 
Collective action problems may arise if Act 160 vested negative 
externalities on adjacent states or on the states as a whole. Since Vermont is not 
closing its borders to an unwanted land use, which another state or the federal 
government wants to locate there, its law is not forcing that unwanted land use 
and its harms onto another state;451 Vermont Yankee is not going to be 
relocated because the plant's only purpose is to provide power to local 
customers. Vermont's law will not have a direct impact on any other state's 
treatment of nuclear power plants. Nor will national regulations that might 
affect some regulatory threshold result from Vermont Act 160. Thus, allowing 
Vermont Act 160 to stay in effect will not create a barrier to the location of 
nuclear plants in other states or the location of non-nuclear plants in Vermont. 
So, no other state will suffer lost positive externalities and Vermont Act 160 
44 7. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 70 I ("States, observing nuclear power from a localized point of 
view, inevitably base their safety estimations on parochial concerns. They may very well overemphasize 
the risk of a severe nuclear accident, since this would profoundly affect the population within their 
borders."). 
448. See id. ("While states overemphasize the likelihood of a nuclear disaster, they simultaneously 
de-emphasize the significant environmental benefits of nuclear energy. Many of these benefits would be 
external to state borders and thus apparent only from a national or global perspective."); id. at 702 
(California's nuclear moratorium law "may have forced California to import electricity from states in the 
Northwest. Production of this electricity may severely pollute the Northwest, but leave the Californian 
environment untouched."); id. ("In Northern States Power, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals 
anticipated state overregulation of nuclear power," and "enforced federal preemption of state nuclear 
regulation because '[states] might conceivably be so overprotective in the area of health and safety as to 
unnecessarily stultifY the industrial development and use of atomic energy for the production of electric 
power."' (quoting N. States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 
405 U.S. 1035 (1972))). 
449. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 930 ("[F]ederal action is necessary or justified 
when state regulation is unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the perspective of the 
United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual states and the interests of the states as a 
collective run in different directions."); Cavers, supra note 19, at 51 ("If the reactor were simply a part 
of an electric power system, ministering to no special federal objectives in its particular location, I 
should not be surprised if the authority of the state were held to prevail."). But see Tribe, supra note 19, 
at 723 ("[E]ven if California's nuclear provisions were to result in the exclusion of nuclear reactors-a 
wholly speculative possibility-they should not, solely for that reason, be deemed preempted by federal 
law."). 
450. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 647-48. 
451. Conceivably, as a seller of wholesale power to customers in other states, the loss of that power 
or any increase in its costs could hurt those out-of-state consumers. But it is assumed that Vermont 
would be able to produce or purchase replacement power, thus eliminating any such harm. 
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will not create any transboundary pollution. Indeed, shuttering Vermont 
Yankee eliminates that likelihood.452 This is also not a situation involving 
resource pooling--creating incentives for other states to free ride on the efforts 
of Vermont-or resource harding-giving Vermont an unfair advantage. 
Therefore, Vermont Act 160 does not create any collective action problems for 
other states or the country as a whole. 
While Vermont's citizens may benefit from the shutdown of Vermont 
Yankee to the extent that they are protected from unwanted future costs or 
health risks, the state will also suffer costs, such as the need to buy or develop 
replacement power, the loss of plant-related jobs, and the loss of state revenue 
from plant operation. 453 Vermont might even find itself subject to a takings 
claim should it deny a certificate of public good for the plant. 454 
Therefore, any collective action problems attributable to Vermont's law, 
on closer examination, disappear. Vermont alone will bear the costs and 
benefits of its action. There is no reason to expect other states to follow 
Vermont's lead by also blocking the extension of their nuclear plants' operating 
licenses. Even if they do, this dynamic may be a valuable communication tool 
causing the NRC to rethink its policy of automatically granting license 
extensions-a reason why Congress, in the AEA, preserved a sphere of state 
regulation of nuclear power plants when their operation directly affects a state's 
traditional police power concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
The AEA should not preempt Vermont Act 160. Vermont's law falls 
452. The plant would be decommissioned and dismantled in accordance with NRC rules and the 
remaining fuel would be sent to a licensed waste repository or stored onsite. 
453. See generally HEAPS, supra note 432. Vermont may also not be able to recoup these costs in 
the rate base. See Guastella, supra note 10, at 759 ("The second test is the used and useful test, which 
excludes from the rate base the costs of a plant that is not providing service. In reality, it is not a test at 
all. The principle strips the regulatory body of any discretion and denies recovery regardless of whether 
the investment was prudent, without regard to the potentially devastating effect such a decision might 
have on a utility."). 
454. See Guastella, supra note 10, at 763 (discussing Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 454 A.2d 
435 (1982), which found a decision by the state public utility commission prohibiting the expenditure of 
capital received in "a routine stock issuance, on construction of Unit II of the Seabrook nuclear facility" 
a regulatory taking because it "effectively precluded completion of the project"); id. at 760-61 (New 
York's Used and Useful law when "combined with the state's new anti-Shoreham policies, appear[ed] to 
unreasonably defeat the investment expectations of LILCO. LILCO shareholders would be injured by 
receiving no return on their investment in an operational nuclear plant for which the state, through past 
participation and support, was partly responsible. Management and investors relied on this government 
cooperation and the prudent investment rule. It now appears they were misled by the state and county, 
which have embarked on policies of active opposition to Shoreham."); see also Shattuck, supra note 17, 
at 267 ("To saddle a utility with the costs of a political change of mind by a state or local government, 
and to allow their consequent nonparticipation in emergency planning to become a de facto veto after 
hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent, makes no more sense than telling people with a 
rector in their backyard that they must not think the unthinkable and must not worry over how to get 
out."). 
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squarely within the state's traditional police power preserved in the AEA and is 
consistent with federalism principles. State participation in the regulation of 
nuclear plants has not been expressly preempted by the AEA, nor has the NRC 
totally occupied the field of nuclear power plant regulation. Absent a statutory 
mandate supporting the national development of commercial nuclear power 
plants, the AEA creates no obstacle to a state wishing to pursue alternative 
forms of power. The conflation of economic and radiological safety concerns 
that underlie the AEA underlie nuclear power itself-radiological safety cannot 
easily be separated from a state's concerns about the economic wellbeing of its 
citizens, nor should it be. Preserving Vermont's capacity to say no to the 
continued operation of Vermont Yankee protects the state's exercise of its 
traditional police power authorities and preserves it as a robust center of 
governance-a useful check on federal excesses and errors and a source of new 
ideas for solving regulatory problems. The only valid justification for 
preemption of state authority in a circumstance such as this is to prevent 
collective action problems, but there are none here that would harm other states 
or the nation. 
Vermont should be allowed to protect its citizens from what it perceives as 
a potential economic and environmental harm. Vermont Yankee is no different 
from any other type of plant a state public service commission determines is 
imprudent. Indeed, in an era where there are many power generation choices, to 
saddle Vermont with a plant that has been accident prone, poorly managed, and 
costly, based upon decisions made nearly half a century ago, would be unwise 
and unfortunate. This is certainly not what the Framers intended when 
establishing the federalism balance that envisioned states as coequal partners 
with the federal government in the business of governing. 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org. 
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq. 
